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Available literature showed that the Egyptian diaspora (e.g., emigrants who share a 
common situations and work for the same cause) has been developing and engaging 
politically in the United States during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The diasporas’ role 
was of interest to researchers and policymakers; however, the literature concerning 
diasporas has underexamined the Egyptian diaspora regarding its proliferation and active 
political engagement. Using the conflict and climate theories of Truman, and Cigler and 
Loomis in conjunction with the political engagement factors theory of Jang as the 
theoretical foundation of the study, the purpose was to explore how members of the 
diaspora explain and perceive their political engagement in Washington, DC. In this 
qualitative study, the key characteristics of diaspora and political and social factors of 
home and host countries that enable and inhibit that engagement regarding particular 
issues were addressed through 16 in-depth, face-to-face interviews with Egyptian-
Americans. Maxwell and Miller’s doubled-strategy and Yin’s case study steps approach 
were used for analysis. The findings indicated that the engagement of the diaspora except 
Coptic and some Islamic groups are passive most of the time because of the political 
home culture; despite that fact, the diaspora became active for a short time because of the 
Egyptian revolution. Future research should exam those aspects to better understand the 
mechanism of building an Egyptian lobby to work continuously and effectively on 
Egyptian interests in the United States. The diaspora and policymakers may use the study 
results to help improve the role of this diaspora to impose positive social changes in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The topic of the study was the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in 
the United States in the context of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the events that 
followed, including the 2013 revolution. The focus of the study was on the politically 
active Egyptian population in the Washington, DC metropolitan area employing the 
Alliance of Egyptian Americans (AEA) group as a representative case for that 
population. The 2011 revolution began as demonstrations on January 25, 2011, Egyptian 
National Police Day, with an announced goal of social and political reforms (Heggy, 
2011) The Egyptian diaspora abroad supported the protesters (Müller-Funk, 2016, pp. 
357-358). February 11, 2011 marked the end of the 30 years of the Mubarak regime 
(Heggy, 2011).  
The protesters assumed this triumph marked the complete end of that era, and a 
new goal emerged: a civic regime in Egypt; however, according to Heggy (2011), later in 
2011, it became clear that although Mubarak had gone, the regime itself was only 
weakened, not toppled. People kept demonstrating widely, demanding “social justice, 
freedom, and welfare” (Heggy, 2011). The 2011 revolutionary triumph was followed by 
consequences: A military rule was instituted preventing democratic transition (Habatamu, 
2017, p. 44). The Muslim Brotherhood ruled the country for one year; however, the 
second revolution on June 30, 2013, against them followed this event.  
Researchers disagree over whether June 30 was a revolution or rather a coup. 
There is also significant disagreement on whether 2011 was a revolution or a foreign 
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conspiracy that was based on hidden cooperation between the Western states and 
domestic Islamic powers. Regardless of that disagreement, there is a lack of national as 
well as international consensus on whether both events were beneficial or harmful to the 
country. The study-collected data will provide evidence to support these substantive 
statements later in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The 2011 revolution also caused tremendous changes in the role and influence of 
the domestic Egyptian political powers and civil society as well as the role and influence 
of Egyptians living abroad (El-Saeed, 2012). The main assumption of my study was that 
the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have had significant effects on the Egyptian group living 
abroad—their interests as well as their political engagement. I tested this assumption 
based on my study participants’ answers to the interview questions. The 2011 revolution 
and several changes in the Egyptian ruling administrations have imposed profound and 
broad changes in Egyptians’ political attitudes and engagement inside Egypt and abroad 
(Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 8). Severo and Zuolo (2012) cited Médam’s summary of the 
changing status of this diaspora as “still fluid, shifting, [and] floating” (p. 7).  
Having said that, I found that comparing the Egyptian case to other diasporas such 
as the Korean and Jewish diasporas can be beneficial. Jang’s (2012, 2014) work 
contributed to the base of my theoretical foundation. About the Korean case, Jang (2014) 
wrote, “Scholars as well as the Korean community leaders posit that Koreans are 
becoming more politically conscious and have been since the 1992 Los Angeles riot” (p. 
634). Similarly, the Egyptian diaspora had a historic event that affected its style of 
political engagement and social changes.  
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There are many essential differences between the Korean and Egyptian cases; 
however, a similar situation—lack of interest in political engagement and a remarkable 
event or historic turning point—happened in both cases. Regarding the relatively small 
size of both diasporas, the Korean American population in the United States is much 
bigger than the Egyptian one but is still smaller than Mexican and Cuban diasporas. As I 
will explain in detail, great changes affecting the typical passive attitude of both 
populations have occurred. However, one of the differences between the two cases is that 
the event was local in the Korean case (i.e., the 1992 Los Angeles riots against Korean 
businesses) and involved non-Koreans, while in the Egyptian case; the event (i.e., the 
2011 Cairo massive demonstrations against the national regime) occurred on Egyptian 
land and involved only Egyptians. In the next chapter, I will discuss a number of factors 
that might explain differences in political behavior between the Korean and Egyptian 
diasporas. 
This study was necessary because of its potential social and political implications. 
The study findings could enable the diaspora members to maximize benefits to their 
country’s economic welfare and political interests in Washington, DC by lobbying the 
U.S. government in a consistent, organized, and professional manner. As suggested by 
Filipovic, Devjak, and Ferfila (2012), one of the primary interests of the policy makers of 
countries became the cooperation between them and their local diasporas dealing with 
diaspora and development-related issues such as promoting of networks and strategic 
alliances (pp. 7-8). The results of the study can be used to call for improving better 
cooperation between the Egyptian diaspora and the diasporas of other countries, the home 
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and host lands, and the Egyptian diaspora members themselves. Active diaspora should 
support the social progress inside the homeland regarding several concerns, such as 
human rights in Egypt. In this study, I will also offer suggestions for future research so 
that ethnic minorities could contribute to building a stronger democracy in increasingly 
diversifying societies.  
In this chapter, I introduce the current situation of the Egyptian diaspora and its 
political appearance and engagement. The chapter includes the background of the 
diaspora studies related to the scope of this study to better understand the Egyptian 
diaspora problem. The nature of the study, its significance, limitations, and definition of 
terms are also provided in the chapter.  
Background of the Study 
Jang’s (2014) Korean diaspora study provided the substructure for my study of 
the Egyptian diaspora case. As I mentioned before, both cases have several similarities 
that I will detail. Jang studied the Korean diaspora showing its characteristics as well as 
its typical passive engagement and the new positive changes in that engagement. Jang’s 
exploratory study on Korean political engagement in Washington, DC is the modified 
brief of the author’s 2012 dissertation. According to Jang (2014), building upon 
framework of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), the study applied qualitative 
grounded theory approach to examine how members of the Korean diaspora Washington, 
D.C., provided meaning to their political engagement on their own words. The theory of 
Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad addressed the aforementioned general, known factors of 
place, type of group, and organizational type.  
5 
 
For that purpose, Jang (2012, 2014) addressed several known factors that could be 
related to diasporas in general, then generated new factors that are related to the Korean 
diaspora in particular. Those factors all influence that desired engagement in different 
ways or levels. Jang built the theory or model inductively (i.e., it was empirically based 
on the reciprocal relationships among the data collected from interviewing study 
participants). 
In this study, I used a combination of the theory of Jang (2012, 2014) on the 
political engagement of the Korean diaspora in particular and Ramakrishnan and 
Bloemraad’s (2008) theory for the general political engagement factors. This 
combination constituted the major components of my own theoretical framework for 
building my study and its findings inductively about the Egyptian diaspora, assuming a 
valid comparison between the Korean and Egyptian cases. Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 
suggested other factors that have been found to encourage and discourage political 
engagement of ethnic Koreans in Washington, DC, including underestimation of the 
self’s political engagement, lack of strong ownership toward the host lands, and negative 
perception toward politics (Jang, 2014). Jang (2012, 2014) addressed these new factors 
inductively based on the personal perceptions of the participants while giving much 
attention to several elements such as religion. I will explain these factors and others in 
detail in Chapter 2. 
Another justification for drawing comparisons between the Korean-American 
diaspora and the Egyptian diaspora is a special quality of the framework for Jang’s 
examination of political engagement of ethnic Koreans: It focused on a significant 
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weakness, which was the negative relationship between the church institution and 
politics. This central finding of Jang’s study might be in contrast with my assumption in 
this study about the Egyptian diaspora or might support it. As I will detail in Chapter 2, 
the emphasis on places of worship is essential for 21st-century diaspora political 
mobilization in the United States and, therefore, was one of the focuses of my research 
hypotheses.  
Jang’s (2014) research is also related to the scope of my study at several other 
points. Jang explored new factors and characteristics that were not mentioned in the 
literature, and in my study, I tested their appropriateness to the Egyptian case. According 
to Sheffer’s (2006) data, the Korean and Egyptian groups are incipient diasporas and not 
old or historical in the United States. In different words, the Korean and Egyptian groups 
are different from other, older groups, such as the Jewish or Cubans, and the Korean and 
Egyptian groups might have similar time and push factors for immigration. Considering 
both diasporas as incipient should not mean that they are similar in total. They are still 
different for a variety of reasons including the difference between their home countries in 
many aspects, such as size population size and economy.  
The general tone of Jang’s (2014) study is negative regarding the past and current 
image of Koreans’ political engagement. The factors Jang listed, tested, or modified 
implied a deficiency in engagement level and activities. My personal experience and 
readings in the available literature and resources gave me the same impression about the 
Egyptian diaspora; however, I tested the correctness of this essential impression and will 
provide more details on the results in Chapters 2, 4, and 5. Jang gave some 
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recommendations for a better future but did not provide promising indicators that the 
Korean diaspora future would be different. Hence, it would be more rational and practical 
to employ that model (i.e., negative failure factors, or at least, unstable engagement) than 
to use a model of positive factors or successful diaspora such as the Armenian or Jewish.  
On the other hand, both the Egyptian and Korean cases have a specific turning 
point--the racial discrimination and Los Angeles riot in 1992 in the Korean case, and the 
revolutions against Mubarak’s rule in January 2011 as well as the Muslim Brotherhood 
group in June and July 2013 in the Egyptian case. I found that these events are indeed 
critical in the formation of the Egyptian American diaspora as well as its polarization and 
weakness and, therefore, was significant. The respective turning points imposed notable 
changes on the political and social engagement of both diasporas; however, the changes 
from the first Egyptian revolutionary event were different from those of the latter as I 
explained in the Chapter 2.  
Jang (2014) found that this external factor, the 1992 riot in Los Angeles, changed 
the typical Korean passive attitude (p. 634). Ban and Adams (1997) urged Korean 
communities and leaders to stop being isolated socially and financially from the other 
racial minorities. The authors recommended those communities to “make effort to live in 
harmony with their neighbors of other color…participate actively in various events 
occurring in their neighboring minority communities …and to announce…actively, 
their…positive aspects of their lives as American citizens” (pp. 75–76). 
I expected Jang’s (2012, 2014) findings to support my idea that external factors 
(i.e., the revolution event) can change the traditional, passive characteristics of diaspora 
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and make for more engagement. However, regarding the nature of the turning points, I 
had to account for the differences in these cases. Korean Americans were attacked in the 
United States, whereas Egypt is far away from the United States. Therefore, I intended to 
focus exclusively on the abstract idea of the effect of the external factors in general (i.e., 
the sudden event or turning point) and its impact on a diaspora’s negative or positive 
change. In addition, Jang’s grounded theory design showed that not all factors apply 
equally to all diaspora groups and members. For example, the influence of a language 
barrier on Latinos, Koreans, and Mexicans was different. Jang clarified the different 
relationship between the religion factor and political engagement of ethnic Koreans in 
DC. With a practical study, Jang sought ways of improving the typical, limited 
engagement. 
However, generalization of Jang’s (2012, 2014) findings is still possible. Jang’s 
findings contribute to the development of theory building for studies on the political 
engagement of ethnically diverse groups because the author offered propositions that 
other researchers can test and apply to the theory-building process in the political science 
discipline. In particular, Jang’s (2014) findings suggest areas for future research on 
whether non-church-affiliated Koreans also do not contribute politically (p. 649). In the 
Egyptian case, many non-church-or non-mosque-affiliated Egyptians are also not 
politically active. Of course, in the Egyptian case, the reason is not always or only the 
politically passive stand of the religious institution or the separation between politics and 
religion. Before my study provided evidence to support this statement, it would not be 
accurate to conclude anything about whether Washington, DC-area mosques, and Muslim 
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religious organizations facilitate Egyptian Americans’ mobilization or not. Egyptian 
Americans generally might not be active because of other several factors related to the 
diaspora in general.   
Jang (2012, 2014) did not detail the differences in the religious impact on Korean 
political involvement based on the differences among the three types of Korean church, 
the Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists, and sectarian conflicts. Jang just used a general 
term, the Korean Church. In a similar way, I addressed the impact of religion without 
regard to the type of the church and mosque, their different stances, and any level of 
sectarian conflict among them that might include the distrust and dislike seen between 
many Egyptian Christians and Muslims in this study. However, the particular question of 
the likelihood of political contribution by non-church-or non-mosque-affiliated Egyptians 
needed to be addressed by the interview questions as an essential part of my scope.  
Although Jang (2014) found that the relationship between religious affiliation and 
political engagement was negative or lost in the Korean case because the church was 
strong enough to prevent mixing politics with faith, I did not assume the same could be 
applied to the Egyptian case, particularly for the mosques. According to Jang (2014), the 
high level of involvement in religious institutions has a strong positive influence on 
political involvement for Muslims and Arabs. In contrast, the Korean diaspora does not 
show this level of relationship (Jang, 2014).  
In calling for social change in the diaspora population, Jang (2014) recommended 
increasing the impact of the religion factor toward more political involvement to make 
that social change. Because the majority of Koreans are affiliated with their churches, 
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church and community leaders should be open to collaborating to find ways of enabling 
their Christian community and especially encouraging the younger generation to engage 
politically without harming their beliefs (Jang, 2014, p. 649). I challenged Jang’s call in 
application to the Egyptian diaspora due to the differences in the respective roles of 
Korean and Egyptian religious institutions. The problematic nature of the role of mosques 
comes from their refusing the separation between the state and religion. According to 
Pratt (2005), this separation does not exist in the Islamic Arabic culture, and in fact, 
Islamic cultural concepts include the invention of political Islam (p. 74).   
My claim was contrary to the social change that Jang (2014) looks for. The social 
and political role (i.e., other than worship) of the mosques is stronger than the Korean 
church role because some mosques are involved in politics intensively (Jang, 2014). 
Many governments do not welcome this role and consider it harmful; therefore, the 
desired social change for the diaspora reality and mosques might need to be directed 
toward decreasing that extra role. In other words, the role that mosques can fill to help the 
home country as well host communities is to act as the Korean church does. They might 
need to be limited to the basic traditional role, which is the pure worship, as many 
governments such as the Egyptian government wish.  
This raises the question of why mosque involvement could be detrimental in some 
cases and times. I investigated the outreach activities and political role of some mosques 
as well as the American government and local societal attitudes toward those activities in 
the literature review in Chapter 2 and data collection report in Chapter 4. Contemporary 
religious movements and groups are a form of politicized religion, and this means that 
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they pragmatically manipulate the religion as a political medium and combine it with an 
efficacious tactic of violence, seeking to educate and change the face and values of 
jahiliyyah (i.e., “conscious ignorance”) of societies to obtain political power (Friedland, 
2011, pp. 66-67, 75). The minimum outcome that the radical Islamists fight for can be 
seen as achieving the governance and religionization of the society and nation-states 
(Friedland, 2011, p. 66). According to Benard (2008), “Mosque-state separation and 
religious freedom appear to have stalled in Muslim-majority countries, leading scholars, 
theologians, and policymakers to conclude that a theocratic model of governance [such as 
Iran after 1979] is inevitable for the Islamic world” (p. 65). Maybe some Muslim and 
non-Muslim countries have realized these facts, but others still try to ignore or resist 
them.  
Hypothetically, the desirable features in the Korean American case regarding 
activating the involvement of religious or worship institutes in the political realm to 
lobby for South Korea could be not the same for the Egyptian case. In the results and 
conclusions chapter, I dealt with whether such a hypothesis can be ultimately proved or 
disproved. The religion factor will be addressed by the interview instrument questions. 
Mehrez and Hamdy (2010, p. 250) composed one of the few studies on the 
Egyptian diaspora; it concerned one type, the skilled diaspora, focusing on the 
professional members residing in different regions. The scope of the study was limited to 
the diaspora-homeland relationships only. That particular sector, the well-educated and 
skilled members of the diaspora, is capable of supporting the country in many areas: 
investment, human resources, technology transfer, medical facilities, and charity (Mehrez 
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& Hamdy, 2010). The authors examined whether and how the skilled diaspora 
contributes to the development of Egypt and what are the potential sorts of the desired 
contributions.  
Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) gave several indications about the diaspora 
characteristics and its social engagement abroad; however, the authors also inquired 
about to what degree and in which areas the skilled diasporas could engage in efforts in 
their host communities to benefit their parent country, Egypt. Similarly, the scope of my 
study was limited to certain types of the diaspora members based on their location, 
education level, political interest, and other affiliations. This implies that I was focused 
on the members who have attributes that can make them a leader or political activist, such 
as native-level equivalent influence in English, high education, high income, and so on. 
Having said that, the results of this study might also support the assumption of Ceschi, 
Coslovi, Mora, and Stocchiero (2005), who stated that the Egyptian diaspora could be 
able to canalize new migrants for working purposes; however, formalization of its social 
role can be also an effective action insinuating excellent political relevance (p. 53). 
Chapter 4 showed whether the Egyptian diaspora members support the new immigrants 
or not as an aspect of the engagement and loyalty to the homeland.  
Based on the previously summarized research literature related to the scope of the 
study topic, there is a gap in this existing literature needed to be covered. Jang (2014) 
commented on this gap, stating, “ [the] body of literature on the political engagement of 
ethnically diverse publics is growing, however, research on this population remain less 
compared to native-born, as many immigrants are not yet U.S. citizens” (p. 630). One of 
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the underresearched ethnic groups is the Egyptian. The major need was to know how the 
Egyptian diaspora behaves regarding its proliferation and fall, in particular its political 
performance. What makes this group or some of its members develop and engage or 
disengage in the U.S. political sphere and why that engagement concurs at intervals 
needed to be explored. As Sheffer (2006) said, “such studies are necessary to facilitate 
assessment of the potential for diaspora’s further development” (p. 250). 
One of the major factors behind that style of engagement is the salient external 
factor, the 2011 and 2013 revolutions in Egypt. There is a need to explore what was 
known as typical about the Egyptian diaspora before that turning point has, for several 
reasons, been changed during and after the revolutions. What has been changed in 
Egyptians’ political life abroad and whether that change has continued or waned after the 
revolution also needed to be explored. Some of the literature, such as Severo and Zuolo 
(2012), has addressed the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its impact on the country as well 
as the region; however, the current literature has not mentioned the impact on Egyptians 
abroad and their political development. Severo and Zuolo asserted that the revolution has 
changed the diaspora positively (pp. 3-4). They also thoroughly explored the revolution’s 
impact on the Egyptian e-diaspora (i.e., websites of the Egyptian emigrant community) 
all over the world, but did not focus on an actual (i.e., not online) diaspora in a specific 
geographic area such as the United States—their scope was wide and global.  
As the diaspora is subject to the influence of several factors and parties on one 
hand; on the other hand, it can be an effective factor influencing the political bodies, 
environment, and foreign politics of the homeland and host land. According to Sheffer 
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(2006), new world disorder can in part be attributed to diasporas themselves and their 
good or bad agendas and conflicts so that dispersed groups deserve additional 
investigation. The historically active Jewish diasporas, the incipient Iraqi diasporas 
before 2003, and Russians after 1990 are all examples of that role and importance for the 
world at different times (Sheffer, 2006, p. 248).  
This significant status of diasporas is not limited to the Egyptian diaspora. 
Diasporaism is an extreme case in general because of the globalization implementations 
and critical complex social and political circumstances of diasporas (Sheffer, 2006, p. 
249). This extreme status should impose the present and future need to study issues such 
as the nature of the diaspora identities and loyalty patterns. These last two issues connect 
to another issue: the confrontation and challenges that diasporas can cause to both types 
of governments, the host and home. Sheffer (2006) urged future researchers to answer the 
question of “whether or not we currently have strategies adequate to reduce the tensions 
and conflicts associated with such groups” (p. 249). 
Problem Statement  
The problem was that the Egyptian diaspora is not continually active with 
unpredictable political and social behavior because of unknown factors that need to be 
addressed with research. As Severo and Zuolo (2012) have said, “Few studies have been 
carried out on Egyptians abroad, and the majority concerns the link between remittances 
and development. In particular, very few of the studies are recent and focus on [diaspora] 
political or lobbying role” (p. 7). There is a scarcity of empirical, updated information on 
the Egyptian diaspora’s characteristics and the connection between those inherent, 
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influential characteristics and the external engagement factors (Müller-Funk, 2016, pp. 
353). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to close the gap of a clear understanding of 
a comprehensive model for the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora as well as 
political engagement factors in Washington, DC in particular.  
In general, researchers have noted the importance of diasporas’ influence on the 
formulation of foreign policy in the diaspora’s home and host countries (Ambrosio, 
2002). Diasporas are an influential player in many host states, especially in democratic 
states such as the United States, and they will play a growing role; however, not all 
diasporas and lobbies are equal concerning this influential role (Ambrosio, 2002). 
Existing research has delineated multiple factors that increase or decrease the diasporas’ 
role and ability to exercise their power. However, I noticed that the existing literature’s 
stance toward some incipient (i.e., groups at initial stage) and new ethnic diaspora groups 
is different, and toward the Egyptian diaspora is very different, if not insufficient. Some 
studies offered a panoramic image, and others focused on some key diasporas only, such 
as the Jewish and Cubans.  
Available research that considers the Egyptian diaspora is limited to two major 
types. Most of the research, such as Dickinson (2008) on the Egyptian diaspora, focused 
on the Coptic sector as a unique group in the United States. The other type focused on the 
relationship between the diaspora and home countries, which consists mostly of financial 
contribution (Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 7). Most studies on political engagement were 
conducted on White or Anglo ethnic (i.e., native-born), ignoring or not focusing enough 
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on other groups such as the incipient Korean diasporas (Jang, 2012) and Pakistani 
diasporas or the relatively new and growing groups such as Egyptian.  
For known and unknown reasons, the Egyptian diaspora used to be a passive 
group but became very active in Egypt and abroad during and right after the recent 
Egyptian revolution based on its action and reaction to the removal of Mubarak (Severo, 
& Zuolo, 2012, p. 9). Despite the growing number of some diasporas and their 
tremendous immigration waves, the Egyptian diaspora is not very active; therefore, it is 
being ignored by governments and researchers. I will explain different factors behind this 
situation. 
The relatively small size—approximately less than quarter a million in the United 
States as of 2013 (Migration Policy Institute [MPI], 2015)—and weak influence of the 
Egyptian diaspora might be another reason for being ignored by the researchers. 
However, the population of Egyptian immigrants has grown recently because of several 
reasons, including the 9/11/2001 event and its offspring. Therefore, it becomes 
increasingly important to understand how those newcomers experience the acculturation 
process in their new host land (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 3). The increase in diaspora 
populations in U.S. society has influenced the engagement of some diasporas positively 
compared to some other large-population diasporas (Jang, 2014). Therefore, there is a 
growing academic interest in the diasporas and interest groups (Filipovic et al., 2012, p. 
49).  
However, an initial review of the literature revealed the growing number of new 
citizens, good opportunities for political practicing in the U.S. welcoming sphere, and 
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other positive factors. Despite this observation, little is known about the political 
engagement influence of specific groups, such as the new or small ethnic groups on the 
formulation of American foreign policy (Jang 2014; Ramakrishna & Espenshade, 2001; 
Sheffer, 2006). This finding shows that my research problem itself focuses on some 
meaningful gaps in the research-based literature that my work helped to fill. Such 
literature has led to more interest in and recognition of the need to study the factors of 
political engagement of some particular incipient or new diasporas and migrant groups, 
especially in Washington, DC (Jang, 2012, 2014), including the Egyptian diaspora. 
Therefore, there was awe need to explore and understand whether that Egyptian diaspora 
could have potential engagement, influence, and success.  
Purpose of the Study  
The qualitative case study approach is designed to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of a specific phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). The general rationale for this 
research paradigm is the need to understand how some factors regarding that 
phenomenon happen and work in one way or another. Based on that chosen general 
methodological frame and the study problem, in this study, I responded to the need for 
clearer understanding of whether and how, based on its characteristics and related 
external factors, the Egyptian diaspora engages in and contributes to the political process. 
That political process, in particular, concerns some contemporary Egyptian political 
issues and the U.S. foreign policy toward those issues, which was addressed by the 
research questions.  
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Hypothetically, the Egyptian diaspora reacts to the Egyptian national events and 
not acts or has initiatives. Therefore, the engagement of the diaspora is temporary and 
takes a model of waves that need to be understood. Understanding this pattern should 
explain whether that diaspora could have potential engagement, influence, and success; 
therefore, the study aims to understand that general model of the characteristics of the 
Egyptian diaspora; its political engagement factors and style in Washington, DC, in 
particular; and the interactive relation between the characteristics and factors. Hence, the 
research and interview questions were developed to explore the political engagement 
interests and issues of the Egyptian diaspora addressing topics, such as Egyptian 
immigration to America, good governance and democracy, mixing religion and politics 
and terrorism, and the Egypt–U.S. relationship. 
In this study, I explored those issues that were of interest for the diaspora 
members (i.e., the study participants) and could indicate their political engagement within 
their time context. That time context and boundary was the 2011 revolution against 
Mubarak’s regime and 2013 events against the short rule of the Muslim Brotherhood-
imposed changes regarding these issues and how the Egyptian diaspora interacts with 
them. Therefore, I interviewed different types of people, such as those who have founded 
organizations and those who attend mosques or churches infrequently, regularly, or very 
frequently. The interview questions addressed this religious affiliation as an independent 




In sum, the purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore, 
describe, and share information regarding the political engagement of the Egyptian 
diaspora and its different members and subgroups in Washington, DC before and after the 
revolutions. Another goal was to determine the key joined internal and external factors 
that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement regarding particular issues or forms.  
The 2011 revolution was the major factor that I explored in this study regarding its 
impact on diaspora engagement behavior. The pivotal focus on this factor was inspired by 
Jang’s (2014) study but aligning closer with Jang’s focus on the existential threat Korean 
Americans felt following the Los Angeles riots was not the only basis of this focus. There 
was also a need to explore and test my hypothesis about the shift in the Egyptian diaspora 
attitude. To do that, I employed a known factor—the revolution—that was of crucial 
importance in relation to the development of and change in the diaspora’s engagement. 
Other factors were also explored and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.    
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the 
joint effect of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution 
organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S. 
environment elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host country) 
of political engagement and the internal factors (i.e., small size, negative 
perception of politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the 
institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in 
Washington, DC society? 
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Research Question 2: How did the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act 
and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns, such 
as the Egyptian revolution and the following presidential elections?   
Theoretical Foundation 
My theoretical foundation was based on a combination of those theories 
concerning three connected wings: the diaspora proliferation, characteristics, and factors 
of their engagement as I mentioned in the purpose section. The essential theoretical 
framework of my study was Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory on the Korean diaspora. Jang’s 
model was the basis for generating my pattern of meanings and themes of the Egyptian 
diaspora case. Nevertheless, I explored additional proliferation and engagement factors 
derived from different cases other than Jang’s model, such as the Ethiopian case. 
Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) highlighted the place, group type, and 
organization type as three factors that could affect the civic and political engagement of 
ethnic groups (Jang, 2012, p. 42). Jang’s (2014) new model examined some of these 
factors. Building upon the theoretical framework of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, Jang 
also developed new factors pertinent to the Korean diaspora’s political engagement, such 
as the lack of organization and religious institutions (p. 637). According to Jang’s theory, 
the Korean diaspora has not had a sense of how they might be active in meaningful ways, 
and they have lacked opportunities to engage in political conversations. Jang’s model 
includes factors that were mainly relevant to why the diaspora was not very engaging or 
influential. Not all elements are found to have direct or similar influence on the level of 
political involvement for diasporas (Jang, 2014, p. 633).  
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Jang’s (2014) theory is the modified application of Ramakrishnan and 
Bloemraad’s model of the general political engagement factors (p. 629). Jang extended 
and refined that original theory of diaspora political engagement in order to generate a 
theory on the Korean diaspora inductively at the end of a qualitative study. That theory 
examined factors that might encourage or inhibit ethnic Koreans’ political engagement as 
well as ways in which they make meaning of political engagement. 
It should be noted that the debate in the literature debate on the diaspora 
definitions and identification relates to diaspora proliferation and development. I found 
that the theories of identification and proliferation included and were related to the 
factors and employed strategies of the political engagement of diasporas. In particular, 
Cigler and Loomis (2007) briefly showed some theories of the proliferation of ethnic 
interest groups, including the seminal theory of Truman. Those studies on diaspora 
proliferation and ethnic political engagement have identified diaspora characteristics and 
factors to explain the existence of opportunities for some ethnic and dispersed groups to 
be politically influential in the U.S. environment (Cigler & Loomis, 2007).  
As I will detail in Chapter 2, when leaders and members act, the diaspora emerges 
somewhere and vice versa, leaders emerge, and members act when diaspora comes to the 
real world. In different words, “Diasporas have to be invented and mobilized in order to 
come into existence” (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 315). The diaspora leadership and 
members should be active supporting a specific national cause consistently based on its 
feeling of attachment to the home if they want to be considered as an active influential 
group in the host land political scene (McCormick, 2012; Oswiecimski, 2013).  
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The Korean and Egyptian diasporas might be similar and different in their 
political engagement and the outcomes of the engagement factors. The potential 
similarities and differences were one of my justifications for choosing the theoretical 
framework of Jang (2012, 2014). I chose the Korean model as a key base for comparison 
with the targeted Egyptian case; however, I did not ignore other classical diaspora cases, 
such as the Jewish in New York and Washington, DC or Ethiopian and Cuban groups. 
These groups and the Egyptian diaspora share some political, historical, cultural, and 
possibly physiological roots. My use of any component of a diaspora case depended on 
the similarity and connectivity with the Egyptian case and appropriateness to the chapter 
content. For example, no other study mentioned the underestimation of self’s political 
engagement, lack of substantial ownership, and negative perception of politics as a factor 
of civic and political influence of diasporas. These factors and others in the Jang model 
have much to do with the Egyptian case and do not exist or relate to other diaspora cases, 
as I will show in the literature review. 
Concerning the theories of proliferation of diaspora and other interest groups, 
Jang’s (2014) theory of Korean diaspora engagement did not address them. Cigler and 
Loomis (2007) proposed that the surrounding national, tolerant climate should lead to and 
interpret the expected proliferation of groups and organizations within the U.S. 
sociopolitical environment. As I will illustrate in the next chapter, this theory can be 
insufficient to explain some cases of diaspora proliferation and political engagement, 
such as the Korean and Egyptian cases. Therefore, Cigler and Loomis introduced 
Truman’s theory of groups’ proliferation through the conflict of the groups’ interests. 
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The function of theory is to explore and address research questions (Creswell, 
2009, p. 49). The research questions should relate to and build upon existing theory or 
theories, and I will explain that alignment in detail in Chapter 2. For example, one of my 
questions concerned the political engagement style of the Egyptian diaspora in 
Washington, DC and why it takes a zigzag course. According to the conflict theory of 
Truman (as cited in Cigler & Loomis, 2007), “group formation ‘tends to occur in waves’ 
and is greater in some periods than in others” (p. 8). As the research questions and study 
approach show, my central interest in the current study was how the participants made 
sense of the phenomenon of diaspora political engagement and how their points of view 
informed the study, rather than determining what actually happened and what they really 
thought was true. Jang (2014) adopted this methodological base to generate a theory 
inductively, and I will apply the same method to my Egyptian case. 
My approach aligns with the theory of Truman for proliferation and of Jang for 
engagement because all of these models consider the interest groups’ conflict approach. 
The social disturbance that Koreans faced in 1992 was an external factor; it was a calling 
for organizational unity and mobilization (Jang, 2014). Group conflict, however, was not 
the major element of Jang’s theory. The relation between the existing theories and my 
study approach and questions was one of my rationales for choosing these theories of 
proliferation and engagement. 
There is a body of work called social identity theory that might be useful in 
explaining diaspora behavior, and it is more recent than Truman’s interest group 
approach. Sheffer’s (2014) new model of convergence and divergence in diaspora-host 
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government relationships and the diaspora-home country relationships also revealed the 
migration causes and proliferation factors that would be essential for understanding those 
questions. Therefore, I used the second prong of my theoretical foundation, the political 
engagement factors theories of Jang and of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, to explain the 
proliferation of diasporas. This conclusion might lead to some validity concerning my 
study approach. The uniqueness of the diaspora characteristics could explain why it can 
be studied as an extreme case. I describe the case as extreme because it includes weak 
proliferation, unhelpful characteristics, and unique inconsistent political engagement 
behavior, which all lead to notable failure or at least unstable mobilization and success. 
The extreme case is one of the rationales for selecting a single case rather than a multiple-
case design (Yin, 2014).  
Regarding the Egyptian diaspora, extant studies, such as Mehrez and Hamdy 
(2010) and Mowafi and Farag (n.d.), were limited to the diasporas’ connections to the 
homeland (in particular, economic and financial contributions to the home development).  
The scope of research by Dickinson (2008) and Zohry and Debnath (2010) was the 
Egyptian diaspora-host land relationship. There was no single, peer-reviewed study 
addressing both sides at the same time or addressing the proliferation and political 
engagement jointly. Oliver and Montgomery (as cited in Nkongolo-Bakenda & 
Chrysostome, 2013) asserted that, to play an effective role, the diaspora should consider 
“the conditions in the home country and those in the host country [or the external 
factors], as well as the profile of the diasporas involved [or the group characteristics]” (p. 
34). That said, exploring why and when individuals establish or leave a diaspora should 
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be connected to the understanding of the individuals’ inclinations and the characteristics 
of that diaspora and the external factors that affect the diaspora characteristics and 
political engagement.  
Nature of the Study 
The central phenomenon of this study was not the ethnic Egyptian population 
itself as an intrinsic case. I selected the Egyptian diaspora as an instrumental case to best 
understand the aspects and unique phenomenon of Egyptian diaspora political activities 
and engagement in specific Egyptian issues and forms, such as human rights matters in 
Egypt, Egyptian governance, and Egypt–U.S. relationships. The issue of Egyptian 
governance affects other current issues in Egypt and between Egypt and the United 
States. Determining which issue should be the focus was important because the research 
questions reflected and connected those issues. If the focus included other forms of the 
political participation activity of the Egyptian American diaspora in the U.S. political 
system, then it would also be good to indicate what they could be. For example, political 
participation can be focused on shaping U.S. policymakers’ views about Egypt’s internal 
politics or economy or something specific like Egypt’s position regarding the dispute 
with Ethiopia over the Nile River. This latter example might be something that highly 
educated Egyptian Americans might be attentive to. Other issues and related questions 
could have been how the interviewees viewed the President El-Sisi government or the 
2011 and 2013 revolutions or coups, which are controversial.  
The overarching focus of this study was how Egyptian Americans attempt to 
influence the U.S. government. In previous sections of this chapter, I mentioned the 
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issues of Egyptian Americans’ political participation and engagement as well as others, 
such as facilitating emigration to America. Facilitating emigration is important issue 
because it can include and affect many other forms of political participation. My study 
would achieve the goal of investigating the political engagement by addressing the 
Egyptian diaspora characteristics as well as several external factors, such as the current 
revolution, that could all relate to and affect the weak political role and engagement of 
this diaspora.  
I conducted a qualitative single case study using in-depth interviewing as the main 
method to collect data. The qualitative method guided my research approach in several 
ways. According to Jang (2014), The interest of the researcher in the daily, social 
interactions as expressed and attributed by the study participants themselves is one reason 
for choosing the qualitative method. There was compatibility between the qualitative 
tradition and my research activities, personal goals, and designed research questions. This 
compatibility justified my personal motives and values for doing a qualitative study, 
which aligned well with my abilities and subjective interest in the tradition of qualitative 
fieldwork (see Maxwell, 2013, p. 26). 
The qualitative design of this study was a case study. In general, the case study is 
an approach involving an in-depth exploration of a specific bounded system or case(s), 
such as a program, organization, event, and individual or individuals (Creswell, 2013). 
Case studies can be an intrinsic single, instrumental single (within site), or collective 
(multisite) (Creswell, 2013). I adopted the approach of single case study, including a 
small number of embedded subunits (not cases) because of the analytical and practical 
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considerations of the study. Therefore, the purpose of choosing a particular Egyptian 
organization and some individuals was so they could function as analysis units for this 
single case study. I used only those units to help the case illustrate, explore, and present 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon or concern of my study. Qualitative 
tradition and case study design require collecting data from several sources considering 
validity issues, and the analysis units should help further this goal and develop the in-
depth understanding of the case and topic (Creswell, 2013).  
Operational Definitions 
Some of the key concepts and terms in this study will likely be found in the 
literature or everyday conversation and will often have a wide array of meanings 
therefore, I provided concise definitions of them. Some terms such as revolution and 
coup d’état are controversial; therefore, I did not waste time defining them. The concept 
of revolution has long been a focus of study in political science because controversy over 
its definition and implementation exists on the media, academic, and especially the 
political levels. Terms such as uprising or overthrow might be used instead; however, I 
used the term revolution because the relevant literature uses it.  
Diaspora: Jang (2012) asserted that dispersion, homeland orientation, and 
boundary maintenance criteria could be applied for defining the diaspora term and 
distinguishing a diasporic group from nondiasporic groups that could seem similar to 
diasporas (p. 7). Bruneau (2010) adopted the physical approach of defining the term, 
considering the diaspora materiality in terms of space, place, and territory. On the other 
hand, Bruneau said, “In everyday language, the term is now applied to all forms of 
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migration and dispersion of a people, even where no migration is involved” (p. 35). This 
means that the diaspora term might refer to any population beyond the home national 
borders (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 147). On the other hand and similar to Bruneau, 
Waterbury (2010) mentioned that a diaspora is composed of “a population beyond the 
border” (p. 147). Kenny (2013) has mentioned that the term diaspora is a synonym for the 
nature of migration or all displacement types.  
These wide definitions could resolve the specific debate on whether the Egyptian 
diaspora is a diaspora or not as it will be detailed in chapter 2. I considered and defined 
diaspora based on its behavior and identity, not physical shape and geographical 
boundaries. In practical terms, a group can be a diaspora if it mobilizes for such a cause 
(Bauböck, & Faist, 2010, p. 315), such as resisting the host country’s immigration 
policies or supporting the economy or fighting for democratic values in the diaspora 
homeland. In Chapter 2, I will continue this essential illustration, assuming that the 
Egyptian diaspora is a diaspora. I will explore whether the Egyptian diaspora’s political 
engagement exists or not and determine whether the diaspora itself exists or not. The 
assumption here is that the Egyptian diaspora exists because it acts and engages actively. 
The definition of political engagement will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Ethnicity: This term refers to the quality that gives the close personal identity that 
members of some ethnic groups need and feel toward a policy issue, and that should 
produce “the strong identity politics” of that group’s members (McCormick, 2012, p. 
339). This identity, as well as the ethnicity power and quality, can be facilitated when 
“the strong emotional bonds of large numbers of Americans to their cultural or ancestral 
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homes,” have been characterized as the “secret weapon” of [some] ethnic groups” 
(Mathias as cited in McCormick, 2012, p. 339). 
Ethno-national: Sheffer (2006) imposed this term to identify the diaspora limiting 
the diaspora term to specific categories. According to Sheffer, the term ethno-national 
defines diasporas as a group of people for whom their common collective identity is 
based on their feeling of being attached to the same ethnic nation and believing in shared 
values, cultural mores, shared history, and biological traits. The second condition that an 
ethnic group needs to meet to be regarded as a diaspora is the actual moving. According 
to Sheffer (2014), the group should also emigrate from an actual state or imagined 
country (i.e. Palestinians, Kurds, and Romani state-less cases) to live as a minority in the 
host country or countries permanently. 
Incipient diaspora: This term refers to “groups of migrants who are in the initial 
stages of forming organized diasporas” (Sheffer, 2006, p. 75). This term does not mean 
modern or new diaspora. This category refers to diasporas Incipient diasporas such as 
Koreans in the Arab-Persian Gulf area or Russians in Baltic Sea area are newly 
developing organizations and composed of new migrants. They have established 
adequate, active organizations in the host land and yet are not known as historical 
diasporas (Sheffer, 2006, 2014).  
Political engagement factors: I used this term to refer to the external factors that 
surround the diaspora in host and home countries affecting the diaspora existence, 
influence, and success. This term is detailed in the following chapter. 
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Characteristics of a diaspora: I employed this general term to refer to the internal 
factors of a diaspora that could affect its organizational development and political 
performance. They are another set of variables that could affect the diaspora by 
determining its reaction to the external factors differently from other diasporas reactions.  
Assumptions  
In-depth interviews with the Egyptian diaspora members were able to produce 
insight into the participants’ subjective perceptions, but not objective facts of the diaspora 
political engagement situation itself. The model of the Egyptian diaspora assumes that 
this diaspora behaves according to a pattern of waves that the study findings should 
confirm or disconfirm. What is desirable in the Korean-American case regarding 
activating the religious or worship institutes involvement in the political realm to lobby 
for South Korea could be not the same for the Egyptian case. What can be a positive or 
desirable factor for such a diaspora, is not necessary to be the same way for another 
diaspora. The assimilation into American societies for many Egyptians contradicts the 
diaspora proliferation itself, diaspora-home state relationship, and the potentiality of the 
political engagement in the Egyptian concerns in general. Every diaspora needs a waking 
up event making the diaspora act and engage. That event cannot be the same in each 
diaspora case.  
The more the size of the group is significant, the less the group is united and 
organized. A big size does not lead an influence and success for diasporas in all cases. 
The good example here is the Jewish diaspora. If this assumption of the size and 
organizational unity characteristic could be applied to the small-size Jewish or Cuban 
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diaspora, it might be not applicable to the smaller-size Egyptian diaspora. There are 
factors other than the size factor that can affect that diaspora existence as well as success. 
The Egyptian diaspora is an incipient group. This assumption was necessary in 
the study context because clarifying it should help clear up several related issues such as 
diaspora formation and potential development and success of such a diaspora. The 
incipient type of diaspora has not been researched yet (Sheffer, 2006, p. 250).  
Exploring the Egyptian diaspora proliferation and role should help positive social 
change in its reality, and the political atmosphere of the home and hose countries. The 
main assumption of my study was that the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have had 
significant effects on the Egyptian groups living abroad—its interests and political 
engagement. Therefore, external factors (i.e., the revolution event) can change the 
traditional passive characteristics of diaspora and make for more engagement. 
Scope and Delimitation 
The scope of the study was on the approach of the identified active diaspora 
members in Washington, DC only. I collected the data from the target diaspora members, 
in their private setting or via online way. Hence, the data were obtained with collective 
views from all the study suitable participants. The collection data process and the study 
findings scope have been limited by the revolution times and Egyptian populations in 
Washington, DC in particular. Therefore, I was able identify major emerging themes 
when analyzing the Egyptian diaspora political engagement issues. The sudden positive 
and sharp negative shifts of the political powers in the local Egyptian sphere from 2011 
to 2013 were deviant enough to catch the attention of the researchers in different fields. 
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While this fluctuating mood of the national Egyptian powers and parties also reflected on 
the Egyptian diasporas in abroad, it did not catch any attention of the researchers yet. 
That was the major aspect of the research problem to be in the study scope. 
Other Egyptian diaspora members, such as the diaspora of New Jersey and New 
York City were not included in this study. Living and involving in the diaspora activities 
in Washington, DC during the revolution time gave me a unique opportunity to approach 
the group. Many Egyptian organizations and activists participated politically taking 
advantage of being close to the political atmosphere of the political capital city of 
America such as the Congress, think tanks, and the Department of State. That fact gave 
the members easy access and fast communications with the U.S. official decision makers. 
All of these elements do not exist in other U.S. cities. 
However, not everyone in the Washington, DC diaspora will be considered. I do 
not intend to interview someone who is politically inattentive and uninterested in the 
political activities of his or her diaspora in Washington, DC I am focusing on questioning 
members who were relatively inactive but became active in the civil society and Egyptian 
diaspora organization(s) during and after the revolution, and because of that event. The 
immigration status and political orientation were not included in the criteria for excluding 
some population members. I chose and used specific units of the population (individuals 
and one group) within the single case for the interviews and observations based on the 
values only those samples can bring to the study. My study’s scope would be limited to 
some types of the diaspora members based on their education level, political interest, and 
other affiliations. That implies that I am going to be focusing on people that have 
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attributes that make them such a leader, such as native-level equivalent influence in 
English, high education, high income, a reasonable level of communications and 
interests, and so on. Based on these boundaries, my major unit of analysis is the AEA 
group and its members.  
Limitations 
The small size of the Egyptian diaspora means exploring less than a quarter of a 
million Egyptians in the United States (MPI, 2015, p. 1). A small part of that number may 
exist in Washington, DC and that should impose challenges regarding the availability of 
the data, resources, and studies on this small diaspora. Although the sample size in a case 
study approach should be small, I still need to find a sufficient number of participants 
who can provide precious information for my study. Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) found 
that “most respondents did not belong to any diaspora network…this noticeable lack of 
enthusiasm toward diaspora networking and advising indicates a missed opportunity for 
the country” (p. 48). However, my research data would tell whether this negative image 
existed before the Egyptian revolution, and whether it incurred some tremendous change 
because of that event or not. But as I mentioned earlier, based on my first-hand 
experience in the Egyptian diaspora field in Washington, DC the diaspora members 
became passive or had different goals or motivations that keep them again from being 
organized and active. Therefore, I expect the same unhelpful attitude among my study 
participants. The survey and interviews that I have designed to collect my data should 
prove or disprove my expectation practically. To address this limitation and others, I 
therefore decided to apply several methods of sampling, to be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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One of my other rationales for applying the qualitative tradition is my set of 
personal goals, abilities, and motives. Personal goals can be a sufficient base for 
conducting a qualitative study if the questions are appropriate for that approach 
(Maxwell, 2013, p. 26). Because personal goals and abilities cannot be excluded from the 
research design, they can also have consequences for the findings credibility. I would 
therefore take into account how my goals shape and affect my topic and research, design 
of the questions, choice of particular participants, and data collection and analysis 
methods (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 24, 26-27). I need to be aware of how to deal with any 
possible barriers and negative effects of my goals and personal motives. These personal 
and practical goals are my patriotic and personal desire to conduct this particular type of 
research for the purpose of illustrating and improving the Egyptian diaspora situation and 
its relations with Egypt and the United States.    
This study topic affects and involves several aspects such as organizational unity, 
nationalism, religious perspectives, identity, integration and assimilation, host and home 
states relationships with the diaspora, and loyalty. All of these aspects could be 
controversial and personal if not emotional for the participants. This expected style of 
participants’ emotional and subjective reaction should affect the efforts of seeking the 
absolute and actual reality. The nature of the emotional behavior of participants as well as 
the study topic, Egyptian diaspora, imposed difficulty in collecting data from that type of 
participants and addressing all of the case dimensions and realities objectively. That is 
also because many known and unknown control variables and factors involved in the case 
and because of my potential personal bias. Hence, using a qualitative case study approach 
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and its relative flexibility gave me that desired deep understanding for diasporas within a 
bounded system by specific time and space. 
Significance of the Study 
Based on the justifications I have shown, I will try to drive the attention of the 
research toward (a) the proliferation, development, and political role of the incipient 
diasporas; (b) the Washington DC area as a critical environment for that type of diaspora 
and any diaspora; (c) and the choice of Egypt and the justification for choosing the 
incipient Egyptian diaspora in particular. 
 Egyptian case choice is significant for several justifications. As Jones (2012) 
asserted, “The fate of reforms and changes in Egypt will be particularly important in 
setting the tone for the rest of the region. Egypt has a disproportionate influence on the 
politics and culture of the Arab world” (pp. 459-460). This proposition might support my 
general belief that this study could help launch and support future research regarding the 
Egyptian diaspora and other similar relatively new diaspora such as the Arab and African. 
Also, I have mentioned several times in this proposal that the Egyptian diasporas have 
been addressed as a part of the Arab diaspora, ignoring the clear or subtle differences 
between the big and small groups. Hence, according to Coles and Timothy (2004), there 
is a need for Western researchers to read the diaspora matter from a different and wider 
frame of mind and to avoid the current tendency of generalization.  
My interest in this basic and applied study and its potential findings and lessons is 
personal, academic, and practical. As an intellectual goal and based on the study problem, 
this study is significant because it addresses a topic that has not yet been explored in 
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detail (Maxwell, 2013, p. 28) has not been accessible. Hence, this study would offer an 
original contribution to this area of research and fill in that recent gap in the literature. 
Hopefully, this will lead to future research on this topic.  
There is still a need to explore the Egyptian diaspora’s political position and 
engagement through explaining the intertwined relationship between religion and 
political participation in that diaspora as well the relationship of the diaspora with the 
most powerful political player, Washington, DC. In short, the rationale of the study 
problem is the heightening of awareness for the Egyptian diaspora political experience 
that is being forgotten or ignored by researchers and politicians, unintentionally or 
purposely, despite plenty of studies on the Egyptian revolution and its influence on the 
citizens and the region.   
Exploring these controversial relationships should be critical to understanding the 
Egyptian diaspora on a general theoretical basis. The grounded theory is not my study 
design or at least is not the primary one, and the deductive process approach (specifically, 
testing variables relation) is not my primary way of leading to an entirely new 
generalized model or theory. Although earlier in the study I referred that Jang (2014) had 
used a grounded study qualitative approach, my primary design was the single case study. 
Despite this clarification of my design orientation, the findings of the study could also 
contribute to advance knowledge in the discipline. Hence, using the inductive-deductive 
logic process would be applied to enable my use of complex reasoning skills (Creswell, 
2013, p. 45).  
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There is always a need for the development of theory building for studies on the 
potential for further progress and political engagement of diasporas by offering 
propositions that can be applied to the theory-building process and as a comparison 
foundation (Sheffer, 2006, pp. 250–251). In short, this exploratory study has the potential 
to offer valuable insights that push forward theoretical development in political 
engagement of ethnic Egyptians, which could lead to social changes in the reality and 
future of this group. Justification of the study significance could also come from practical 
goals (Maxwell, 2013, p. 29). This type of goal could include changing the current 
political situation and ongoing conflicts or polarization of Egyptian diaspora and 
improving the governmental policies toward this group. Also, this applied study will offer 
suggestions for future research so that other diasporas and ethnic minorities could 
contribute to building stronger democracies in increasingly diversifying societies (Jang, 
2014, p. 21).  
Hopefully, I was able, based on the study’s results, to have the attention to the 
Egyptian government’s ambivalent outlook on its diaspora in the United States, and 
spotlight the need for making some positive change in the recent U.S. policy toward 
Egypt and the diaspora. The occasional divergence in interests and the relationship of the 
United States to Egypt and the Egyptian diaspora are issues that needed to be addressed 
by both governments in the interest of a better relationship between the two countries. 
The literature review provided illuminating details on this matter. According to 
Muslemany (2013), at present, the Egyptian government puts effort into contacting its 
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diasporas all over the globe, but unfortunately, those efforts are insufficient, and the 
government needs to put forth more consistent, less selective efforts.  
After the end of 2011 revolution and its consequences, the diaspora polarized and, 
therefore, became weaker than before. The Egyptian polarization seems much more 
intense inside Egypt but maybe it is not so intense among Egyptians in the United States. 
Illustrating the need for a strong, active Egyptian diaspora that includes community 
organization hypothetically can result in raised consciousness and a positive culture. This 
desired change could produce a sense of teamwork and unified partnerships and 
leadership among the diaspora. 
 This research aims to support professional practices and allow for transparent and 
practical applications for the current political incorporation of the Egyptian diaspora. It is 
essential to create an organizational awareness and positive culture that encourages the 
members to work together in a professional manner, accepting of the other members’ 
participation and insights. If these goals are not achieved, the present division within the 
Egyptian community, the traditional aversion from politics (a typical weakness), and the 
dominant negative organizational culture and experience will not allow for the legitimate 
positive influence of the diaspora and positive policy of the governments. Furthermore, 
this level of awareness and performance will not be possible without helping the diaspora 
realize the core of its problem: lack of effective organization.  
There were good reasons for conducting this study. Its scope was broad enough 
that it has potential implications for positive social change. Such change might include 
improvement of human or social conditions of this diaspora and others by promoting the 
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worth and development of individuals, communities, organizations, culture, and societies. 
For example, the diaspora’s economic contribution to Egypt’s development should 
intertwine with the political engagement in the host country for the home benefit as well 
as the diaspora influence. 
The advancement of diaspora and the national strategies concerning this 
development are essential. The implementation of the desired development can show how 
and why the home and host state agencies, policymakers, and citizens should cooperate. 
According to (Filipovic et al., 2012), they should think beyond national borders, security, 
and immigration concerns; and make efforts to build or support the existing nonterritorial 
nonprofit or official organizations and activities.   
The weak or unclear relation between the Egyptian governments and diasporas 
can be attributed to “the prevalence of a culture of mistrust between the Egyptians and 
their government in general” (Zohry & Debnath, 2010, pp. 6–7). According to Sheffer 
(2006), the homelands usually are responsible for lack of cooperation and friction in the 
relationships with their diaspora; however, the actual situation should be reexamined (pp. 
255–256). However, the problem exists not only in the relation between the home 
country and diaspora. To enable a diaspora to play the expected roles, it would be useful 
for the diaspora to realize what could disable the proliferation of its organizations, and 
then its political role. Hence, it was important to address the other external factors 




Summary and Transition Statement 
Egyptian diaspora issues were being addressed and proposed for this study 
precisely because little research has been conducted and focused on them. My 
dissertation topic and purpose was clearly connected to this study problem. These issues 
shaped my research questions, data collection method, and analysis process, as was 
described in the next chapters of my dissertation. As the research questions showed, my 
real interest was in how the participants think about the phenomenon of the Egyptian 
diaspora political engagement, and how their personal, social, cultural, and historical 
points of view and information can inform the study. The other desired result of the study 
was the potential social change implications on different levels and for all parties.  
This study usesd a new theoretical foundation that was composed of more than 
one previously developed model. Jang’s (2012, 2014) theoretical framework was the 
essential framework of my study, and it was based on the factors of place, type of group, 
and organizational type. Beyond these frameworks, this study suggested identifying other 
factors that might encourage and inhibit proliferation and the political engagement of 
ethnic Egyptians.  
Building upon this new framework, this study employed qualitative methods 
using a single case study approach of the purpose of exploring how members of the 
Egyptian community in the Washington, DC describe and practice political engagement 
on their own terms. For the purposes of this early work, my goal was not to conduct a 
comprehensive initial search, but rather to explore the landscape in a preliminary fashion 
41 
 
to learn about the main themes, modes, and factors of political engagement that the 
Egyptian diasporas have met and employed over time in their host country.   
The next chapter will include the literature review as it relates to critical variables 
and concepts of the study and the research questions. I elaborated on the background and 
Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory of political engagement factors. The purpose of the chapter is 
showing the apparent gap in the literature on the proliferation and political engagement of 



















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
After careful review of the available literature on diaspora, it appears that there is 
a continuing interest and need for studying the diaspora and many related issues, such as 
the factors of political engagement in incipient or new diasporas and migrant groups 
(Jang, 2014; Severo & Zuolo, 2012). Therefore, the problem under study was that while 
the potential general importance of diasporas is known and while previous research has 
identified a number of possible factors influencing engagement, how those factors and 
others affect some specific incipient diasporas, such as the Egyptian, or how they affect 
its political role are not known. No current researchers have looked at the importance and 
uniqueness of those growing groups and their political role in Washington, DC in 
particular. A few studies have been conducted on this particular type of diaspora, 
including Egyptian, Arab, and others (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2; Severo & Zuolo, 
2012, p. 7). Very few of the studies, however, are recent, and they did not focus on the 
political or lobbying role of the Egyptian diaspora. Most also focused on the financial 
contribution of the diaspora to its homeland instead (Severo & Zuolo, p. 7). Therefore, 
this study aimed to remedy the lack of a clear understanding of a comprehensive model 
for the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora and political engagement factors in 
Washington, DC in particular.  
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore, explain, and 
describe the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and its different ethnic 
Egyptian members in Washington, DC at the time of the 2011 Egyptian revolution as 
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well as the key factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement. Therefore, my 
focus in this study was on describing these factors and the characteristics of the diaspora 
that have not been addressed in the literature. Ultimately, I aimed to contribute to 
knowledge and theory as well as drive attention to a social concern (see Patton, 2002, p. 
213). 
 This chapter includes an explanation of the theoretical foundation as connected to 
an exhaustive literature review. It also includes information regarding the key concepts 
and phenomena of the study. The purpose of synthesizing the current literature studies 
was to produce a description of what is known, what is controversial, and what remains 
to be studied. Achieving this purpose assisted me in filling the apparent gap in the 
literature on the proliferation and political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in 
particular.   
Literature Search Strategy  
In this section, I describe the strategy I used to search for the literature. It includes 
a list of the databases, journals, and search engines I used to gather the literature. A list of 
the keywords I used in my searches is also included.  
Literature Source  
I searched for relevant literature for review using several sources gathered via 
Google Scholar, American University in Cairo, and Walden University’s library website. 
I conduced a majority of my research using the Thoreau Multi-Database Search and the 
ProQuest Central with full text database. I also collected ethnic data and associated 
information from the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale and Foreign Policy magazine 
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websites. These sources provided information about diasporas in general and the 
Egyptian diaspora in particular, including diasporic Egyptian’s cooperation with the 
homeland, the Coptic diaspora, and characteristics and political engagement of the 
Egyptian diaspora.  
Literature Key Search Terms Used 
The principal search terms I used were diaspora, Korean diaspora, groups’ 
conflict, revolution, political engagement, lobbying, ethnic groups, ethnic identity, 
political relationship, assimilation, and Muslim Brotherhood. To narrow the search 
process and to focus the results, I subsequently searched for Egyptian Diaspora, e-
diaspora, ethnic conflict, mother country and homeland, power struggle, power 
decentralization/centralization, incipient diaspora and group, diaspora size, traumatic 
memory, ethnic clashes, and convergence and divergence. Some of these terms such as 
the term Egyptian Diaspora came up with a few relevant results.  
The Iterative Search Process 
When conducting my searches, I logged into Walden’s University Library 
website, clicked search and obtained articles through Thoreau Multi-Database Search, 
Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, and ProQuest Central with full text. I tried to limit my 
searches to materials published in the past 5 years, but I subsequently expanded the 
range. I reviewed materials published in English and Arabic. In the initial search of 
Thoreau, I entered Egypt and diaspora on the second bar. The search results displayed 
over a thousand articles with “Peer Reviewed” checked, but many of these were not 
specific to the Egyptian Diaspora. Using the terms Egypt and diaspora produced results 
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about Somali and Jewish diasporas in Egypt and not the Egyptian diaspora elsewhere. 
Therefore, I narrowed the search process. When I entered Egypt and diaspora/Egyptian 
diaspora on the first bar, political engagement on the second bar, and political 
engagement and America on the third bar, the search resulted in about 500 articles from 
which I selected and reviewed the newest scholarly papers and journal articles. I applied 
the same search format to the multiple databases listed above; however, the results were 
not the same each time or try. In addition, I used Google Scholar through my account in 
the Walden University Library and came up with much more accurate results. 
Theoretical Foundation 
A Brief Map of the Theoretical Framework  
The purpose of the theoretical framework for this study was to provide an 
explanatory, narrative text that can illuminate the major items and concepts to be studied 
in the following literature review section, which include the key factors and constructs 
and the presumed relationships among them. In general, the topic includes two major 
prongs: diaspora engagement and diaspora proliferation. The existing political models 
and theories are not suitable or inclusive enough in exploring and examining the political 
engagement of diasporas (Jang, 2014). This insufficiency is especially visible in the 
Egyptian diaspora literature; hence, I adopted a new theoretical framework developed by 
Jang (2012, 2014) in this study that explored several known factors and new factors 
influencing how members of the Korean community in the Washington, DC area make 
meaning of political engagement on their own terms. Regarding the theories of 
proliferation, Cigler and Loomis (2007, 2014) mentioned several theories, such as 
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Truman’s theory, that might explain the expected proliferation of ethnic interest groups 
and organizations within the U.S. sociopolitical environment.  
In order to explore the components of theoretical framework of the study, I 
explain the origin or source of the theory and describe major theoretical propositions and 
major hypotheses, including a delineation of any assumptions appropriate to the 
application of the theory. Next, I provide a literature- and research-based analysis of how 
the theory has been applied previously in ways similar to the current study. Finally, I 
describe how and why the theory of Jang relates to the present study, and how my 
research questions relate to, challenge, and/or build upon existing theory. 
 Origin or source of the theory: Major theoretical propositions and major 
hypotheses, including its delineation. To inductively generate a new theory on the 
political engagement of the Korean diaspora in Washington, DC, Jang (2012, 2014) 
extended and refined a framework that had been developed by Ramakrishnan and 
Bloemraad (2008). The latter one, the theory of the political engagement factors, looked 
at the place, type of group, and organizational type to understand political engagement of 
ethnic groups in United States. On the other hand, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s theory 
found its roots in Ramakrishnan and Espenshade’s (2001) comprehensive study entitled, 
“Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States” that examined 
factors of engagement of many diasporas, without focusing on a specific place. 
In line with Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s (2008) framework of the three 
factors, Jang (2014) also suggested that factors, such as underestimation of self’s political 
engagement, language barrier, religious faith, type of group and organizational type, and 
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gender, enable and disable political involvement of the Korean diaspora (p. 637). Jang 
applied a mix of original factors and factors from Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s model 
to examine the Korean diaspora. These factors can hinder and encourage political 
engagement of Korean as well as other diasporas. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, according to the researcher, Jang’s (2012, 2014) study 
has limitations in terms of applying the factors that exclusively focus on one area: the 
Washington, DC metropolitan area. Because of those limitations and other similar ones 
that apply to the Egyptian case and have appeared in its available literature, I needed to 
support the framework of Jang with other theories. The differences between the Egyptian 
and Korean cases also suggested that caution be used when drawing parallels between 
them. 
Several scholars, such as Ambrosio (2002), Cigler and Loomis (2007, 2014), 
Kenny (2008), and Zuolo and Severo (2012), have identified a number of political 
engagement factors and strategies. Those factors and strategies are related to the 
diaspora’s identity and loyalty, environment, organization, group size, convergence and 
divergence in interests between diasporas and host and home governments, and 
nationalism that were all of interest in the current study. Besides the factors model of the 
Korean case, these factors listed above and others explain the influence, success, and 
failure of several other ethnic groups and diasporas, including the political performance 
of the Egyptian diaspora in the United States. Those theories and models were the 
theoretical foundation for my study of the Egyptian diaspora case.  
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 Assumption of the connection between proliferation and engagement 
concepts. Besides the factors of political engagement theories, I address diaspora and 
ethnic group proliferation in this chapter. Through my review of the existing literature, I 
found that the debates and theories on the proliferation or existence of diasporas and 
political engagement factors were not separated because the concepts and mechanism of 
engagement and proliferation are also not separated from each other in the real world, as I 
will show in the remainder of this chapter. Therefore, I claim that, theoretically, when a 
diaspora emerges somewhere, it acts and engages actively and the proliferating and 
existing diaspora will have a chance to play its role. Practically, it is a diaspora if it acts 
like one. As Cigler and Loomis (2007) stated, there has to be a motivating issue all the 
time encouraging people to gather or join the diaspora. In this study, I inferred that 
proliferation and engagement are two sides of one coin.  
Diaspora proliferation and development theories are connected to a broad debate 
in the current literature on diaspora’s definitions and identification. My collective 
theoretical foundation considered the diaspora identity and identification and was based 
on a mix of theories concerning two connected wings that are the proliferation side 
(Cigler and Loomis’s (2007) theories) and factors of the engagement side (Jang (2014) 
and Smith [2014] and their other colleagues). The engagement factors also included two 
parts: the internal factors (i.e., characteristics) and external factors. These elements are 
connected to each other to compose the image of the diaspora performance. Hence, I 
chose a mix of those theories for the theoretical foundation and to describe the ways 
researchers in the discipline approached the problem as well as the strengths and 
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weakness in their approaches.  
The Korean and Egyptian diasporas might be similar and different regarding their 
political engagement and the influence of the factors on their formation and engagement. 
However, I chose the Korean model for comparing with the targeted Egyptian case. I also 
considered some other classical diaspora cases that have similar roots in the Middle East 
and Africa and are close to Egypt, such as the Jewish, Ethiopian, and Lebanese. 
In addition, the literature review revealed that many factors of political 
engagement are alike in both diasporas. For instance, both types of citizens, as well as 
diasporas members, have inherited negative perceptions about politics and politicians. 
Also, I have found that the religion factor is a great ascendant influence on both sides. As 
Jang (2012, 2014) did, my study will explore engagement factors inductively, and that 
will be my study’s original contribution: discovering how the Egyptian diaspora evolves, 
operates, prospers, or fails, something to which the literature has not paid particular 
attention. Likewise, Jang complained that the existing literature has not paid enough 
attention to addressing the Korean case. 
Jang (2012) provided a comprehensive list of research and interview questions 
that I have used, with several modifications, as a suitable model for my proposed research 
and interview questions. Finally, adopting the theoretical framework as well as the 
Korean diaspora case of Jang (2012, 2014) should give a new model for comparison. It is 
obvious that the Korean diaspora is different from another conventional model of cases 
such as Arab Egyptian diasporas that are similar in many issues and features. I consider 
the difference as a point of strength, not weakness. The similarities between Egyptian and 
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Arab or some African cases perhaps will not reveal many new details about the target 
case. However, there are not enough studies on Egyptian diaspora to be compared to the 
similar diasporas.  
Theories on Interest Groups and Ethnic Interest Groups (Diaspora) Proliferation  
According to Sheffer (2006, p. 250), the need for definitional boundaries of the 
phenomenon and its components generates difficulty and ambiguity that should be 
resolved first. This step should help clear several related issues, such as diaspora 
formation and potential development of diasporas, e.g., the understudied incipient type of 
diaspora. In short, studying diaspora formation and proliferation should be combined 
with resolving the ambiguity of the diaspora definitions; that issue will be addressed in 
the literature review.   
Concerning the theories of the proliferation of diaspora, Jang’s theory of Korean 
diaspora engagement focused on the social, civic, and political engagement, but there was 
a lack of in-depth or exclusive examination concerning the ways and factors in which 
Koreans have been formed into and acted as a diaspora. Jang mentioned that Koreans in 
the Washington, DC area, a new host for the newcomers, have not experienced the same 
strong ethnic or racial tension as Koreans in the 1992 Los Angeles and New York riots 
(Jang, 2012, p. 629). Jang (2012) said, “After the 1992 riot, there were significant 
changes in Korean communities. Most important, the uprising brought the community 
together. Political associations sprung up noticeably after the 1992 incident” (p. 47). 
What can explain the positive reactions and positions of Koreans groups? What made 
Korean Americans realize that they needed to be politically empowered to defend 
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themselves by joining a group? (Jang, 2014, p. 633) In short, what was their reason for 
that change: external force or personal or organizational benefit? The answer can be an 
application of Truman’s conflict theory or other pluralist theories. However, as I will 
explain shortly, a conflict can explain the behavior of Los Angles Korean Americans, but 
it cannot be applicable to the quiet Washington, DC Korean Americans.  
Truman’s theory of group proliferation: Group interest conflicts. This theory 
concerns all interest groups and is not particularly focused on ethnic interest communities 
(Lowery & Gray, 2007, p. 135). The conflict or disturbance theory could explain two 
different dimensions that are related to the present study: first, the push factor of 
immigrating, and second, the pull factor of joining a diaspora after the immigrating 
process has completed. According to this theory, interest groups and their communities 
arise spontaneously as a reaction to an action, force, or need (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 
7). When like-minded people gather to address a common problem, the interest groups 
emerge and are mobilized as a natural response (Lowery & Gray, 2007, p. 135). Those 
“groups organize politically when the existing order is disturbed, and certain interests are, 
in turn, helped or hurt” (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8). But the proliferation, 
development, and mobilization of the responsive groups do not happen immediately or 
suddenly. Instead, the political interest groups come to the real world in successive waves 
as a response to the disturbance in the existing socioeconomic or political order and 
interests.  
According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), the imbalance of interests could lead to 
conflict. Changes in socioeconomic development of complex communities and 
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improvement of technology and communication could impose a subsequent 
disequilibrium among the social powers and create new problems, needs, and interests for 
them; thus, groups proliferate and develop reacting to an event or events (p. 7). Similarly, 
Rowe (2001) argued, “conflict of interests between diasporas and their domestic 
compatriots is part of a significant search for survival strategies, identity, and meaning” 
(p. 84).  
The interest conflict in the Ethiopian diaspora case as well as the Egyptian case 
has some violence, to a different degree and nature, all the time. Of course, the conflicts 
have different causes because different parties are involved claiming different agendas. 
The Addis Ababa government used to claim that some Ethiopian diaspora groups in 
America were actually terroristic in that they carried on the national conflicts by 
supporting the “violent” local Ethiopian groups and influencing the international 
community (DeWind & Sigura, 2014, p. 178). Probably, the Egyptian governments also 
have the same attitude against the Islamic groups abroad. According to DeWind and 
Sigura (2014), ethno-national-religious diasporic entities and organizations such as 
fundamentalist Muslim groups of North Africa can use violence to promote their interests 
in either host lands or homelands (p. 47). 
As a reaction to the disturbance and conflict, citizens create, develop, or join 
interest groups, and thus the interest communities, or any interest groups, exist (Lowery 
& Gray, 2014, p. 135) to expand and invest in existing opportunities in response to the 
rise of other counterparts or interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 7, 8). Rowe (2001) 
noted that their behaviors could also be attributed to “the spread of a domestic struggle 
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for legitimacy and power to a transnational setting” (p. 84). The size and age of those 
groups and their organizations depend on the number, frequency, and density of 
disturbing events (Lowery & Gray, 2014, p. 135). 
The disturbance of the existing orders of life can take multiple shapes, such as 
organizational, social, economic, military, or political and sometimes violent disruption 
(i.e., the action). In turn, these actions can lead to new needs or interests that could be 
protected sooner or later (the reaction) by new or emerging social factors such as 
business, labor, or ethnic interest groups. Cigler and Loomis (2007, pp. 7, 8) observed 
that the emerging groups’ needs and responses are not always good and can be bad in 
some events, such as terrorism. 
This selected theory of conflict or disturbance might relate to the present study, 
and the research questions might relate to and build upon that existing theory. For 
example, the emergence of new interests and the conflict of many new and old Egyptian 
political and religious groups and organizations came to reality because of the 2011 
revolution. According to Lowery and Gray (2014), “The interest community is generated 
merely through the accumulation of these mobilization events” (p. 135). This remarkable 
event was a response to accumulated social and political disturbance in the ordinary 
system of the country and legislative challenges facing the groups’ and powers’ existence 
before and after that event.  
Patterson and Singer (2007) observed, “Although Truman’s theory may explain 
the origin of groups and their emergence, it does not explain how groups evolve over 
time, prosper, or fail altogether” (p. 39). What happened in the Egyptian situation was 
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that the old powers, interest groups, and counterparts that commonly were titled as a 
counterrevolution power or deep state have partly and gradually retrieved the normal 
system of life again. Many new revolutionary powers became disappointed and thus 
passive and disorganized again. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it later became clearer that 
the regime itself was only weakened, not toppled (Heggy, 2001). The army and Muslim 
Brotherhood appeared again explicitly and heavily in the political scene, leaving only 
slight room for political engagement of the other revolutionary powers and reformists, 
and much economic hardship for people. 
This observation, based on the theory of interest conflict, might explain this cyclic 
attitude of not only the Egyptian diaspora’s unstable engagement but also the domestic 
political groups and their activities. According to Truman’s theory, group formation 
“tends to occur in waves” and is greater in some periods than in others” (as quoted in 
Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8). This assumption might also be correct for the other 
diasporas, such as the Arab and Korean. This relation between the existing theories and 
my study and research questions is one of my rationales for the choice of these theories of 
diaspora proliferation and engagement. 
Arab Americans have traditionally not been very active in foreign policies or do 
not have enough numbers of unified political organizations (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 
307; Oswiecimski, 2014, p. 66; Uslaner, 2007, p. 307). Nevertheless, they reacted 
collectively and individually on different levels to the 9/11 attacks, and its legal, societal, 
and political consequences were, presumably, targeting Arab and Muslim communities. 
Those groups responded positively to the irreconcilable atmosphere of inequity and 
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imbalance of interests or positions. Their reaction was not just to change the biased 
foreign policy of the United States, but also to resist some new national policies (i.e., the 
Patriot Act), public discriminations, and some public violence toward Arabs and 
Muslims. They also reacted to maintain the balance with other groups who took 
advantage of the American government, and the new laws.  
According to Kalmbach and Moghissi (2009), “the potential for diasporas united 
by an identity other than shared origin and the importance of the threat of violence in 
maintaining group cohesiveness have added significance for Muslim diasporas after 
9/11” (p. 352). Although this sudden extreme disturbance was appalling, it created a 
unique opportunity for a new wave of mobilization and countermobilization in the Arab 
and Muslim civil society in New York and Washington, DC (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 
8, 307).  Referring back to Jang’s case, the disturbance theory of Truman might answer 
many questions I have asked and explain why the riot against Koreans in Los Angeles in 
1992 led to political awareness and mobilization for coalition building among the 
diaspora members. However, that theory could not explain why this diaspora in a later 
time, as well as the Egyptian one after the revolution, has become retrograde. 
Conflict theory could explain why and how some ethnic and interest groups 
emerge. It could also explain their engagement and role. Conflicts seem to have a 
negative meaning or tone; however, this is not always true for all parties or times. I found 
that the revolution was a temporary positive factor that forced different Egyptian 
diasporas all over the world to react to the indigenous movements and changes in the 
country. This event or internal conflict produced organized mobilization and the 
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emergence of the virtual e-diaspora as well as actual diaspora. According to Ambrosio 
(2002, pp. 169, 184), the homeland’s conflict can be over the national identity, and this 
type of conflict becomes a threat to the diaspora survival that turns into an ingredient in 
diaspora identity. As a potential result, this menace will be a motivation to the diasporic 
communities to mobilize. The homeland conflicts and violence enable the diaspora to 
justify its political act and fight for its homeland and its interests and to maintain and 
nourish its ethnic identity.  
Ironically, Ambrosio (2002, pp. 184, 188) argued that resolving the homeland’s 
conflicts and having stability and peace could threaten the diaspora’s identity and change 
the public and official attitude toward that group. As a result, the motivation for 
mobilization would disappear, and that ethnic community would need to be reshaped to 
keep the diaspora’s life and its accepted role in the host and home states. Moreover, the 
diaspora groups and leaders might try to keep the conflict going or even create other 
conflicts to keep both the home and host governments in need of the diaspora role. 
In short, a diaspora needs the homeland’s conflicts to survive, and its identity and 
role emerge and continue as a result. The same technique that American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the American Jewish Committee use to maintain their 
organizational bureaucratic interests and financial support in U.S. foreign policies 
(Ambrosio, 2002, pp. 188–189). Islamic radical groups recently realized how to 
manipulate this strategy too. The conclusion is that conflict theories could explain the 
proliferation and the engagement of the diaspora in some cases and times. It would not 
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explain why the diaspora or other interest groups fail to keep their active status and 
existence and how they could develop.  
Other theories of ethnic interest groups. Other theories might be able to explain 
the proliferation as well as the failure and success of diasporas. Climate theory is another 
approach to the proliferation and political engagement of diasporas. According to Cigler 
and Loomis (2007, p. 6), a national, tolerant climate should shape the expected 
proliferation of interest groups and organizations. American history and sociopolitical 
environment have provided this favorable climate. This relatively open atmosphere is 
rooted in several constitutional democratic principles, such as separation of parties and 
powers, decentralization, and equity and justice. Moreover, we must consider the 
vastness and the great variety of the country’s regions, different traditions and 
opportunities, open immigration policies that allowed for cultural diversity and 
heterogeneity of populace, and U.S. cultural values that appreciate the individual 
initiative—all of these factors created a favorable climate for transnational groups in the 
United States. These contextual or external features are opportunities that encourage 
individuals to join groups and use different kinds of access points to the political 
decision-makers at all levels, at least theoretically.  
Similarly, this positive climate, jointly with various factors such as 
decentralization and division of the federal political system and vagueness of the strategic 
priorities of foreign policy, has caused a vacuum and hesitation within the political 
process and system of Washington, DC. For example, the reactive policy of Obama’s 
administration toward the new rule of Egypt after the fall of the Islamic Brotherhoods 
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was hesitant, confused, and confusing (Bamyeh, 2014, p. 91). That administrative policy 
allowed several Islamic groups in DC to try to fill up the gap and manipulate that 
hesitation and vacancy in an attempt to influence the current American administration 
regarding Egyptian and other concerns (Sorko-Ram, 2015).  
This assumption is not new and has several precedents in recent history. This 
vacuity and uncertainty about the U.S. strategic policies provided an opportunity for 
some interest groups, including some ethnic interest groups such as the Jewish diaspora 
after and during the Cold War. This diaspora always works to fill up the decentralized 
political power structure and power vacuum in the decision-making process. I refer to this 
status as political system gaps. The interest groups or political organizations such as 
diaspora take advantage of this status to influence political decisions and to comment on 
foreign policies based on the benefits of the favorable environment for the development 
of such decisions and comments (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 6-7; Huntington as cited in 
Ambrosio, 2002, p. 135). The Jewish lobby did not just fill up the gap; it also achieved 
obvious influence on U.S. foreign policy (Bamyeh, as cited in DeWind and Segura, 2014, 
p. 15; McCormick, 2012, p. 320).    
The external factor of the absence of defined national interests and meaningful 
national policies of the United States after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union permitted some ethnic groups to wield influence more than other groups in 
shaping that indeterminate U.S. policy. I have found this to be a striking fact: the 
vagueness of the strategic priorities of the foreign policy became a common notion that 
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could be cited in many resources of the political and ethnicity literature and scholars such 
as Fukuyama (2014) and Ambrosio (2002).  
Besides the vacuity, weakness of the general structure, knowledge, and sphere of 
the U.S. foreign policies might also allow the interest groups to be influential. According 
to Perez (2014, p. 147), a vacuum also implies insufficient stake or little stimulus to 
change a particular American foreign policy that should allow an organization to work in 
Washington, DC. This situation allows the well-organized communities and groups to 
shape the foreign policy of the United States (Smith, 2014, p. 256). For example, 
according to Pérez (2014), the well-organized Cuban diaspora worked sufficiently well 
under an efficient lobbyist leadership and operated in a political vacuum in Washington, 
DC in the 1980s and 1990s because the organization did not encounter strong organized 
political opposition. The result was an open sphere and opened doors for that smart 
organization and leadership.  
This theory and its implementations could be interpreted by Baubock and Fiast’s 
(2010) model of diaspora as resource. According to that model of comparison, the state 
policies toward diasporas will shape the diasporas’ ability to be organized and mobilized 
as a valuable resource for the state. Favorable climate and policies of the state should 
consider diasporas as a definite source for national benefits rather than a symbol of 
weakness for their original countries or threat against their host states (Baubock, & Fiast, 
2010, pp. 146-147).   
In conclusion, the positive climate for ethnic interest groups refers not just to 
positive public attitude and cultural tolerance. As an extended meaning of the theory, it 
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could also refer to decentralization, separation of powers, and weakness and vagueness of 
the host state foreign policies and strategic priorities. The theory implications also 
include the difficulty of defining the public interest, and other circumstances of the host 
environment that might allow diasporas to work. 
 How the existing theories have been applied similarly to the current study? I 
would provide a brief literature and research-based analysis of how the existing theories I 
mentioned have been applied previously in ways similar to the current study. For 
example, the incipient Ethiopian diaspora is an ideal example of the conflict of interests 
as a factor of the proliferation as well as political mobilization. This case is different from 
the Egyptian diaspora case concerning the interests, levels, and times of the conflict, but 
the Ethiopian diaspora is relatively much different from the Korean case. According to 
Sheffer (2006), most, but not all, incipient diasporas or subgroups emigrate mainly due to 
economic reasons, including deprivation as well as career opportunities, so they would 
not be forced. Thus, they have grown voluntarily (pp. 113-114). However, the fleeing 
persecution, oppression, and marginalization, even genocidal attack is another set of 
motivations for emigration. It would seem that migrants such as Rohingya refugees from 
Myanmar today fleeing persecution are more likely to continue to self-identify with their 
lost home in their origin country and therefore act like a diaspora in the new, host 
country. 
However, what makes the Ethiopian diaspora case attractive concerning the 
comparison with the Egyptian diaspora case is that both groups share the same African 
origin and region. Also, both countries have historic relationships that range from 
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friendly to very strained. Of course, the Nile is the most critical issue regarding this 
changeable relation, but this matter is out of the study scope because the studied conflict 
is not between states but between groups and their state or governments. The possible 
comparison might expose and point to the similarity between the peoples as well as 
between the characteristics of both diasporas. Both cases include political adversaries 
who work actively to defeat the incumbent regime by building lobbies, and relationships 
with the host government of the United States. Besides, there are other reasons and 
factors for choosing this group for the comparison purpose and that all should be 
illustrated in the next two paragraphs and two sections. 
Ethiopian groups as an application of the conflict theory. It seems that Lyons 
(2014) adopted the conflict approach to explaining that interest groups’ proliferation. 
This approach might explain how and why Ethiopian diaspora emerged and settled. This 
approach denotes the disturbance of regular social order and imbalance between different 
interests in the local sphere. Lyons (2014) believed that Ethiopian ethnic groups were a 
conflict-generated diaspora, and this is the reason behind its origination in the political 
atmosphere of Washington, DC (p. 164).  
According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), events of disturbance such as a war can 
“place extreme burdens on society, and protracted conflict lead to a growth of groups, 
whether based on support of [the war] or opposition to the conflict” (p. 8). In the 
Ethiopian case the disturbance of the normal life system occurred because of the internal, 
natural ethnic conflict, communist military coup, and the prolonged one-party rule. 
Because of the ethnic nature of the Ethiopian society, the local confrontation also took 
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ethnic trait, and that caused the conflict to be multisided, lengthy, cultural, and armed. I 
would investigate whether the Egyptian case had any disturbance causing the diaspora 
members to escape.  
 The conflict became an identity crisis in a period of uncertainty and confusion in 
which the society parties’ sense of identity became insecure, typically due to a change in 
their expected aims or role in that society. Therefore, that multi ethnic domestic conflict 
led to waves of Ethiopian migrants moving to Italy, European Union, and the United 
States. According to Lyons (2014), some of those immigrants framed their country 
conflicts in “categorical, hardline terms, thereby strengthening confrontational leaders 
and organizations and undermining others seeking compromise” (p. 164). In the Egyptian 
case, some groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and some Coptic organizations do not 
escape from local conflict only but also escalate that conflict remotely while they settle in 
host states. Interviewing some members of those groups should approve or disapprove 
this assumption. 
The validity of applying the conflict theory and Ethiopian groups model to the 
Egyptian Diaspora case. Sheffer (2014) listed three main reasons for national conflicts 
that could motivate the individual diasporans to involve themselves while they are 
abroad. Those reasons are the expulsion, struggles for separation and independence, and 
discrimination and deprivation (p. 43). Those reasons of homelands’ conflicts could also 
discourage the United States to be involving itself in the same conflicts. Sheffer (2014) 
categorized diasporas and groups based on the prevalent causes of conflict. Sheffer 
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(2014) put Ethiopian diasporic groups in the category of the “cultural, political, social, 
and economic discrimination and deprivation of their kin in their homeland” (pp. 43-44).  
Some Egyptian groups such as some Copts and Islamists including the Muslim 
Brotherhood could claim discrimination and denial. All of those groups would seek 
strategies to fight for what they claim and assume. According to Sheffer (2014), the most 
important factor in those conflicts is the United States interest in involving itself. It is 
important because the diasporas always need to keep convergence in the core goals and 
interests with the United States because that consequently can lead to the United States 
involvement in some international cases based on the severity degree of those cases of 
conflict and other U.S. determinations (pp. 42-44). 
The different groups of the Ethiopian diaspora employed several transnational 
strategies and activities to heat up the existing internal disturbance; therefore, the conflict 
over interests resources and legitimacy became a transnational conflict. Several Ethiopian 
conflicting groups involved in the conflicts by sustaining and using hard feelings and 
traumatic memories. They also provided different supplying resources such as 
remittances from the kin and back-and-forth visitations of internal opposition leaders to 
their dispirited followers and pre-existing networks in America. They used the Internet 
means and oriented radio for their mobilization efforts and transnational communication 
with the preexisting networks in the host country. As I mentioned before, improvement of 
technology and communication means could impose a subsequent disequilibrium among 
the social powers and create new problems for all interest groups. Moreover, those 
groups engage in the ongoing conflict and transnational politics through employing 
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strategies of lobbying a number of the U.S. congressmen, raising funds, and using the 
social media applications (Lyons, 2014, pp. 164-165). 
 It is possible to infer that some groups of the Egyptian diaspora have the same 
situation at the current time, given evidence of the past Ethiopian case. The Ethiopian 
specimen is similar to some contemporary Egyptian groups in the United States after the 
2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions. As these two events were a decisive factor for the 
organizational unity of the diaspora, they became a factor for the fraction and ongoing 
conflict among the Egyptian political parties in the homeland and distant lands. 
Similarly to Ethiopian groups, the Egyptian opposition groups’ agenda and 
strategies can be challenging to the Egyptian regime when those groups try to convince 
the United States to block any U.S. official aid and supportive public opinion. Hence, I 
have noticed the proliferation of a new group that is the Egyptian Islamists group based 
on their portrayed conflict and active strategies. The diaspora’s type and proliferation 
shape should be different based on the differences of the motives, conflicts, and time. The 
cause of Ethiopian, Irish, Tamil, and Egyptian groups in the 1960s and 1970s were 
different historical racial, religious, and political events that produced their respective 
homelands' different conflicts. 
What happened is that some counterparts disturbed the existing order, and certain 
interests of some powers were, in turn, helped or hurt. This internal situation in the 
homeland gave those groups a ground to flow from domestic homeland disturbances or 
injustice, as they perceive, and then organize themselves financially and politically using 
transnational political relations and strategies (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8; Dickinson, 
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2008, p. 38; Lyons, 2014, pp. 164-165). This observation could be applicable also to 
small diasporas such as Egyptians in the United States, and the newest diasporas such as 
Syrian, and Egyptian Islamic groups in Turkey and Qatar after and during the severe 
political events of 2013, 2014, and 2015. It may be partly a class issue. The Egyptian 
diaspora in Washington, DC disproportionately consists of well-educated professionals 
who are fluent in English. They may have the time, resources, and self-confidence to 
participate in diaspora formation and lobbying of the U.S. government. The Syrian 
diaspora today consists of desperate, poor or poverty-stricken refugees fleeing, often in 
fear for their lives. They want to stay and survive, not engage in diaspora formation. 
However, diaspora formation and lobbying may be an issue for their children in a later 
time.  
The members of these groups brought their conflicts to their new environments 
and continued the same path. However, the catalyst conflicts, of course, occur at different 
times, degrees, and nature in each case, therefore, the emergence nature and time, goals, 
and characteristics of each diaspora were different too. Other factors can affect those 
diasporas’ appearance and political role in the host lands, and that would be the subject of 
the other sections of this chapter. I would say in conclusion that the major comparison 
point between Ethiopian and Egyptian cases is the behavior of both diasporas against 
their incumbent governments and their lobbying strategies that they apply to conduct 
their homelands conflicts. 
66 
 
Literature Review  
An Exhaustive Review of Current Literature    
In this section, I provided my rationale for selection of the study concepts based 
on the relation between the available literature, the phenomenon, and my study scope. 
Having said that, I continued to explore other points related to the diaspora proliferation 
theories and diaspora development theories that I have just presented in the theoretical 
foundation section. I analyzed the connection between the climate and conflict theories 
and other concepts to assess their validity for exploring the proliferation and mobilization 
of the Egyptian diaspora. When considering the proliferation, development, and 
engagement of diasporas, a review of Jang (2012, 2014) and other researchers’ studies of 
factors and characteristics that might encourage or discourage political engagement in 
diasporas is warranted. 
 In short, I turned to the literature to justify my selection of the phenomena and 
concepts under investigation to produce a description of what is known about them, what 
is controversial, and what remains to be studied. As part of this process, I reviewed and 
synthesized studies related to the concepts of identification, characteristics, and political 
engagement in the Egyptian diaspora problem. Therefore, I started by exploring how the 
literature consider the Egyptian diaspora 
Is the Egyptian Diaspora a diaspora? In the first chapter of the study, I 
mentioned Sheffer’s (2006) limited term ethno-national when defining the term diaspora. 
A different approach to the definition takes into account the communications and culture 
that diaspora produces while abroad (Kenny, 2013, p. 12). Dufoix (as cited in Müller-
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Funk, 2016), argued that no diasporas as such exist physically, but diaspora means the 
ways of managing its the relationships with the homeland. Diasporas develop by 
themselves when the members share common situations, and believe and work for the 
same cause (p. 354). Given that some scholars have broadly defined diaspora as not 
limited to a distinct social or physical entity, all Egyptian migrants might simply be 
considered members of a diaspora. Moreover, Kenny (2013) argued that diaspora is just 
an “idea that helps explain the word migration [or] the migrant experience abroad” (pp. 1, 
11). In other words, diaspora connotes a broad emigrational and cultural frame 
explaining all migrant experience (Kenny, 2013, p. 6).  
Given the limit Sheffer’s (2006) ethnonational definition of diaspora, I adopted a 
wider definition of diaspora to include ethnic Egyptian groups and to avoid the 
sophisticated theoretical debate on ethnicity. Like Zohry and Debnath’s (2010) definition 
of diaspora, Sheffer (p. 9) asserted that the broad definition frames a group as a diaspora 
when it has been established outside of its homeland because of voluntary or forced 
migrations. Hence, Sheffer excluded several types of diaspora from his limited ethno-
national definition. According to his limited application of the term, pan-diasporas such 
as the Muslim and Arab American diasporas are not ethnonational diasporas, but 
according to the broad definition, they are. These groups are also considered diasporas 
because the majority of Muslims and Arabs speak the same language and share the same 
dominant religion of the majority, Islam (pp. 10-11).  
It was relatively difficult to locate materials on the political influence of Arab and 
Muslim diasporas during and after the Cold War. If this is the case, then it will also be 
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harder to assess the appearance and influence of the Egyptian diaspora because the scope 
of early studies was on Arab immigrants in general, and not on the diasporas of different 
subgroups such as Egyptians. Moreover, I noticed that researchers such as, Sheffer (2006, 
2014) and Bamyeh (2014) often study Arab diasporic groups in comparison with the 
Jewish Diaspora and conflict with Israel, and rarely study these groups outside of this 
approach. That is one of my justifications for studying the Egyptian diaspora separately 
from these typical approaches and limits. 
Does Egyptian identity, for all Egyptians, really reflect and belong to Arab 
nationalism? What can describe the Egyptian national identity prior to the Arab 
nationalism wave? Nasser’s Arabism propaganda in the 1960s deepened this problematic 
phenomenon and question. Witteborn (2007) asserted that Egypt was Arabized and 
Islamized by social and political powers. That means that the country had come to the 
reality from thousands of years ago as not Arab or Muslim before those two fixed 
interrelated identities, the Arab and Muslim.  
The modern Egyptian national identity was reproduced by regnant powers under 
new circumstances and for specific reasons. Concerning a particular agenda and interest, 
Pratt (2005) said, “The reproduction of [Egyptian] national culture and identity acts as a 
means of reproducing the dominant configuration of relations of power in society, or 
hegemony” (p. 90). The imposed national identity did not just change and reproduce the 
Egyptian people’s culture and identity, but it also impacted the practice of democracy 
(Pratt, 2005, pp. 1, 74). In this study, I considered the Egyptian case as one entity, but I 
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also mentioned the uniqueness and influence of both Copts and the Muslim Brotherhood 
whenever doing so could serve my study purpose. 
  The concept of political engagement and participation. The term political 
engagement is varied and unclear (Jang, 2014). It could be defined as that which grants 
citizens in a well-functioning democracy an opportunity to influence the political choices 
of government officials to communicate specific information to those officials about 
citizens’ concerns and to put pressure on them to respond positively. This political 
participation involves a wide range of informal activities and is not limited to the typical 
formal participation that exists (Boarini & Diaz, 2015). 
Political engagement might take several forms and range from passive or inactive 
to proactive and traditional activities. These forms could include a minimal level such as 
watching the news or reading newspapers, meeting a group of friends to discuss political 
issues, paying taxes, boycotting products and recommending others to do the same, and 
serving on a jury. A higher level of engagement could include visible activities such as 
electoral voting, participating in politicians' campaigns, participating and organizing 
demonstrations, or signing petitions for a cause via social media or other traditional ways. 
According to Jang (2012), generally, people engage by communicating with the decision 
makers directly or indirectly by influencing the electoral outcomes of those politicians 
and other officials (p. 639). In the Korean ideal, Jang asserted that second generation of 
diasporic populations might tend to adopt the traditional activities that are at the higher 




Of course, the choice of engagement activities and levels depends on several 
factors that are part of the study topic. However, Jang (2014) asserted that the low 
engagement and influence emerges because people underestimate their own political 
commitments because they believe that being active should mean being proactive and 
visible. They have a misunderstanding and no confidence in their ability to make any 
change; hence, they avert from doing any activity, however minimal.  
Finally, ethnic groups are, in general, different regarding their political 
engagement based on the engagement factors combined with the groups’ characteristics 
(Jang, 2012, p. 41). Political engagement is an outcome of a long process of interaction 
between many related elements. I designed my approach to studying the external and 
inter factors of political engagement in the Egyptian diaspora based on the premise that 
engagement is the result of such a process. Jang’s statement assures my notion that no 
separation should be made between all types of factors at the theory and practice level in 
order to address what is political engagement and how it could look like for the diaspora 
The concept of the diaspora identity and how it affects the diaspora 
formation and proliferation. Goodman (as cited in Kalmbach & Moghissi, 2009) 
argued that diasporic individuals forge their new identity in host lands through both 
passive and active processes and interaction with the environing population and 
environment (p. 352). As Aswad (2001) noted that identities vary and change and people 
can have multiple identities at the same time and situation (p. 2). That is because ethnic, 
national, religious, and other forms of identification depend on situational factors such as 
political context and geographic location (Witteborn, 2007).  
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Also, changing identity is a common behavior and is not limited to the diaspora 
members. As I have explained previously, the authorities of the country of origin, i.e. the 
regime of the Egyptian military coup of 1952, also tended to change and reproduce the 
people’s identity as Pratt (2005) explained. That happened because of other 
circumstances such as the regime need of having its stable legitimacy instead of the 
revolutionary legitimacy.  
Changing, hiding, or showing a distinct identity of diaspora members is a general 
notion; however, Watanabe (2002) referred to the situational political mobilization to 
indicate one of two dimensions of addressing the Asian Americans’ identity. Sheffer 
(2006, p. 18) pointed to the same approach as one of the several approaches addressing 
the ethno-diaspora identities concept. Some diasporas such as Asian-Americans or 
Coptic-Americans could choose one of the several identities, or they could gather several 
identities. For example, the identity can be global versus the local or limited national or 
religious identity. According to Dickinson (2008), the Copt community in Michigan 
chose to show their religious identity and hiding their Arab identity because of the hassles 
that occurred after the situation of 9/11. 
This orientation was not limited to the Copts or Michigan. “Today, as Muslim 
Arabs receive so much attention many Christians Arabs in the Detroit, [Michigan] area 
[were] distancing themselves by wearing large crosses” (Aswad, 2001, p. 2) and that 
orientation was not limited to that city. In the United States as a whole, “much of the 2/3 
of the American Arab community that is Christian [tended to] distance itself from the 1/3 
that is Moslem” based on the effect of the same situation of 9/11 (Wilson Center, 2001). 
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But although some “Arabs in abroad dropped the label of “Arab” after September 11 to 
avoid discrimination, others started to self-identify as “Arab American”” (Witteborn, 
2007, p. 556) 
On the other hand, this event and its public consequences and legal problems also 
made many Arab Americans start feeling their original identity for the first time (Hajjar, 
2001). Therefore, because of this public hassle and suspicion, Arab and Muslim 
Americans found that event as a strong reason to shift to the protection of civil liberties 
and identity and to be more active and organized (Uslaner, 2007). This positive, 
pragmatic notion can also be applied to other diaspora cases. With peace in the Middle 
East based on the Oslo Agreement of peace between Palestinians and Israelis in 1993, the 
homeland “would no longer remain Jewish-America’s “secular religion,” and the 
[Jewish] diaspora would have to reshape its identity” (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 184) Each 
diaspora and subgroups have a different reason or motive to come to the United States.  
The paradoxical situations of those diasporas denote that their unique Islamic and 
Arabic identities become explicitly salient in the host environment more or easier than in 
the home country. According to Kalmbach and Moghissi (2009), group identity is 
“constructed” through experience in the host country and these experiences can lead to 
more explicitly Islamic identities (p. 351). High unemployment and exclusion from 
certain social circles in the host societies are another example of those negative 
experiences of Muslim diasporas. Those experiences increase not only the feeling of the 
Muslim identity but also extend the radical identity, Islamism identity (Mossallanejad as 
cited in Kalmbach & Moghissi, 2009, p. 352). 
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Watanabe (2002) referred to the flexibility of choosing one identity, which is 
option one or assuming multiple identities instead, which is option two, for the Asian-
Americans groups. The flexibility of the situational model allows more than one 
mobilization reaction and other political behaviors (Hing, as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 
139). The second option that is the multiple identities is also based on the political and 
social situations and changes. In different words, politics can be the base of assuming 
multiple identities (Wang as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139).  
As a result, the identity was not solid all the time because of some political 
situations. According to Jang (2012), several studies found “identity changes and evolves 
over time as immigrants assimilate into the host culture” (p. 9). That also means that the 
identity formation is a natural process and outcome as it could also be an arbitrary choice 
of individuals in a specific time and for a reason. Is it perhaps rather that they have a 
range of more or less intense identities, among which some become more salient 
depending on the external circumstances. Egyptians are very unlikely to assume a 
Muslim, Buddhist, or Jewish identity, for example, even if they would get material and 
security benefits. Some might, i.e. those who marry outside the ethnic group and convert 
their religion, but that situation is not often occurring. In the section of loyalty 
characteristic, I showed how that identity and assimilation could be a factor in deciding 
on loyalty type of diaspora.   
In sum, identity has a role in defining the diaspora political choices on the one 
hand (Watanabe as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139), and choosing or forming any 
identity is a product of interactions between several social, political factors such as the 
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context, immigration policies, foreign policy, political status of the home country, and 
time, on the other hand. This cyclic process and relation also indicate that having a 
particular identity can be not only the group choice only but also the outsiders’ perception 
and treatment towards the group (Watanabe as cited in Ambrosio, pp. 138, 139).  
Egyptians have long conducted an intense national debate about what Egypt is, 
what it stands for, and its place in the world (Cook, 2011). Hatina (2007) stated, “The 
struggle over Egypt’s cultural identity was reflected in a large corpus of ideological 
writing, quintessentially represented in the works of neo-liberals and their Islamist 
writing” (p. 8). Neo-liberal Egyptian theorists use Islamist concepts regarding several 
issues such as, the challenge of modernization and Western culture, and the true Islam 
(pp. 8-9) While Egyptians are African in nature origin, the Arab, and Western mindsets 
commonly identify them as Muslim-Arab or Middle Eastern. This public perception and 
reception consider the contemporary political, religious, and linguistic dimensions that 
Arabs share with Egyptians, and does not reflect many aspects of the physical differences 
and social, history, and geography facts. Islamic culture and values were the most 
influential factor in shaping the Middle East and North Africa image and making the 
assimilation of Egyptians into the Arab Muslim culture (Bishai, 2010, pp. 18-19).  
The problem is that many Egyptians and Egyptian diasporas mostly changed that 
path and believed in the Arabic identification and nationalism for mostly political 
agendas and crisis events (e.g. wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973). This change caused 
a new formation of the Egyptian nation as well as diasporas and, thereby determined their 
policy choices and actions especially after 1956 during Abdel Nasser’s rule. “In other 
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words, [Egyptians’] cultures and identities are socially constructed, yet, for political 
reasons [and particular interests], they are represented as natural and unchanging” (Pratt, 
2005, p. 91). Several national identities should lead to different or situational political 
behaviors and activities within both the host and home countries. While I could address 
these situational behaviors of Egyptians in the Gulf area, I explored their behaviors in the 
American environment, which still has not been handled in the available literature.   
A long time of observation could show and approve the situational model of 
identity for the different Egyptian diasporas. Many of the their members of the 1960s and 
1970s immigration waves had chosen a radical Islamic identity when they lived for long 
terms in Saudi Arabia and Persian/Arabian Gulf states. After the 1967 defeat, Nasserist 
nationalists and pan-Arabism declined, which opened the national sphere to the Islamic 
discourse and powers to come back and became salient in the 1970s and 1980s (Hatina, 
2007, pp. 8-10, 100). Thus, “the Islamist movement in Egypt is active in attempting to 
shape cultural practices” (Pratt, 2005, p. 78). 
There was a need to explore what other political situations or factors could make 
ethnic groups have a specific identity and form their diaspora based on that. Teitelbaum 
(as cited in Watanabe, 2002) argued that migration policies and process are the most 
important element that affects the U.S. foreign policy through regulating the ethnic 
composition (p. 132). Ambrosio (2002) had the opposite view of this triple relation. 
Ambrosio believed that the foundations of Asian-American groups connect to the foreign 
events more than the U.S. local immigration regulations (p. 133). Does that mean 
anything regarding the Egyptian case due to their identifications and mobilization as a 
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diaspora? I would merge both views that Ambrosio showed to explain the ethnic groups 
formation and connect it to the identity choice. 
I adopted a simple idea of Glazer and Moynihan that implied that there could be a 
loop of interactions between the formation of ethnic groups, and the formation of foreign 
policies. Hence, the ethnic group foundations, including the identity, are located and 
affected by the context that implies several internal and external actors, counterparts, 
opposing or coinciding interests, and foreign policy. In turn, ethnic groups participate in 
shaping the foreign policy; however, they are not the only factor in this process. The 
foreign policy and other elements such as national immigration policies and global forces 
and concerns also shape the size, identification, and diversity of the groups such as Asian 
Americans (Watanabe, 2002, pp. 132-133). In different words, all of these factors are 
functioning as a cause and result of each other in a cyclic style, not a linear way.   
Egyptians are not different from some other Arab ethnic groups regarding to their 
identity aspects. According to Connor and Smith (as cited in Sheffer, 2006) the identity 
of groups ethno-national groups such as Gypsies are based on primordial, instrumental, 
and mythical/psychological elements (p. 11). The controversial identity, loyalty, and 
relationship between Arab and Egyptians are one of the elements making the Egyptian 
identity that is still undetermined. According to Witteborn (2007), some Egyptian 
diaspora members emphasize an Egyptian instead of an Arab identity in their daily, social 
communications. They believe that Egypt was Arabized and Islamized by the state 
authority (p. 566). Confusion about the identity choices and the situational characteristics 
are an important determinate of the division among the Arab diaspora and Egyptian 
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diaspora members and their deficient political engagement in America. However, let us 
also continue considering all Egyptians abroad as diaspora and one diaspora only, and 
exploring its internal characteristics as a diaspora as well as the external engagement 
factors in the coming sections.  
Approaching the Diasporas’ Characteristics and External Factors 
Oswiecimski (2013) detailed the characteristics and factors of political influence 
and engagement of some powerful and traditional diasporas in history, which are the 
Jewish, Cuban, and Armenian Americans (p. 70). Oswiecimski built a list of factors on 
the perception of the influence and power using a comparative approach. Similarly, 
DeWind and Segura (2014) used a distinctive interactive approach to explore and analyze 
the different degrees of diasporas-governments relations to examine the influence of 
several diasporas such as Jewish and Iraqi (p. 15).  
According to Oswiecimski (2013), “To discuss the role of ethnic lobbies in 
foreign policy making one should rather look at examples of groups that are the most 
active and are perceived as having the most influence” (p. 53). My study also used the 
same approach that is the compared powers; however, my comparison will not be 
inclusively using successful models such as Jews and their powerful organization, 
AIPAC, only. Instead, I would compare the Egyptian ethnic group to influential diasporas 
such as Cuban and Jewish besides less powerful diaspora, which is the Arab, Ethiopian, 
and Korean ethnic groups to explore the characteristics and factors of the Egyptian 
diaspora influence.  
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I chose new, incipient, or less powerful diasporas because their influence level 
assumingly, would not be far or very different from the Arab or Egyptian diasporas. 
Jang’s model of included factors were mainly addressing why the Korean-Americans 
were not very engaging or influential. Having said that, it would be more rationale to use 
that model of adverse factors or failing enterprise of Korean-American lack of 
engagement. This approach is more reasonable than using a model of very positive 
factors or model of success to explain Egyptian-American weak political diaspora 
lobbying engagement. Jang (2014) offered a new model of the political engagement 
factors and diaspora characteristics that I would take in my primary account.  
Of course, in any comparison, I take into my consideration that the ethnic groups 
have different features and would be different regarding their political engagement level 
and type depending on several factors. Those factors are such as what kind of priorities 
and problems ethnic groups face and faced given their unique circumstances (Jang, 2012, 
p. 41). Jang’s (2012) theoretical foundation considered “studies have not separated 
behaviors from knowledge and attitude, along with resources, recruitment, and 
psychological orientation, when examining groups under investigation” (p. 40). Hence, 
exploring the political engagement factors would not be separated from the nature and 
characteristics of the diaspora. That is because these two categories of factors were not 
studied separately in the literature and because they could not be separated from each 
other as well as the strategies the diasporas employed to be influential in the real world.  
The effectiveness of an ethnic group is primarily due to some relevant group and 
organizational characteristics such as the size, particular electoral distribution, and 
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motivation and commitment to a specific policy and country (McCormick, 2012, p. 338). 
McCormick built an approach to the success of all interest groups including ethnic 
lobbies on Smith’s general factors: the pluralist nature of the American political system 
that implies several divisions among the official political branches and powers of 
Washington, DC and the characteristics of ethnic groups themselves (p. 321). Both 
scholars considered the external factors such as the nature of the U.S. political system, as 
well as the internal organizational and characteristics as essential independent, 
intervening, or confounding variables to determine the diaspora potential influence and 
success. Among the external factors are the democratic principles such as Madison’s 
version of democracy that exist in the host country sphere. 
Diaspora Characteristics 
Political apathy has dominated the behavior of most Egyptian expats, and indeed 
most other Arab expatriates, with the exception of some Palestinians. Concerning the 
typical style of that diaspora’s engagement, Ashour (2010) believed that “Most Egyptian 
expats have been more concerned about building economic fortunes and retaining the 
ability to go back home without fear of government reprisals” (para. 2) This section, 
covering the characteristics, explored and tested if that statement of Ashour (2010) has 
reflected the reality of the Egyptian diaspora.  
The Korean case and Jang’s study are significant for my study basically, because 
of its theoretical framework and new factors of diaspora political engagement model. 
Jang’s study shows several characteristics of the Korean diaspora and other diasporas, 
and external factors of their political engagement. No other study mentioned the 
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underestimation of self's political engagement, lack of substantial ownership, and 
negative perception on politics as all factors of civic and political influence of diasporas, 
and that was the uniqueness of Jang’s new model.  
These internal characteristics and external factors and other variables of Jang 
model do not exist or relate to many other diaspora cases but they still have many things 
to do with the Egyptian case as well as the Korean. In general, the diaspora 
characteristics exist and form the diaspora profile and engagement at different levels 
because of different reasons and factors. According to Watanabe (2002), the foreign 
policy and other elements such as national immigration policies and global forces and 
concerns also shape the characteristics size, identification, and diversity of the groups 
such as Asian Americans (pp. 132-133). Severo and Zuolo (2012) summarized the 
characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora as the following: 
[It is] known phenomena: the fact that the Egyptian diaspora is limited; the weak 
link with the country of origin; the variety of the diaspora’s dynamics and how 
they differ according to the host country; and, last but not least, the strength of the 
Coptic diaspora. Given these facts, we can describe the Egyptian diaspora as one 
of those diasporas that Alain Médam defines as “still fluid, shifting, floating. 
Even if these data cannot be considered as representative of all Egyptians abroad, 
they reveal an interest of part of Egyptian migrants for their homeland, a common 
feature of diasporas. (p. 7)  
I cannot consider all of these features of Egyptian diaspora as an absolute fact. 
The link with the country of origin is not weak at all. According to Talani (2005), the 
81 
 
patterns of Egyptian migration indicates that Egyptians have a reputation of attachment to 
the land and kin, and when they travel, they always return no matter how long they stayed 
out that homeland. However, recently, the number of migrants raised and one-third of the 
Egyptian migrants all over the world are permanent. Usually, Egyptians who go to work 
in the Arab countries and come back while their peers in the West prefer to stay in the 
diasporic countries (pp. 18-19). They are also eager to obtain the citizenship as a clear 
indicator that they decided to stay and maybe assimilate into those Western countries. 
This generalized statement could be challenged by a hypothesis that I intend to 
test to determine whether it is true through my questions research. Egyptians emigrants’ 
self-identity is not that weak; hence, that unique characteristic might explain why their 
connection with the homeland and kin is still salient, however, that is not the only reason. 
Egyptians emigrants are not just this diasporic sector of the Arab diaspora that has not 
been assimilated into the American environment. That is if I generally speak by 
considering the Egyptian diaspora as a part of the Arab Americans (or Arab-Americans), 
therefore I could agree with Suleiman (2001) who asserted that Arab Americans still have 
a serious difficulty of being accepted, assimilated and integrated into that environment, 
especially into the political realm (pp. 9-10). 
Nevertheless, generalization is not the right way to address the Egyptian group’s 
status. The strength and salience of the different activities of the Coptic sector of the 
Egyptian diaspora is a fact according to many researchers such as Severo and Zuolo 
(2012), Dickinson (2008), and Rowe (2001). However, the dispersed Islamists after the 
January 2011 Revolution should also be considered in the same active group category. I 
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would address and test this statement by exploring the following characteristics. The 
Egyptian diaspora also has other attributes that need to be explored in terms of 
highlighting their effect on the political engagement of that ethnic group.  
First characteristic: Negative perceptions of politics and politicians. Jang 
(2014) found that negative perceptions of politics and politicians were attributed to direct 
and indirect negative political experience of the Korean diaspora members in the home 
and host countries. This stand made them refrain from politically engage and decide not 
to establish or join active diaspora. The first generation has this stand that is more 
intensive than the stand of the latter generations. That is because they had direct 
experience in Korea and America and negative impression about the Korean politicians 
and organizational leaders in the United States (pp. 637, 642). That can also be true in the 
Egyptian case. The negative impression of Egyptians is not on Egyptian organizational 
leaders in the United States only.  
There are many reasons for assuming the existence of negative perceptions 
characteristic in both the Korean and Egyptian cases. Egyptians have typical negative 
perceptions of their politicians, political system, and all powers in Egypt. For example, 
Islamists were already framed negatively before they reached power, and when their 
political roles changed, framing became more negative (El-Haddad, 2013, pp. 41-44). It 
is not just negative perceptions but also mistrust between citizens and the government 
that affect the citizens as well diaspora members (Zohry & Debnath, 2010, p. 7). In line 
with those statements, Jang (2014) found that distrust toward Korean associations and 
their leadership is a common negative perception among Koreans in Washington, D.C. 
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For example, it is a common thought that those leaders and politicians only work for 
themselves, family businesses, and personal prestige (p. 642).  
Moreover, since 1952 and Nasser’s regime, Egyptians have reasonable causes to 
fear the state and its long unchecked arms, and the fall of democracy and the Egyptian 
liberal era. That era had extended from the Constitution of 1923 under King Fouad the 
First and impaired partly by the British and then diametrically by the coup d'état of 1952. 
According to Pratt (2005), “The importance of dominating the cultural sphere in order to 
exercise political power may be signaled by the vast amount of resources dedicated to 
promoting the leadership cult of [a number of Pan-Arabism leaders such as]” (p. 77) 
Nasser. Having said that, in Egypt, the typical Egyptian culture, and identity, based on 
liberal values that were common before the Free-Officers coup had vanished (Hatina, 
2007). The new authoritarian rule has reshaped this national culture and thus identity. 
The regime’s rationale for going this way was the regime's rhetorical pan-
Arabism, the claim of security, protecting the “our newborn revolution” from the forces 
of reaction and feudality powers, and fighting “what is called Israel.” The result on the 
national level was a new fixed identity but also new resistances against that imposed 
orientation of the state and the society. The resistance came from Islamists as well as the 
civil society but of course, for different socio-political goals and confronting agendas 
(Hatina, 2007, p. 31, 100; Pratt, 2005, pp. 74, 77). When Egyptians moved to other states 
regardless any positive climate of those new host lands, they kept and transferred the 
conflicts between all of these factors and the reproduced culture. In addition, there were 
always other reasons for the adverse perception of politics and politicians such as the 
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high rate of corruption that has been composed due to the illegal marriage between the 
wealth and authority. Due to these reasons and others, many Egyptians believe that there 
is a difference between the welfare of the country and the interests of the ruling regime. 
(Ashour, 2010) 
Second characteristic: Organizational unity. This internal factor is an umbrella 
of several factors facilitating political influence for diasporas and their lobbies. The 
diaspora’s strength is rooted in the organizational unity. The unity means the collective 
and dominant national dream, a single clear agenda backed up by salient goals and 
organizational purpose, positive human communication, and mutual understanding of the 
differences of the nation’ parties. Adopting one national motive can be the backbone of 
organizational unity (Smith, 2000, pp. 110-111). Jang (2014) mentioned that the diaspora 
members realized their need for being united only when they faced a disturbing, robust, 
and external factor (e.g., the domestic racial riot against the diaspora and its interest).  
As an independent variable, when divisions occur and grow within the diaspora, it 
will lose its one-voice characteristic, and it will be harder to gain or keep support outside 
one’s own group for the diaspora cause (Uslaner, 2007, p. 302). Losing this support 
should lead to a lack of the diaspora motion and influence that is the dependent variable 
of this relationship. As per Smith (2000) and McCormick (2012), interest groups 
including diasporas permanently should adopt and press for achieving a primary purpose 
for its institutional structure under a single leader, for example, a historical founder as in 
the Cuban diaspora. (p. 110, pp. 319-320, 338) or collective institutional leadership that 
members have to appreciate. The institutional backbone is the harmony of the 
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organization among the leaders and between its leadership and the diaspora community 
(Smith, p. 116).  
Before the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian diasporas had “face [d] real challenges 
in terms of overcoming their differences in order to form strong organizations” (Ashour, 
2010). Supporting the country’s economy by the diaspora and national agenda had kept 
the organizational harmony for a very short time during the last few years that followed 
the Revolution. The state, organizations, and individuals might need an external enemy 
(i.e., Israel before Camp David Treaty in 1979, Ethiopia Dam project, or Shi'ite rhetoric 
of Iran) or internal challenges (i.e., Muslim Brotherhoods and ISIS and terrorism in north 
of Sinai) to keep the national entities’ friendship, solo national identity, unity, and maybe 
all parties’ life. The new revolution was the key to the national unity because people, 
organizations, and civil society were all fighting one enemy or challenge that was 
Mubarak’s tenure.  
Although this collective mindset of national popular struggle was the key to the 
resurgence for citizens as well as Egyptian diasporas and political groups, Egyptians tend 
typically to disagree on one leadership or agenda and a collaboration culture or tradition 
does not exist in many situations. According to Ashour (2010), the reason could be the 
diaspora is divided along political, ideological, religious, and social class lines (para. 4). 
On the other hand, according to Abdel Aziz and Marcos (2013), Egyptian organizational 
culture is known as having a high level of power distance and hierarchy (p. 1). Hence, the 
unity might not be available if was not imposed by the polity from top to down.  
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For example, the revolt or coup d'état of 1952 that was the symbol of the struggle 
for national independence had succeeded in imposing and maintaining the national unity 
and consequently, the Islamic slogan and activities had disappeared for some years till the 
1970s. Ironically, one of the factors that existed behind the return of the Islamic powers 
and discourse was the Egyptian state itself (Hatia, 2007, pp. 3, 100). That template was 
not different or separated from the situation of the Egyptian diaspora and was expanded 
to all Arab diaspora especially, Arab and African students’ unions abroad during the 
collective revolutionary waves in the 1960s. 
For Egyptian Americans diaspora and its advocacy organizations, there is severe 
polarization, social class lines, and political, ideological, religious divisions amongst 
them and between them and the Egyptian state, and an apparent lack of organizational 
experience and lobbying history (Ashour, 2010, para. 4, 9). In a later section of this 
paper, I explored the connection between this characteristic, the organizational unity, and 
an external factor that is the relationships between a state and diaspora. In sum, these 
characteristics and others set back the political influence on the home and host countries’ 
politics. The identity profile of Egyptian diaspora including Copts is a complicated, 
critical matter because of common issues such as faith as well as past and emergence 
political circumstances. The current research on diaspora did not approach the influence 
of the current Egyptian identity debate and struggle on the likelihood prominence of 
united diaspora leadership and organized political mobilization. In the following section, 
I continue exploring more characteristics as well as factors that all are independent 
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variables that intertwine determining the potential political engagement and Influence of 
diaspora with more focus on the Egyptian ethnic group.  
Factors of Diaspora’s Political Engagement, Influence, Strategies, and Nature  
Egyptians in the diaspora face many different obstacles to playing such a political 
role (Ashour, 2010). Of course, those obstacles change due to the change in time frame 
and the internal and external circumstances. As I mentioned, several writers found that 
ethnic interest groups, communities, and diasporas are not solid or static entities, but they 
are changeable and dynamic objects whereas they react to different types of factors and 
changes as well as they influence other parties along history and the current time. In other 
words, no diaspora is always paramount or passive (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 71) because a 
diaspora is not an isolated group or organization.  
Diaspora consists of human beings who influence as well as being influenced by 
others and surrounding historical and new events and factors every day. For example, “In 
1987, the pro-Israel groups began to lose some of their clout because the rising success 
on the Palestinians side and the conflict in the region which led to fractionalization within 
the Jewish organizational unity” (Uslaner, 2007, p. 308). Similarly, the strong, active 
Cuban diaspora lost its unity, the one-voice trait; because of the change in its solo, 
leadership coupled with the United States government policy shifting towards new 
collaboration the Castro brothers’ Cuban dictatorship regime (Uslaner, 2007, p. 303).  
In sum, diaspora is a subject of changes based on its amebic nature and 
changeable characteristics that expose the diaspora to different factors. The following 
sections will demonstrate factors and more characteristics of different diasporas to be 
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applied and compared to the Egyptian case. The analysis of the available literature would 
conclude that the emergence of the ethnic groups and the existence of their influence per 
se are also linked to each other and those factors and others. In a similar vein, Jang 
(2014), Smith (2005), Sheffer (2006), McCormick (2012), and Ambrosio (2002) 
summarized several factors or characteristics that ethnic groups should have to be seen as 
a successful and influential actor in the foreign politics realm. 
The organizational type and strength. This major factor was widely explored 
by several studies. Jang (2012, 2014) and Ambrosio (2002) found that this factor could 
include several elements; however, not all studies classified or identified it in the same 
way. The organizational factor includes the role of the religious institution, unity among 
leadership and members, using advanced technology, and relatively easy access to the 
Congress members. The last element should reduce the cost and obstacles of lobbying the 
decision-makers.  
When Jang (2014, pp. 633-634, 640) referred to this factor, she did not mean the 
diaspora as a substantial entity and its organizational issues. She focused on one 
dimension that is the religious institution as a primary organization in the Korean 
diaspora’s life. Korean churches play a fundamental role within Korean social enclaves at 
all levels of social and civic assets (Jang, 2012, pp. 29-31). However, its notable role and 
attitudes constituted a negative influence on the Korean community regarding the 
participation in political activities (Jang, 2014, p. 634). The church leaders firmly believe 
that this contrasting stand of abstaining from politics should keep the church and diaspora 
strong and united regardless of the political engagement. 
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Jang (2014, p. 632) paid more attention to the religious organizational element 
that influences political engagement of ethnically diverse publics; however, she found 
this relation between mobilization and religious organization factor was clear and 
confident in other diasporas such as Arabs, except for the Korean diaspora members. On 
the other hand, the religious institution is not the only dimension or element of the 
organizational type factor. Jang found that diaspora was not organized politically before 
the 1992 riot that imposed profound shifts in the community by bringing it together. As a 
result, the diaspora realized the need of being politically empowered and organized to be 
able to defend its benefits and assets when confronting other minority groups (Ban and 
Adams as cited in Jang, 2014, p. 634).  
This factor also implies long, successful organizational experience that has 
furnished a roadmap for the newcomers to the political process. Arab diasporas do not 
have this level of experience unlike Jews, and that organizational feature affected their 
potential access to the decision-makers’ layers. According to Smith (2000), some 
professional organizations of diasporas such as Jews, Albanians, and Cubans are able to 
push for enacting particular legislations and policies, monitor the decision-making 
process, and building cooperation with other diasporas, maintain ethnic unity, and all of 
these elements lead to strong organizational type and experience. Being close and closer 
to the decision makers is fundamental to achieving greater change and influence on the 
foreign politics (pp. 94, 123).   
Electoral mobilization implication. This factor includes several elements of 
membership unity, concentrations in states rich in congressional districts and electoral 
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college votes; political and financial contribution of ethnic groups; and access to 
contacting the district constituency that might lead to voters participation impact, voting 
bloc pressure, and financial ethnic support (Ambrosio, 2002, p.p. 11-12; McCormick, 
2012, pp. 319-324). According to the annual report of the Arab American Institution 
(AAI), (2016), although Arab Americans live in all 50 states, two-thirds reside in 10 
states only such as New York, Washington, DC, and New Jersey. As I mentioned 
previously, Egyptian immigrant communities are growing up. They composed one of the 
three largest Arab communities: Egyptian (12% which was 9% in 1990), Syrian (12%), 
and Lebanese according to Census 2000. Then, the Egyptian group became the largest 
Arab group as Egyptians (34%) who concentrate in California and New Jersey 
respectively according to U.S. Census 2010 (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2). One limitation 
that statics have is that “there was no statistical difference between the size of the 
Egyptian populations in New Jersey and New York” according to Census 2000 (Census, 
2003, p. 8). The meaning is that they are both the same proportion of the population in 
those cities.  
 Available literature and resources did not explain the reason behind this type of 
concentration of Arabs and Egyptians. However, the Egyptian diaspora concentration in 
New Jersey might be explained by saying that since New Jersey has the largest 
population of Coptic Christians in the United States, therefore the reason for Egyptian 
and Egyptian-Christian concentration in this state might be religious, personal, or 
cultural. In other words, the political power of the diasporas concentration pattern is not 
the reason for moving and mobilizing, but it is just a consequent result. The concentrated 
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voting power could explain the contrast between the small size and significant influence 
in many cases such as Jews, Greeks, and Albanians (Smith, 2005, p. 95) with taking into 
account that the Greeks and Jews must be significantly larger U.S. diasporas than the 
Albanians. This idea should explain the finding of Oswiecimski (2013) that is about why 
the small size is not always effective in a negative way. This issue will be a subject of 
more explanation through other factors that are connected functionally to electoral 
mobilization.  
The effective size and expected influence. This factor has particular significance 
because it connects and affects the diaspora’ proliferation, engagement, and potential 
influence. According to Jang (2014), given the exponential growth in the size of the 
population of ethnic minorities increased the academic interest on them; therefore, more 
research was needed to understand their political engagement (p. 649). The effective size 
factor includes population concentration, effective generation, and leadership style. 
Ashour (2010) addressed this point and found “the potential advantage of the expats lies 
in their numbers, and thus have made permitting Egyptians abroad to vote in Egyptian 
elections via consulates.” However, this claim cannot be generalized or believed all the 
time. 
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, “It would seem that the size of the 
group should affect its lobbying effectiveness. This is only partly true, though” 
(Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 64). Theoretically, Irish and some other European diasporas 
should have stronger lobbies than the Jewish lobby based on the vast difference in size, 
but this is not the fact on the ground. The enormous size of some diasporas such as the 
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Egyptian, Mexicans, and Chinese caused by their countries large population also did not 
necessarily lead to greater political effectiveness all the time or in all cases.  
According to Mowafi and Farag (n.d), “Creating a sense of community is not 
dependent on size of country” (p. 6). To explain this contrast, we should differentiate 
between two sorts of population sizes, the general and core size. Mearsheimer and Walt 
(2006), and Oswiecimski (2013) asserted that the most substantial Jewish populations 
concentrate in key electoral districts such as New York, California, and Washington, DC. 
The most important is not the general population size (pp. 54, 63, 65; pp. 41, 43). The 
Jewish-Americans small portion (3 percent) of the general American population 
guaranteed a place for Jewish agenda on the table of foreign policy deliberation in 
Washington, DC (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 43; Smith, 2006, p. 99).  
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that this concentration of population 
is an important factor of ethnic groups’ political power and influence in general, and 
voting turnout in particular, besides other organizational benefits (p. 878). However, this 
finding of Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, and Oswiecimski (2013) were not the common 
belief in the literature on some groups such as Latinos. Due to some characteristics and 
contextual social factors such language barriers and insufficiency of financial resources 
and immigration status, higher ethno concentration might be not a useful factor for 
electoral mobilization, voting participation, and political manipulation (Cho; de la Graza; 
Espenshade & Fu; DeSipio, as cited in Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 878). 
Those two contrasting ideas cannot be generalized to all ethnic groups or across 
all generations. Ethnic concentration can be sufficiently positive for diasporas to organize 
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themselves as effective organizations and voting bloc. Concerning the small size of the 
diaspora in the United States, the MPI report (2015) indicated that the “Egyptian diaspora 
organizations are relatively abundant” (p. 2). I inferred that the entire small size of the 
population did not affect the proliferation and engagement of the Egyptian diaspora's 
organizations all the time negatively.  
However, I should assert that being effective does not always mean being 
successful and achievable. Also, the success is a relative perception, i.e., the Palestinian 
diaspora is relatively unsuccessful if we considered it in proportion to AIPAC. There are 
always other factors as well as characteristics intertwining with the consideration of the 
size enabling or disabling the social assimilation, in general, political integration in 
particular, and organizations’ proliferation. De La Raza (as cited in Oswiecimski, 2013) 
expected that Mexican-Americans and African Americans might have a future chance of 
being a potential influential ethnic community mainly because of their large and growing 
population size (p. 63). It is easy to generalize by saying that as big it is it should be 
strong. However, Oswiecimski (2013) challenges this hypothesis by saying that despite 
the large size of some ethnic groups including Mexicans, these groups do not formulate 
an influential lobbying power in America (p. 64).  
The Egyptian diaspora essentially does not have significant absolute size (less 
than quarter of a million in 2013 in America) or concentrated population (one type of the 
effective size) in any politically important electoral district (MPI, 2015, p. 6). While 
Egyptians comprise about 12% of the 1.7 million Arab people as 2010 U.S. Census 
record indicated (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2), they compose only 9% of the total Arab 
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population, that is less than 4000 in Washington, DC according to the same year of U.S. 
Census record (Suleiman, 2001). That is, could this tiny group come to be concentrated 
and thus mobilized and active? This claim about Egyptian and Arab Americans might 
support my idea; there is a difference between the size of the ethnic group population and 
concentrated population size that interest organizations can mobilize for lobbying. And 
because of this debate, yet, there is no direct connection between the group size and 
effectiveness. According to Smith (2000), regarding the Irish Americans, “one should not 
confuse their numbers with their strength” (p. 117).   
 The effective size is not only resulting from the concentration of the ethnic 
population in the key electoral districts. The other type of the effective size is the core 
size of the group, which I will speak about in the section of the diaspora’s proliferation, 
and effective size. According to Oswiecimski (2013), some diasporas such as Cubans had 
an effective center that should represent and push the whole diaspora to be effective 
regardless of its actual size. This substantial size refers to wealthier, better-educated, and 
politically active members (the exile generation in the Cuban case) who care about the 
interests of their country of origin (pp. 65-57, 70). Those two specific components-the 
concentrated population in the key electoral districts and effective core-of the population 
is the launcher of the diaspora lobby and its influence. Egyptian diaspora might need to 
gather those two elements to be an influential group, however, the entire population is 
tremendously small, and that might make this hypothesis such dreaming.  
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Finally, neither the mother country population nor diaspora total population size could 
always lead to automatic political effectiveness of its diasporas. According to Mowafi 
and Farag (n.d),  
“Israel is less than 1/10th the size of Egypt and India is more than 10 times the 
size of Egypt; yet both have managed to foster a strong self-identity and linkages 
to their diasporas that have benefited both the home country as well as their 
respective communities worldwide” (p. 16)   
The small size of a country could make it feel the need for its diasporas support 
more than other bigger countries could do. However, the strong, big Indian diaspora in 
the Silicon Valley, CA could challenge this assumption meaning that a significant 
national population can also lead to the vast and influential diaspora in some cases. 
Regardless of this hypothesis, the population of Egyptian immigrants to the United States 
is growing (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2), and Egypt population exceeded the 80 million 
in 2013. But this growing rate of immigrants and the enormous number of the national 
population is out of proportion to the minuscule size of the diaspora population and this 
diaspora is not influential compared to the large Indian one. The total estimated Egyptian 
diasporas size was about 2.7 million only in 2005 in the whole world including Saudi 
Arabia and America (Talani, 2005, pp. 18-19). In different words, they compose about 
only 1.5 % of 175 million that is the total of migrants all over the world.  
This percent has changed due to the large refugee movements in the last two 
years. While Egyptian diaspora size in the United States is small, much smaller countries 
such as Albania and Czech Republic have much bigger diasporas size which does not 
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consist with their tiny countries population and area. That Albanian diaspora became 
much stronger and bigger (Sheffer, 2006, pp. 106-107). Although there are many 
Egyptians, especially the well-educated young generations and middle class eager to 
escape to the United States, their existing number is modest. For the Egyptian situation in 
particular, there are specific factors could be behind that contrast between the country 
size and its diaspora size. American foreign policy and national immigration policies (e.g. 
visa and Green Card), and global forces and concerns should affect the formation of 
diaspora by shaping its absolute size. The interview questions would try to find out an 
explanation of that contrast.  
The Connection Between the External Factors, Internal Characteristics, and 
Strategies 
The last section included several references to the diaspora characteristics and 
their relations to other factors and strategies of political engagement and influence. In the 
current section, I make a closer focus on this relation in more details. The factors listed in 
both sections are separated or different. I simply try to see the external factors through 
their links to characteristics and how the literature has linked them.   
Uslaner (2007) and McCormick (2012) listed some essential conditions and 
strategies for ethnic interest groups to employ if those groups seek to be influential and 
successful. The two authors asserted the need for organizational unity that supports a 
specific national cause of the home state they present, a supportive public opinion of the 
host country, campaign contributions, and diaspora members’ concentration in key 
political states and cities. The pro-Israel lobby was able to integrate and manipulate these 
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particular elements. However, the lobby was not able to maintain these strategies and 
features all the time (McCormick, 2012, pp. 321-325; Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307-308).  
Also, it could infer from these strategies that they are not different from factors 
and characteristics. What can be characteristics of one diaspora can be applicable 
strategies or external factors of one another. The classification and differentiation depend 
on authors’ views and his study purpose. All factors connect to different parties and 
political contexts that diasporas work through and with them. This second type of factors 
is the external factors that do not directly or solely determine the engagement or compose 
the diaspora characteristics (internal factors), but they mingle with them to determine the 
collective image, engagement, and strategies of any diaspora (Jang, 2012, p. 40).  
    The effect of the external type of factors connects and depends on the internal 
factors or characteristics of each diaspora, and all should jointly enable or disable 
diasporas to bring pressure to bear on the political process and influence. This point is 
essential to this study, and I am testing and explaining it in detail in the following section 
shortly and through the entire study. The external factors are such as, how the public and 
government perceive the group, the changes in the governmental attitude and political 
process, the ongoing national and international historical conditions and changes such as 
the post-Cold War and 9/11, and the political system mechanism, nature, and gaps 
(Ambrosio, 2002, p. 12; Smith, 2000, pp. 94-129). To differentiate the external factors 
from the internal characteristics, we could consider the element of the local political 
system as an external factor (independent variable). The way that the diaspora could use 
to show its professional understanding and take advantage of the political system element 
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(intermediate variable) should consider the internal organizational characteristics 
(dependent variable). 
By exploring the factors and their elements, the objective of this research has been 
reached. Although not all of those items were found to have direct or any influence on the 
level of political engagement for ethnic minorities (Jang, 2014, p. 633) some factors are 
more important than others depending on the groups' characteristics. For example, the 
religion as an element of the organization type factor was not always positive. It is 
positive in the Arab Muslims and Black Americans cases and negative in the Korean case 
(see Jang, 2012, pp. 3-4).  
According to Oswiecimski (2013), the size of the ethnic population might 
translate into the size of a motivated lobbying ethnic community but it is not the only 
factor. Many encouraging and discouraging circumstances and characters can always 
control the implementation of the diaspora size (p. 65). A large size of diaspora does not 
necessarily provide more resources or has more perceived political influence and 
presence (Jang, 2014, p. 633). Ashour’s (2010) findings indicated that “The Egyptian 
diaspora, estimated at between 3 and 8 million worldwide, has until now not been a factor 
in Egyptian domestic politics, in contrast to the active roles played by Armenian, Irish, 
and Cuban expatriates” (para. 2) 
Historical and historic factors. Smith (2000) mentioned that some historic well-
established diasporas such as Jewish and African Americans continued with their 
influence on different domestic and international American policies (pp. 64, 68). In other 
words, some tremendous shifting events in the world did not impose significant change 
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on the unique position of some diasporas. More recently after historical events such as 
World War II and the period of the new Arab military regimes, Arab Nationalism’s 
(Nasserism and Al-Baath) rise, sectarian strife in some countries such as Lebanon, and 
the disastrous outcome of the 1967 war for Arab states, Arab-Muslims also has been 
immigrating to America and established their new groups. 
Besides these internal factors of migration, Arabs faced other factors in America 
such as the positive change in the immigration quota system that ended favoring 
European immigrants in 1965, and the consequences of the 1967 war and the biased 
support for Israel (McCormick, 2012, p. 323). Therefore, they launched their first 
organization or lobby, the National Association of Arab Americans in 1972 (McCormick, 
p. 323). They have significant disadvantages compared to the historic Zionist lobby, and 
the community still lacks a coherent lobbying arm in Washington, DC and thus has not 
served as effective counterweights (Wilson Center, 2001).  
Every Arab group including Muslim and Christian had its historical motivation or 
incentives to flee to a different era forcibly or voluntarily. It might be correct to say that 
any ethnic group needs a wake-up call to immigrate and then to be active in the foreign 
settler societies. That wake-up call could be national or local events. The 1992 Los 
Angeles riot against Korean business offered this call and rang the bill for making 
significant changes in the passive Korean communities. Most importantly, the riot 
brought the community together raising the unity characteristic and the need for being 
active and empowered (Jang, 2014, p. 634).  
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Similarly, Egyptian ethnic groups were partly contradictory and passive until the 
revolution in 2011. This historic event was national and not a U.S. local event in contrast 
with the Los Angeles riot. Although the revolution was the direct motivation for 
displaying the unity characteristic of Egyptian diaspora, the domestic following events in 
Egypt had an obvious negative effect on that temporary organizational unity. This 
tendency contrasts with the advantage of the immense unity of Jewish diaspora that rarely 
desire to bring any dissonance to the public sphere or the congress (Mearsheimer & Walt, 
2006, p. 46; Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 56). Although the Coptic lobby in the United States 
and Canada is very active and more organized in the Internet sphere compared to the 
Muslim groups, the Coptic groups have no one voice, which conforms with the general 
characteristic of the Muslim Arab and Egyptian peers (Rowe, 2001, pp. 89, 90).  
The relationships between the host state and its diasporas. DeWind and 
Segura (2014) focused on this factor in their new edited book Diaspora Lobbies and the 
US Government Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy. The major case 
study of their book is the convergence of interests between the U.S. government and 
Israel and the Jewish ethnic group that seek to influence the U.S. foreign policies 
especially towards the Middle East all the time (DeWind & Segura, 2014, p. 7). It is not 
just that a good relationship between both states reflects positively on the diaspora 
political positions, but also the stability of that relationship does.  
The relation between diasporas and host land is not limited to them but extends to 
involve the homelands too. According to DeWind and Segura (2014), the host land-
diaspora relation should help resolve the conflicts in the motherland (p. 5). However, this 
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association is not always positive in its nature and it can affect the diaspora’s homeland. 
It can be negative because of the negative role or bad agenda of the diaspora per se. For 
example, the Egyptian media, press, and official discourse claim that the role of the 
Muslim Brotherhoods and, sometimes the Coptic groups and their relations with their 
host lands should have negative consequences on the Egyptian state and its relations with 
the diasporas’ host lands such as Canada, Britain, and America. According to Sheffer 
(2006), this role, and nature of some diasporas can be negative on the political level 
causing conflicts and terrorism not just in the homeland but also in host lands (p. 31).  
Other Factors Related to Diasporas’ Proliferation or Mobilization and Devaluation  
To have a deeper exemplary understanding of the diasporas’ proliferation and 
devaluation, I need to explore the effect of the connection between immigration motive 
factor and effective size factor on diasporas’ proliferation or mobilization in particular. 
The decision of migrants and community members on immigrating contributes to joining 
a new or incipient diaspora. Therefore, their decision affects the establishment or 
materialization as well as the disintegration of that diaspora itself. These events are all 
affected by more factors such as the original culture and immigrants’ experiences, 
prevailed attitude of host and home countries, globalization, migration orders, and 
backgrounds or motivations for emigrating. According to Sheffer (2006), The migration 
pushing-factors and patterns with the pulling-causes for taking part in a diaspora can 
together establish a specific diaspora in a particular region and time; however, the cause 
for migration decision and reasons for being members of a diaspora are different (p. 115).  
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According to Ceschi et al., (2005), the immigration pattern, namely, the kin 
network is a cumulative process. This process implies a structured pre-existing diaspora 
that attracts a particular population of, for example, an Egyptian countryside region to 
come to specific Italian cities. For example, the majority of Egyptian diaspora members 
of Milan city came from individual villages of Banha city seeking work and only work. 
The newcomers would receive generous help in all areas, and the total group became in 
touch with the homeland through a representative organization in Egypt (p. 3). According 
to Jang (2012), in this type of immigrants group, the laborers typically preserve their 
emotional and social connections with their kin and homeland (p. 6). As a result, the 
concentration of the new and old migrants in a specific place in the host land as well as 
being committed and attached to the ancestral homeland give the feelings and shape of 
the diaspora.  
However, concerning the diaspora emergence, establishment and, development, 
Sheffer (2006), argued that the traditional hypothesis of making a connection between the 
migrating reasons and the diaspora nature and creation is not conclusive because there 
should be other related factors affecting the diaspora presence (pp. 115, 128). 
Alternatively, Sheffer proposed four factors or interpretations explaining the individuals’ 
decision of establishing and joining or abandoning a diaspora. Those factors are based on 
the related immigrants’ status and various circumstances, and they concern the naturally 
expected delay of the settlement decision based on home and host land’s conditions. No 
settlement decision would be made before a certain time of living and assessing the 
conditions prevailing in the host land (pp. 128-131).  
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Having said that, the delay in making the final determination of settling in the 
host country is a result of many issues such as the attachments to the homelands and kin, 
fear of the immigration authority’s regulations, and common visa obstacles. Sheffer 
(2006) used only the example of Egyptian guest workers in Iraq (p. 130) as an example of 
the fear of the immigration authorities. However, I assume that Sheffer’s example is 
ideally applicable to Egyptian illegal migrants in America too. The restrictiveness on the 
new immigration mantle decreased the growth of the Egyptian population after 9/11 in 
the host land (MPI, 2015, p. 3). In addition, many diasporas - such as Egyptian -do not 
decide clearly, for different reasons and times, to stay when they come to America, thus, 
they do not have interest in joining or staying in a diaspora and being active (Sheffer, 
2006, p. 129; Zohry & Debnath, 2010, p. 16).  
However, the data of MPI (2015) study has reported that the “population’s 
relatively high naturalization rate suggests that many Egyptian immigrants applied for 
citizenship shortly after they became eligible” (p. 4). Moreover, many doctoral students 
(67 %) decided to change their immigration visa to stay longer in the States (MPI, 2015, 
p. 5). On the other hand, Egyptians who have migrated to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and 
Libya after the 1973 War and oil prosperity moved to those host lands “on a temporary 
basis, since [they were] unlikely to gain citizenship in these countries” (MPI, 2015, p. 3). 
The differences between host countries (i.e., Iraq in the 1970s and the United States) 
regarding their social and political circumstances and legal conditions and restrictions 
affect the migrants’ decision of settling and the time of making that final decision that all 
affect the chance for diasporas emergence and development or devaluation. In sum, the 
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host lands and homelands’ policies, time, and place, and different personal and legal 
factors and concerns effect the settling decision of immigrants. 
I would describe how and why the selected climate theory relates to the present 
study. The previous finding should remind us the climate theory approach to the interest 
groups’ proliferation. As it was mentioned, the religious and political freedom in the 
United States encouraged different particular ethnic groups such as Copts as well as 
radical Islamists to flee and settle in the States. Moreover, the educational and practical 
opportunities are unique in the United States and should attract scholars such as Ph.D. 
students to change their basic plan of coming and staying for a short time.  
However, these different phases of the American tolerance climate, the religious 
freedom, the secure political practice, and educational and financial opportunities might 
not clarify the decision of coming and settling by other sectors of the diaspora. What 
about people who decided to stay based on new random changes or chances that they 
found a mate and married? They did not plan for that decision in advance, as they may 
not have any particular reason to come to the host country (Ceschi et al., 2005, p. 25). 
This may be more common among lower socio-economic classes such as Egyptian 
immigrants who fled from poverty in their home to live and maybe settle in the United 
States or the Arabian Gulf. 
 Generally speaking, the lower socio-economic classes or guest workers in a 
diaspora would maintain their self-identity and dual national identity differently from 
other peers (Sheffer, 2006, p. pp. 129-130) such as Ph.D. holders and scientists who can 
speak different languages and could find a job anywhere in the world. It seems that they 
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prefer to keep strong relationships with their kin in the homeland, and they might prefer 
and able to return back home when they accomplish a satisfactory economic or social 
level or for different personal reasons (Ceschi et al., 2005, pp. 38-39) without considering 
any academic or political or religious fear or concern.  
There could be a significant difference in political, organizational behavior 
between Egyptian graduate students in the United States and poorer and less educated 
migrants working in a menial job in Italy. The climate and conflict approaches would not 
interpret other cases of the migrants who decided to settle in the United States for pure 
personal reasons, e.g. making money, with a legal or illegal status. Once again, the 
motivation approaches of the Pluralists and Olson as well as Sheffer’s new model of the 
establishment and demise of diasporas could remain proper to explain the migration 
cause and the existence or establishment of one sector of the Egyptian diaspora, the 
economic immigrants.   
According to Sheffer (2006), the ambiguity or hesitation of the settling decision in 
the host country reflects on another ambiguity of establishing and developing the 
diaspora itself. Moreover, it is very common that many of those migrants deciding to stay 
permanently would not return home if they could (p. 129). The status of the Egyptian 
case supports this assumption of Sheffer but not all the time. After Mubarak’s fall, many 
Egyptians (long-distance nationalists), who left the country because of utter political 
suppression, decided to go back and contribute in the political compass regardless of their 
past final decision of settling in the host lands forever.  
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I would ask if this decision of come-backs could support the diaspora strength and 
influence in the host countries! The interview questions of this study would illustrate the 
answer from the participants’ point of views. As I mentioned previously, the Egyptian 
Diaspora has never been a stable or solid entity because of many external circumstances 
and organizational factors. It changes over time based on the mentioned factors. 
According to Halpin and Nownes (2012), it is hard to imagine a group will remain as we 
found it at its outset; therefore, it is essential to the researchers “…to know what it used 
to be and what it is now” (p. 57). 
The diaspora’s proliferation and effective size and leadership (core adequate 
size). The previous different point of views regarding the diaspora’s proliferation should 
explain and match to the idea of ‘the core adequate size’ that Oswiecimski (2013) 
mentioned in his study. According to Oswiecimski, not all Cuban diaspora members are 
considered as active political and organizational members. The exiles were the dominant 
hub of the Cuban community; therefore, they are the, not the entire group, effective 
organizational size (p. 56). When compared to the exile generation, the second and third 
generation does not fully involve in the diaspora political concerns that focus on the 
homeland because the personal political motivation does not exist (p. 57). Besides the 
economic and educational motivations, the assimilation into the U.S. societies in New 
York and Florida is higher amongst the latter generations in all diasporas and Cubans are 
not different. In other words, their motivation became mainly economic and personal; 
hence, their assimilation into the American society and culture enjoying the democracy 
and welfare is higher than the exiles generation’s political motivation.  
107 
 
As a result, the politically oriented generation-the first generation- that fled after 
Castro’s movement- appeared to exercise control over the entire lobby for a long time. 
The difference between the levels of the political concerns of the generations is that the 
leading edge generation (the exile) possesses a hatred for Castro’s regime and that feeling 
is not strong among the following economic immigrants to be mobilized politically 
(Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 57). That might explain the contrast between the small size and 
considerable political and organizational effectiveness. Many second and third generation 
Cubans are politically concerned about Cuba, but generally much less than the original 
exiles. Having said that, the Egyptian diaspora members, in general, had insufficient 
selective benefits or personal motivation to be politically active most of the time, thus, no 
stable, effective size can become apparent through their group. 
The adequate size is not enough by itself, and it relates and includes many 
elements that the leadership style is one of the most important of them. Bauböck and 
Faist (2010) put a very clear conditional statement stating, “Diasporas have to be 
invented and mobilized in order to come into existence” (p. 315). The two authors 
connected this conditional existence of ethnic identity groups to specific positive 
conditions that provide motivations for, particularly, the elite of the diaspora members. 
This elite and their followers should be active working to support a specific national 
project or cause consistently concerning a specific homeland and interests (McCormick, 
2012, pp. 320, 326, 338; Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 56). In short, it will be a diaspora if it 
acts, and it will act if it has an active style of leadership or in other words, an adequate or 
core leading size.  
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The effective size and leadership in the Egyptian case. The same factor of 
leadership effect has appeared in the Egyptian diaspora but for different short times. 
Before and during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Professor Mohamed Elbaradei, the 
former Vice President, was the most important motivation icon. According to Ashour 
(2010), “it is clear that for now [2010] diaspora Egyptians are responding in a way they 
never have before to Elbaradei’s [socialism democracy] message to them.” In the Korean 
case, the church seems to be the active leadership; however, it is active in a contrary 
nature and direction. That religious leadership traditionally keeps the diaspora away from 
political engagement (Jang, 2014, pp. 640-641) and maybe this policy was one of the 
reasons of draining the possible active size of this diaspora. The situation is the same in 
the Egyptian Church in Egypt; however, the restriction of the Egyptian Church on the 
political engagement did not prevent the Coptic People from being politically very active 
in America compared to other passive Egyptians (Dickinson, 2008, pp. 40-41). 
In the same vein of Dickinson’s observation, Rowe (2001) praised the very active 
lobby of Copts that assumed an important role in the politics realm of the West (pp. 86-
90). What about non-militant Muslim Egyptians? Most U.S. Muslim clergy members are 
not militant Islamists. What role do they play in assisting Egyptian Americans to organize 
and mobilize, if any role at all?  Is the typical Egyptian-American imam politically 
passive, apolitical, or uninterested? Do home countries and the attitude of the American 
government and environment welcome the outreach political activates of the mosques 
and their imams? In general, “from being a foreign body in America, [the majority of 
imams of the mosques tend] to be totally integrated into America” (Haddad, 2001, pp. 9-
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10). Haddad conducted this finding came based on a survey during the U.S. office 
election of 2000 before Sept.11, 2001. In the current time, 2017, the question is how can 
imams and mosques’ eagerness of integrating with the American sphere relate and help 
their diasporas political role regarding the home countries? 
Egyptian Coptic people are typically afraid of being active explicitly, politically 
within the local Egyptian climate (Dickinson, 2008, p. 44). The reason can be that the 
Church leadership, military regime of July ’1952, the partial repression of the Muslim 
majority or radical groups, the general common attitude of the Egyptian society towards 
any minority, or all of these counterparts were against the political participation of Copts. 
Depending on those factors, Copts in general, are inactive or not successful politically in 
the home state in contrast to their overpassing economic and business status in Egypt as 
well as their active attitude and political and religious role in the U.S. sphere. The climate 
is supportive and cooperative on all levels in the host countries compared to the home. 
The Muslim Egyptian case is in an opposite direction. This climate might be not applied 
to the Muslim majority who is active in Egypt but relatively inactive in the United States. 
Once again, the climate theory of proliferation that Cigler and Loomis (2007) mentioned 
might be a valid interpretation of this paradoxical situation. 
Compared the small size of Copt inside and outside Egypt, the big population size 
of the Muslim Egyptians might not be the final word in determining that group political 
effectiveness. Here, I can derive another general result from the explanation of the 
connection between the proliferation factors and size characteristic. According to 
Borkowska (2006), “It does not always follow that the larger the group, the better its 
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organization and therefore visibility” (p. 24). These hypotheses should lead us to explore 
the debate about the connection between the other characteristics and effectiveness of 
diaspora. 
The Hypotheses of the Functional, Reciprocal Connection Between the Impact of 
Diaspora’s Characteristics and the Influence of Political External Factors   
One of the theoretical hypotheses of Jang theory is that the difference of the 
factors influence comes from the difference of the influence of groups’ characteristics. 
According to Jang (2014), religious institutions are an important element of the 
organization type factor, however, not all elements such as this element could have a 
direct influence on the political engagement and power of diasporas (p. 633).  
The available literature shows that diasporas’ characteristics cannot be sharply 
separated from the external factors of the diaspora’s proliferation, organizational 
development, political engagement and influence, and success or fall. Both the 
characteristics and factors and their sub-elements are integrated with strategies employed 
by diasporas to impose the desired change in politics and to deal with other diasporas and 
host and homelands. On one hand, diasporas’ characteristics are the result of the factors 
and strategies, and the latter are clearly affected by the characteristic on the other hand. 
As a technical result of this relation, it would be difficult or not reasonable to distinguish 
which ones are independent and which are dependent variables. However, until I found a 
different reasonable hypothesis or observation, I would assume that the diaspora 
characteristics are the independent ones that enable or limit the outcomes of the factors. 
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By investigating the available research, I found that the internal and external 
factors are connected to the strategies and basic preconditions for the effective influence 
of diasporas. Not all factors and their elements or ideals could have the same effect on all 
diasporas. That different effect also varies from time to time, for example, the Cold War 
and the post-Cold War. The characteristics and their influences of each diaspora are 
different. In short, the differences between diasporas make differences of the influence of 
the external factors causing the change in diaspora political engagement level and thus 
the diaspora strategies of influencing the countries politics should also vary. 
 Jang (2012) asserted that understanding the influence of Korean churches and 
their communicative role in shaping the social lives of Korean Americans is very 
important (p. 52). Jang (2014) found that the conservative characteristic of the Korean 
diaspora and honored civic and social role of the churches (mediating variable) enabled a 
close, negative influence of religious institutions and faith (independent variable) on the 
insufficient political engagement of Korean Americans diasporas (dependent variable). 
On the other hand, Jang’s findings referred to a close, positive relationship between 
religious institutions and rhetoric (independent variable) and explicit political 
engagement of other diasporas (dependent variable) such as Arab, and Latinos in 
America. This statement should not lead the reader to assume that this study is going to 
focus on Egyptian-American religious institutions as a factor in their political 
engagement. Of course, religious institutions factor is not the only one. 
While the conservative political characteristic of the Korean diaspora and the 
negative political perception made the majority keep their faith separate from politics for 
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fear of politics influencing their faith and confusing priorities, mosques have been found 
to directly and purposefully influence political engagement and perceptions of Arab 
Muslims (Jang, 2014, p. 639). That is because those groups have salient religious 
characteristic that intertwines with identity and political orientations. Besides, some of 
those institutions and groups have an extreme or harmful agenda against the host or home 
country. For another example, Sheffer (2006) considered the diasporas characteristic of 
identity and identification as one of the elements that shape the factor of loyalty level of 
the diaspora (p. 227). 
On one hand, as the characteristics of a diaspora could enable or disable some 
external factors of engagement, the factor can generate new characteristics on the 
contrary. As I mentioned previously, an ethnic group might need a wake-up call to be 
active in the settling foreign societies. This wake-up call could be national events or local 
events. The factor of the Los Angeles 1992 racial riot brought the Korean community 
together raising the unity characteristic and the need for being active and empowered 
(Jang, 2014, p. 634).  
A diaspora needs to have organizations or lobbies holding a clear agenda and 
reasonable goals in order to be influential in the political process (Mearsheimer & Walt, 
2006, p. 41); however, this characteristic of having organization and unity is not always 
available in all diasporas such as the Egyptian one. In other words, to convince decision-
makers to support diaspora political agenda is to have this agenda clear before the official 
agency and decision-makers (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 70; Smith, 2000, pp. 109, 128). Having 
this influential agenda (factor-intervening variable) should be affected by the unity and 
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organizational level (characteristic- independent or control variable) among the group 
members and leaders, which should lead to some level of political or social influence 
(dependent variable). 
As there are negative characteristics that are connected typically to some 
diasporas, there are several unique characteristics connected to some classical diasporas 
exclusively. Arab and Latino diasporas are criticized that they are not organized 
sufficiently and have no announced clear organizational purpose and goals (Uslaner, 
2007, pp. 307, 310-313). This characteristic could be attributed and related to their 
typical divergence and the multiple, unclear, or controversial identities that some of the 
Arabs have. This image made it impossible for them to be seen as one voice to the public. 
The characteristics and factors jointly made the political groups emergence difficult and 
insufficient. The connection between the characteristics and factors are strong to the 
degree that both of them can be seen as the same. I discerned in the literature that what 
some writers saw as characteristics or strategies, others could see as factors. 
A number of diasporas and their lobbies are characterized as naturally influential 
and successful. According to Uslaner (2007), “Jews benefit from a high rate of 
participation in politics, and Arab Americans are not as great a political force” (p. 307). 
As a result, the characteristic of being generous and caring provides a high image of the 
diaspora and makes its lobby heard by the decision-makers who receive the diaspora’s 
combination of demands and generous donation (McCormick, 2012, pp. 322, 324). The 
pro-Israeli lobby and its active and old organizations realized how to keep the United 
States on their side most of the time.  
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Apart from their influential factors, those diasporas have their several positive 
features that led to positive effect of the external factors on the diaspora political role. 
According to Smith (2000), the Jewish lobby and other lobbies such as Armenian share 
positive features in different degrees and times. Functionally, the Israeli lobby represents 
a state that has a strong military power in its region. This powerful ethnic lobby 
introduces that strong state as the most stalwart keeper for the U.S. strategic interests in 
the Middle East, and that should convince U.S. politicians and government branches to 
keep doors open for that lobby agenda and demands (pp. 124, 128). This type of positive 
relationships is triangular.  
Compared to Arab states, Israel has this favorite position, which reflects 
positively on the Israeli lobby position in the U.S. politics. In other words, the Israeli 
lobby introduces itself and the state of Israel as a compatible alliance to the United States 
with no chance for deep or long public division between both states (Smith, 2000, p. 
127). Arab diasporas do not have those features because of historical, political and 
religious values or obstacles (Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307-308). It might be a common double-
standards case, but the Arab diaspora might still have the chance to change. The change 
that Smith (2000) meant is the change in the diaspora characteristics per se. Smith 
recommended that no efforts should be made for changing the political system of the 
United States because it would be an unrealistic attempt. Instead, groups just need to 
improve themselves and their organizational strategies and show understanding of the 
existing political system, no matter whether the system could be broken or even 
tyrannous (p. 129). 
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Once again, the Israeli lobby enjoys the friendly public opinion and open doors of 
DC most of the time, because that lobby has characteristics and strategies that enable it to 
manipulate the surrounding external factors. The lobby keeps reciting an accepted 
statement and presenting a democratic state that strong and undemocratic enemies 
surround according to Jewish or Israeli eloquent speech and literature (Uslaner, 2007, p. 
307). In addition, the Israel lobby also portrays the Palestinians, particularly Hamas, as 
agents of evil regimes, Damascus, and Teheran. According to the persistent Israeli claim, 
Hamas is not a separate group of people, but it is the extension of bad states that want to 
destroy Israel. This claim parallels the U.S. claim about Damascus and Teheran, with 
North Korea that compose the axis of evil that works to destroy the United States and the 
whole liberal world of good states.  
These claims may be backed up by the observation of Sheffer (2006) that Muslim 
diasporas or groups typically hold hybridized identities and overlapping loyalties, which 
impose difficulties on the relationships between those groups and host governments (pp. 
70-71). On the other hand, the sympathetic public opinion and attitude factor was 
founded upon other factors such as collective ignorance of the public opinion and culture, 
and precise communication between the lobby and the U.S. media (Smith, 2000, p. 124). 
This conditional statement appeals to the Israeli lobby and state.  
Compared to Israel, those all explained features and elements apply partly to the 
Egyptian state and diaspora for several reasons that are not our issue in this study. 
However, the comparison between the American aids given to both states can offer us an 
indicator of the difference in the official and public attitude and opinion towards both 
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sides. Although the Egyptian state does not have the favorite prime position, compared to 
Israel, it is still in a better place than the Arab countries. The question is whether that 
favored treatment towards the Egyptian state reflects on or connects to the diaspora effort 
and position by any mean.  
 The major factor is the strategic interests and relationships between both 
governments. According to Smith (as cited in DeWind & Segura, 2014),  “the United 
States’ place and role in international affairs affect the potential for convergent interests 
between the government and individual diasporas” (p. 12). In other words, the 
governments have the upper hand in determining the relationship between both states and 
the Egyptian diaspora and the influence of that diaspora. However, I would rephrase the 
said question; does the real or surface divergence and convergence regarding specific 
interests between Egypt and the United Sates reflect on or connect to the diaspora effort 
and position by any means? 
Early in this section, I have referred to Jang’s (2014) notion that implied that the 
difference in the diaspora’s influence factors comes from and connects with the 
difference in the respective influence of the groups' characteristics (p. 633). The same 
author found that some good characteristics do not necessary lead to any political 
influence. According to Jang “Despite upward social mobility through education and 
economic achievement, Koreans' civic and political engagements have been low…” (p. 
633) Likewise, Egyptians have a high rate and level of education and income compared 
not just to other diasporas or immigrants such as Latinos but also white American citizens 
(MPI, 2014, pp. 6-9). For example, “38 percent of Egyptian diaspora members age 25 
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and older held a bachelor’s degree as their highest academic credential versus 20 percent 
of the U.S. national population” (MPI, 2014, p. 7). Despite this fact, these positive 
characters of those educated members did not produce correspondent, political 
involvement, and influence of the Egyptian diaspora. 
Let us emphasize, at least theoretically, that the external factors and diaspora 
characteristics are connected variables. Other negative characteristics are strong enough 
to stifle the interchangeable relation between good characteristics and expected political 
presence and influence of the Korean and Egyptian diasporas in the host societies such as 
DC. In other words, correlation between positive traits and external factors is not enough 
in some cases because of the existence of other negative characteristics that can harm that 
correlation and diaspora’s influence. For example, Mexican Americans are more than 15 
million and constitute 60 % of Latinos in America, and Cuban Americans makes 5.5 % 
only in 2000. However, the bigger group, the Mexicans, is commonly poorer, less 
educated, less interested in their home country causes, and the leaders did not campaign 
in the United States on behalf of Mexico, and thus less organized, united, and influential 
than the Cuban group is (Oswiecimski, 2013, pp. 64, 67; Smith, 2000, p. 147; Uslaner, 
2007, p. 311).  
The negative characteristics affect the likely response of the diaspora to the 
external factors differently from other diasporas. My assumption is that each diaspora is 
unique by itself, and there should be no solid ideal of the relation between positive or 
negative characteristics and factors to be applied perfectly to all similar diasporas. I 
would recall the definition of diaspora that I mentioned in Chapter 1; a dispersed group 
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should be having a unique concern with policy and politics in the homeland, which 
shapes its behavior in the host land to be considered as a diaspora.  
The examples of the educated, wealthy Korean and Egyptian diasporas can show 
that the positive characteristics can be not always productive. On the other hand, we 
could also find that negative symptoms are not always negative regarding its connection 
and effects on the external factors as the example of the small size characteristic of 
Jewish or Cuban diaspora showed. Therefore, the research questions of the study will 
address the validity of this hypothesis as an example of the interrelation between 
characteristics and factors of the diasporas’ political influence on the American policy 
making processes.  
Justifying the Relation Between the Available Literature and the Study Concepts 
The study of Zohry and Debnath (2010) on the Egyptian diaspora was not based 
on updated data, and it did not show any clear theoretical framework to back up its way 
of inquiry. However, the authors mentioned that the study would be just a resource for 
information for future studies (p. 1). As a matter of the relation between my proposed 
study and the past studies, Zohry and Debnath’s (2010) study remains a unique resource 
for studying the Egyptian diaspora in the United States since that there is almost no 
available updated research on that topic. In addition, some other studies considered Zohry 
and Debnath as a primary resource on this topic. That study should provide my proposed 
study with much comparative data and information based on the typology base that the 
authors applied to their study.  
119 
 
Second, as nearly all of the studies conducted on Egyptian diasporas, Zohry and 
Debnath’s (2010), Mehrez and Hamdy (2010), Severo and Zuolo (2012), and Dickinson 
(2008) were limited to the diaspora’s economic linkage and contribution in Egypt 
development, or Coptic diaspora traumatic memory and religious freedom in the 
homeland. Those studies had no plan for exploring the political roles of Egyptian 
diaspora in the host countries or connecting that role to their importance and local 
political role in Egypt. The studies of Filipovic et al. (2012), and Ceschi, et al. (2005), are 
other instances of this limitation too. In their article, “Diaspora engagement strategies, 
and policies,” Filipovic et al. (2012) focused on the diaspora-motherland partnership and 
suggested several policies that the administration should adopt to enhance that 
partnership and the diaspora contributions concerning the homeland only.   
Third, I found that diaspora literature adopted a comparative approach to study 
the diasporas’ characteristics, strategies, and factors of formation or mobilization, having 
accepted roles, and engaging in the political process. The literature used comparative 
models of successful diasporas to study or just mention to others who are relatively small 
or unsuccessful. Cigler and Loomis (2007), Oswiecimski (2013), and DeWind and 
Segura’ (2014) studies are ideals of this method. Most of the researches employed the 
Jewish diaspora model to compare or measure the other groups especially the Arab. They 
did not expand their investigation to cover the unsuccessful diasporas per se and why 
they are not successful.  
Regarding the criteria for being active or successful, diasporas have to include a 
degree of influence over particular U.S. foreign policy according to the most of the 
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literature and writers such as, DeWind and Segura (2014). The criteria could also refer to 
the diaspora-host government convergence in policy making, and the extent that 
Egyptian-Americans attend group meetings, and donate money or time, to group activity. 
However, all of these criteria should aim and pave the way for the first one that is the 
ability of influencing over particular U.S. foreign policy for the homeland’s interests. 
Justifying From the Literature the Rationale for Selection of the Study Concepts  
As I found in this analysis of the current literature, several gaps and weaknesses 
need to be covered, which justify from the literature the rationale for selection of the 
studied concepts. I also noticed major trends and themes amongst the researchers. One of 
those major themes was the effect of the external factors on the diasporas’ characteristics, 
presence and, influence. However, that does not mean that the factors should lead to the 
same results in all diaspora cases. The external factors affect the characteristics of each 
diaspora and they together affect the diasporas reaction (their engagement strategies) 
differently. The employed strategies of diasporas for social and political engagement are 
the natural fruit of the connection between the factors and characteristics; however, not 
all diasporas were able to see and use this connection. The relations between the factors, 
characteristics, and engagement strategies are in a loop or cyclic shape. The following 





Figure 1. The loop relations between the factors, characteristics, and engagement 
strategies.  
 The purpose of Oswiecimski’s (2013) study was exploring what could make 
some ethnic groups effective and what could be their potential influence on the American 
foreign policy arena. As major factors, the author found three elements including the 
characteristic of groups and their members, and elements of the political context of the 
host state (p. 43). The contemporary political environment element implies the political 
system, global circumstances such as the changes and events that occurred during or post-
Cold War, terrorism war, 9/11 attacks, regional conflict such as Iraq war in 2003, 
globalization, advanced technology applications, and economy (Dickinson, 2008, p. 39). 
In fact, not all of these factors had been adequately addressed.  
Several pioneering scholars such as DeWind and Segura (2014), Ambrosio 
(2002), and Smith (2005) explained and asserted the positive changes in the political 
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as the Cold War (DeWind & Segura, 2014, p. 251; Smith, 2005, p. 93). While the end of 
the cold war was a decisive factor for ethnic groups in general (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 51) 
such as, Armenians and African Blacks (DeWind & Segura, 2014, pp. 252, 254), and 
negative for East Europeans and Cubans (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 63), it has neutral impact 
on other groups such Cubans specifically right after the war (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 58) 
and Arabs. Having no change can be a kind of success in some cases. The emerged 
concept here is that the uniqueness of the diaspora’s characteristics maximize, minimize, 
or neutralize the same externally related factors. Hence, there will be a need to explore 
the differences between external factors effects on some diasporas, especially the new, 
small, or incipient, because of the differences in their characteristics. For example, as I 
mentioned before, literature did not indicate how has the post-Cold War affected the 
Arab, Egyptian, and Muslim incipient diasporas’ positions compared to Latinos and Jews.  
Hence, if the effect of post-Cold War event on Arab and Egyptian diasporas was 
not salient in the current literature, so I suggested exploring other events that are strongly 
connected to those diasporas and more recent. I would employ the same concept, the 
effect of historic events on diasporas in host countries, but the events would be different 
in terms of its closeness to the Arab and Egyptian diasporas. Many studies such as “The 
Arab Spring” of Jones (2012), explored the new revolutions and its impact on Arabs and 
Egyptians in their home countries but not abroad. However, Severo and Zuolo’s (2012) 
study focused on Egyptian diaspora after the revolution, but the scope was limited to the 
e-Diaspora only and with no focus on a particular groups or city or state. 
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 The 2011 revolution as a major independent variable induced impacts on 
diasporas in discouraging and catalytic ways. The MPI (2014, 2015) reports on Egyptian 
diaspora profile agreed with this finding. New Egyptian organizations work on different 
issues such as supporting the human rights in Egypt and serving the Coptic community. 
A significant portion of those organizations was established during the Arab Spring and 
Egyptian revolutions. Unfortunately, many of those organizations, e-diasporas groups, 
and unregistered groups had already grown inactive, if not disappeared by 2014 (pp. 8-9).  
The post-Cold War period can be called the hinge of history, but it is certainly not the last 
or only one. Other historic-not historical- events such as 9/11, Egyptian revolutions, Arab 
Spring, and the new information technology revolution might be closer to Arab and 
Egyptian diasporas emergence in terms of time closeness and effect of those events.  
The disorganization, disengagement, self-identity, confusing and complex 
identity, and other characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora led and connected to another 
characteristic that is the blatant polarization. This later one is a result and cause of many 
other characteristics and factors that all affect this diaspora political and civic 
engagement in its host lands; therefore, the polarization status deserves more attention 
and needs to be addressed in terms of understanding other factors and engagement status. 
If we want to know what has kept the Egyptian-American diaspora unorganized and 
disengaged, then we might need to investigate the literature to find out if it is profound 
religious differences, e.g., Copt versus Muslim, or ordinary Muslims versus radicals. As 
stated by Jang (2012), because the available studies on the intersection of ethnic identity, 
124 
 
ethnic community, and religion factor, there is a need for future studies for better 
understanding of the influence of religious identification on one’s ethnic identity (p. 11).  
A major claim of this study is that the Egyptian diaspora’s political behavior took 
the wave shape; turning from passive to active and the passive stage again. This behavior 
is an echo of the same behavior of the citizens inside the country. The short period of the 
active engagement could indicate that the external motivation or force was just an 
exception of the common passive behavior of that diaspora. The revolution and its 
ongoing consequences and other several elements cause that behavior of engagement; 
nevertheless, no studies have been conducted addressing this phenomenon. Thus, the 
study questions should address this claim. 
Having said that, the Egyptian diaspora can be similar to Korean diaspora 
engagement behavior. According to Jang (2014), Koreans received the terrible message 
of the racial riot that had led to civic unrest in Los Angeles in 1992 against Korean 
Americans’ businesses. The diaspora understood the need for being active, united, and 
organized, and became aware for coalition building (p. 629). However, “Although [this 
factor] brought attention and awareness to the larger Korean population, despite the need 
to voice their opinions and empower themselves to address their concerns, Koreans have 
continued to be inactive.” (Jang, 2012, p. 54) Jang did not detail what was precisely the 
reason of that unresponsive behavior, and that would be one of the needs for my study of 
explaining the similar behavior of Egyptian diasporas. This concluded observation leads 




Comments on Studies Related to Their Chosen Methods and Ways of Approaching 
the Problem  
Here, I summaries several points that I detailed through the chapter. This brief 
would be focused on describing studies related to the constructs of interest and chosen 
methodology and methods that are consistent with the scope of the study. Second, this 
brief would describe ways researchers in the discipline have approached the problem and 
the strengths and weakness inherent in their approaches. The focus would be on the 
Egyptian diaspora studies because that is the scope of my study. What are the possible 
weaknesses of the methods and design of the literature on diaspora in general, and 
Egyptian diaspora in particular? 
Severo and Zuolo (2012) explored the e-diaspora, not the actual diaspora, as a 
new approach to studying the Egyptian diaspora. This method of sampling can be correct 
and limited to the associations level. Nevertheless, the representation of selected 
associations for the actual groups in the real world can be questionable. Hence, I would 
consider the approach of using e-diaspora besides using surveys and interviews with 
actual groups and not just the online or virtual groups or one association. Using one 
approach can give just a part of the truth, and that would not be ideal for my qualitative 
tradition. Using more than one data resource is a triangulation strategy that is essential for 
a certain level of validity in qualitative studies. As I mentioned throughout this study, 
Egyptian organizations and leaders typically have more than one agenda or have personal 
agendas that are not necessary representing all the diasporas members. In other words, 
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studying the diaspora based on what the diaspora says online cannot be sufficient, 
therefore, meeting with people is necessary to synthesize the actual image.  
I choose my sample purposely to be one actual- not virtual-association or group in 
one specific city; Washington, DC prominent Egyptian associations and figures typically 
concentrate on the important political areas. One of the reasons behind this tendency of 
the diaspora organizations is that “One of the changes in modern interest groups politics 
is the centralization of group headquarters in Washington, DC rather than New York City 
or elsewhere” (Cigler& Loomis, 2007, p. 2). Egyptian organizations and actors are not an 
exception from that common tendency. There was no study conducted on Egyptian and 
maybe Arab diasporas in this city specifically. Jang’s (2012, 2014) studies of Korean 
Americans were my primary theoretical framework; however, it did not focus on Koreans 
in any particular area.  
Another cause related to Egyptian organization placement concentration is the 
Egyptian history and culture that I have to consider in assigning my sample and place. 
Egypt is a central-rule state and presidency or monarchy regime through history; 
therefore, political, civic, and military powers gather around the center that is Cairo in 
Egypt or Washington, DC in the United States. According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), 
organizations of DC aim to be influential so that they decided or accepted to settle close 
to the hub of the policymakers and political kitchen (p. 10). With the same line, 
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that ethnic groups concentration in 
metropolitan areas is “more likely to have contacts with, or espouse to, ethnic media and 
community organizations” (p. 878). Hence, I assume that this choice of the groups could 
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give some advantage to them on one hand, and should give me easier access to the 
organizations and involved stakeholders, save some time, and provide my study with 
updated, direct information on the other hand. 
Finally, as I mentioned in the external factors section listed in this chapter, the 
2011 and 2013 revolutions have to be considered if we need to explore the effect of 
external historic factors, not just the historical factors such as the Cold War. Several 
studies I explored such as Zohry and Debnath (2010) in this proposal were conducted 
before the revolution that made a great shift in the Egyptian political scene in Egypt and 
host countries. This change implies the need to study the same diaspora and that new 
factor related to what happened after 2011.   
Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I mentioned several characteristics and political influence’s factors 
of different diasporas with connection and major concentration on the Egyptian diasporas 
based on several functional comparisons with other traditional and incipient ethnic 
groups. The chapter did not cover all elements or generalize the findings to all Egyptian 
groups in different regions in America or the world. Based on this review of the current 
literature, the size, organizational unity, and religious characteristics had had a great 
focus in literature; thus, they would have the same focus in this study. According to 
Oswiecimski (2013), there are always circumstances (i.e., external factors) and 
characteristics (internal factors) that control the implementation of the size (p. 65). This 
statement shows just one claim of the relation between the independent, dependent, and 
mediating variables that should explain specific outcomes regarding the diaspora political 
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engagement and influence. This relation between the size and unity and political 
effectiveness is still unclear; is it a reverse or direct link? Future studies are in need to 
grasp this particular hypothesis.  
It would not be realistic if the ethnic groups’ characteristics and extrinsic factors 
if they were studied separately. That is because they jointly affect the groups’ political 
proliferation, strategies, position, and power in the host countries. What we can separate 
is the influence from success of the diaspora. According to Lyons (2014), Ethiopian 
diaspora became influential, but that did not mean achieving successful change in the 
American policies towards the Ethiopian government in 2005 (pp. 163, 165, 180). Hence, 
each category is not enough by itself, and both categories of factors are contributing 
jointly in enabling or hindering the diaspora establishment, organizational and political 
strategies employed for active mobilization, engagement, influence, and success.  
The Egyptian diaspora has some common as well as unique characteristics that 
prevent it from taking advantage on the opportune factors and from keeping the active 
status. The limited existing literature had addressed some of those characteristics by 
studying other diasporas but other characteristics had not been addressed. I noticed that 
the Egyptian diasporas has severe political and personal polarization, ideological division 
among them and between them and the Egyptian state, divergence in interests between 
some sectors and the Egyptian state, urgent need for a clear organizational purpose and 
single agenda, and an apparent lack of organizational experience and lobbying history. 
For these reasons and others, compared to the Ethiopian diaspora, the Egyptian diaspora 
was not considered influential because it did not employ effective strategies. Thus, it was 
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unsuccessful because it did not achieve changes in the U.S. foreign politics towards 
Egypt and the region in general. The research questions should test this assumption.   
I could rephrase my concluded statement by saying that the characteristics 
(independent variables) of each diaspora allowed or did not allow it to manipulate the 
external factors (dependent variables). In Chapter 3, I explained, among other things, how 
the research and interviews questions are going to generate valid data regarding the 
relationship between external, independent factors, i.e. the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian 
revolutions/coups, and the internal factors that define the extent to which Egyptian-
Americans are a diaspora, according to my framework. 
Based on this contrast, ethnic groups have different and various activities or 
strategies such as lobbying activities and experiences, which range from two distinct 
ways of lobbying. Lobbying is about “taking the form of campaign contributions or 
influence-buying through other means, as an activity that is aimed at changing [and not 
bending] existing rules or policies [of a government]” (Harstad & Svensson, 2011, p. 46). 
The change and influence can come to reality when the lobbies show the government the 
likely consequences of its action because lobbies are treasured resources of information 
showing those consequences for the governments (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 483).   
Not all groups can lobby the executive government directly and thus they tend to 
do indirect lobbying activities as we saw clearly in the Ethiopian case (Lyons, 2014, pp. 
163-180). Also, the common perception implies that not all countries are able or prefer to 
apply the lobbying strategy. This strategy is relatively more common in the rich or 
developed countries compared to the developing ones. The culture, experience, and 
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mechanism of lobbying might be not common or easy for groups who came from the 
developing countries (Harstad & Svensson, 2011, p. 46).  
The differences in characteristics of diasporas as well as their home countries 
should explain why the external factors have no similar results for all diasporas and why 
diasporas could be able or not able to apply similar strategies (Hrebenar & Thomas, 2012, 
p. 312). Finally, the Korean, Arab, Ethiopian, and Cuban, diasporas were studied here to 
extract lessons for the Egyptian case. In addition, proliferation, characteristics, political 
position, and influence of the Egyptian diasporas’ have still to be addressed due to the 




Chapter 3: Research Method  
Introduction 
The primary purpose of this applied study was (a) to identify, describe, and 
understand the problem of the Egyptian diaspora’s current political engagement and 
potential influence in Washington, DC and (b) to explore the key characteristics and 
related factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement and influence. The 
research tradition I employed in this study to explore the study phenomenon was the 
qualitative, instrumental, single case study design. However, the grounded theory 
approach that was identified in Jang’s study (2012, 2014) was integrated with my primary 
approach of the case study. I applied the case study design expecting to interview 
participants who have different backgrounds and hold contrasting views about Egypt and 
diaspora. The goal was to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and the 
specific bounded case. The source of questions for this case study came from concerns 
experienced by people (see Patton, 2002, p. 217). Therefore, a thorough understanding of 
the phenomenon under study came from the prime data sources: case materials collected 
by exploring the case units and the contrasting perspectives of participants as a prime 
data source (see America Psychological Association (APA), 2010, p. 11).  
To achieve this purpose, I developed the research questions, based on the 
intellectual goals of this study, to essentially focus on exploring what are the Egyptian 
diaspora and its political engagement shape. The search and interviews questions were 
created to provide details about the diaspora’s nature or type, proliferation, components, 
as well as members’ backgrounds, immigration status, interrelationships, assimilation, 
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self-identity, and other characteristics and factors. In Chapter 3, I explain how the 
questions were developed to generate valid data regarding the relationship between 
external, independent factors (i.e., the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions) and the 
internal factors that defined the extent to which Egyptian Americans are a diaspora, 
according to my framework. In this chapter, I also describe and enumerate the particular 
steps that I expected to take to address the research questions. Therefore, the chapter is 
separated into two major sections focusing on (a) the research design and rationale and 
my role as researcher and (b) issues with participant recruitment, instrumentation, the 
procedures for collecting data and analysis, and related issues of trustworthiness. 
Research Design and Rationale  
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora explain the 
connection of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution, 
organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S. 
environment elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host) of 
political engagement and the internal factors (i.e., the small size, negative 
perception on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the 
institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in 
Washington, DC society? 
Research Question 2: How does the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act 
and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns such 
as the presidential election and revolution?  
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The Research Tradition and Rationale for the Chosen Tradition 
In this section, I identified the chosen research tradition that would best answer 
the research questions, and address the rationale for selecting this tradition. The social 
phenomenon in this study is the political engagement and influence of the Egyptian 
diaspora living and acting in Washington, DC during and after the Egyptian revolution. 
Hence, a qualitative methodology was employed to study the factors of this phenomenon.  
The research design derived logically from the problem statement. Based on 
thorough review of the existing literature on diaspora, I found that it would be 
appropriate to use the qualitative case study tradition approach because there is no 
existing theory and very little information about the phenomenon. Hence, the need for 
exploring and understanding the phenomenon and case might exist. A case study required 
using multiple data sources that would be useful and essential to cover the limited 
literature and information about the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, pp. 104-105). 
Therefore, as Creswell wrote, the researcher should rely on participants’ perceptions of 
the phenomenon studied in the specific context (2009, p. 8; 2013, pp. 24-25). The study 
participants developed subjective varied meanings about their personal experience that 
flow from their different historical and cultural backgrounds. 
The definition of the case study approach involves studying a case and its boundaries 
(Creswell, 2013). The case boundaries include the case nature, place, time, and members 
within a real-life, contemporary context or setting that can be described and identified and 
are not abstract (Creswell, 2013). The goal is developing an in-depth description and analysis 
of that case to understand it and the specific related bounded phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, 
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pp. 97, 104; Yin, 2009, p. 32). I chose the case study as a qualitative research methodology 
for several reasons. Namely, I met participants in Washington, DC to learn how the things 
happened in Egypt from their point of view and what makes the diaspora members behave 
and move due to their perceptions, different backgrounds, and worldviews. I listened to 
participants about their engagement in what is going on in Washington, DC regarding 
Egyptian concerns. I began the study with little knowledge about the topic, and using open-
ended questions and descriptive analysis based on several kinds of data sources, completed it 
with more details. 
My case study research was qualitative and descriptive, not a cause-effect study 
that was of the quantitative tradition. As qualitative research, the study aimed to explore 
and gain new information about the unknown phenomenon studied. My qualitative single 
case study showed purposefully different perspectives of the participants on the topic by 
exploring and using multiple units bounded transparently by one place (i.e., Washington, 
DC) for a specific time (i.e., the term of the 2011 Egyptian revolution through 2018).  
In contrast to the quantitative research tradition and because there was not enough 
realistic information on the topic, I did not conduct the study to develop or test a theory 
about the phenomenon (as it is in the grounded theory approach). Moreover, the 
grounded theory approach demands primarily using interviews with a significant number 
of individuals, which was not very possible due to the study topic and circumstances of 
the diaspora, such as its minuscule size in Washington, DC. I did not conduct the study to 
tell a story from marginalized figures or groups or to explore the life of an individual as is 
demanded in the narrative design. With the narrative approach, the data collection 
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method included limited sources that are interviews and documents. In sum, other 
possible choices of research traditions would have been less effective. 
As shown in the literature review, I had been seeking to understand the cultural 
and social settings and experiences of the participants (i.e., the diaspora characteristics). 
The resulting meanings and themes emerged inductively based on my close interaction 
with the community members and the subjective assumptions and interpretation of the 
participants based on their personal view of the world and the situation being studied (see 
Creswell, 2009, pp. 8-9). The subjective assumptions and interpretation should be 
obtained through the participants’ answers to the interview questions. My goal was 
making sense of the participants’ views on the particular topic, the revolution, 
transformation period (i.e., 2011–2013), and the effect of those events on the diaspora 
political engagement.  
Role of the Researcher 
I needed to define the personal and professional relationships that I may have had 
with participants, steps to gain entry, personal connection to the site of interviews to 
collect the data, and my likely biases and sensitiveness to other ethical issues. I also 
needed to state my plan for addressing these issues. According to Rudestam and Newton 
(2015), in qualitative research, the instruments are the human researcher and other sorts 
of traditional instrumentation, such as interviews and observations (p. 127). The 
relationships between participants and me and between people involved in these activities 
can influence the potential results. Therefore, I was the key data collection instrument in 
this single case study by being involved in the case settings as well as conducting the 
136 
 
interviews, browsing documents, and observing what was being studied. My data 
collection instrument was face-to-face interviews, while sending a questionnaire list to 
participants was my alternative plan to be used if I could not meet the participants in 
person.  
As a researcher in the qualitative research tradition, it is typical to be involved in 
intensive experiences and ongoing relations with the prospective participants. Since I was 
a member in a number of the Egyptian organizations and groups in Washington, DC, 
Virginia, and Maryland, I had the necessary access and opportunity to access the 
participants and groups' activities and documents. As such, I knew many of the 
participants. This position and personal relationship led to building reciprocity and trust 
between us. However, I did not have any supervisory or instructor relationships involving 
positions of power with the participants. This situation prevented me from abusing the 
power I had or coercing the participants into the study, which could have been a serious 
validity and ethical issue. To address ethical issues in advance, I developed a consent 
form that functioned as an essential contract between my potential participants and me. 
My role included some essential elements, including the potential biases and 
ethical matters, steps to gain entry, and study values. The ultimate goal was ensuring the 
validity and accuracy of the findings and respect for and protection of participants, their 
organizations, and their rights (Creswell, 2009, pp. 87, 89, 177). I might have faced 
several challenges collecting and analyzing data, such as my presumptions, past 
experiences, access difficulty to the organizations’ sites, abusing power over the 
participants, interpretation accuracy (see Creswell, 2009, pp. 89-92) and lack of 
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anonymity. Those challenges could have imposed limitations on my data collection 
strategy and the quality of collected and analyzed data. To address threats to the quality, I 
discussed my “past experiences, biases, and orientations that have likely shaped the 
interpretation and approach to the study” (Creswell, 2013, p. 251). Moreover, I clearly 
described the methods and procedures I employed for collecting and analyzing the data 
(see Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 310). 
Methodology 
This section deals with the issue of from whom and how data are collected and 
how data will be analyzed. The primary intent of this case study qualitative research is 
not to generalize the information or findings to another population but to explain the 
specifics of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, p. 157). This consideration should also be 
consistent with choosing a small sample size and applying purposeful sampling strategy 
for collecting the data. Having said that, applying the purposeful sampling strategy 
should be the right way to help me use the concrete and small sample size and number of 
units within the major single case for illustrating, exploring, and understanding the target 
unique phenomenon in depth (Patton, 2009, p. 230).  
The case or phenomenon represents an extreme and revelatory case. A revelatory 
single case means revealing and focusing on a phenomenon that is hitherto unknown or 
not studied because it has been inaccessible to social scientists’ inquiry in the past (Yin, 
2014, p. 52). This revelatory instrumental single case study involves the analysis of 
multiple units embedded within the larger case that is the diaspora. Mainly, the case is 
revelatory in nature, and that should give another rationale for selecting an embedded 
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single case rather than multiple-case design (Yin, p. 52). The primary, larger unit is the 
diaspora as a whole (the case). One small-embedded unit (the central unit of the study) 
will be one group of Egyptians, the AEA group in Washington, DC. This small unit 
includes members and leaders or founders, and it is the major unit of the case. I employ 
this unit to explore the primary case, the diaspora itself. My primary individual 
interviewees will come from AEA. 
Throughout personal experience and close navigation, I identified a preliminary 
group of Egyptians that could be considered representative of the Egyptian diaspora in 
Washington, DC. I focus the AEA and its leaders as a representative sample for the 
Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. In other words, the scope is the Egyptian diaspora 
in DC, and AEA is the primary unit of analyses I use as an instrumental case to study the 
Egyptian diaspora as a whole. AEA is a non-profit organization 501-C3 established in 
2005 under U.S. Laws. The announced mission is promoting true democracy, and 
sustainable development and social justice in Egypt and empowers Egyptian Americans 
in their new communities. The general political orientation of the organization is against 
the Egyptian government policies as well as the Muslim Brotherhoods, however, it has 
good relationships with the Egyptian embassy. There is no persistent harmony among the 
members and between them and the elected president and board of directors. AEA has no 
particular physical place for its members' meetings and transparent information regarding 
its financial resources; therefore, the observation instrument would not be applied.  
Personal conflicts reflect on the group work and decisions, but AEA performed 
very well in Washington, DC during the 2011 revolution. Therefore, AEA members were 
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my primary interviews participants. I also chose this group because its leaders and 
members have different political backgrounds and political and religious orientations that 
could enrich the collected data. Finally, the smallest units will be an intermediary unit 
that includes Egyptian activists from outside the AEA, and the leaders or followers of a 
mosque. At each level of analysis, it was likely that slightly different data collection 
techniques and resources were used.  
The case was selected to illustrate the study issue or topic, and it must be 
described in thick detail (Creswell, 2013, p. 102). Defining the phenomenon, case, and 
embedded units of analysis should include defining the case boundaries that includes the 
case nature, place, time, and members. It is important to choose a case with some real-life 
characteristics that can be described and identified and are not very abstract (Yin, 2009, 
p. 32). For this reason, and as I asserted at the outset of this chapter, I tailored questions 
addressing particular issues of daily political engagement, such as facilitating the 
Egyptian immigration and related policy and politics, and Israel-Arab conflict in the light 
of its relation with Egyptian identity.  
Those issues also included the present political development in Egypt in relation 
to the new regime’s manner of governing, as well as the relationships between Egypt and 
the United States pursuant to the 2011 and 2013 revolutions or coups and their effects. 
These issues and related questions reflect the forms of political participation and lobbying 
activity of the Egyptian American diaspora in the U.S. political system. These forms are 
the focus of the study and its questions in terms of examining how the diaspora lobbies 
occasionally for Egypt in the United States.  
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It was necessary to include explanations for why I chose these particular issues 
(the political participation forms and issues) and the related questions. It was also 
necessary to explain to the scholarly readers how the interviewee’s responses are valid 
indicators of a more or less strong sense of diasporic ethnic group cohesiveness, 
proliferation, and the need for political participation among Egyptian Americans. For 
example, the question of why the diaspora size is small and how the immigration policy 
is a reason for that status can be an important political issue to the diaspora members. Of 
course, they like to come to the United States and invite their family easily.  
My major principle that dominates designing the study and choosing the proper 
method and its elements for conducting this qualitative study refers “improved 
understanding of complex human issues is more important than generalizability of 
results” (Marshal, 1996, p. 524). That is because my design is a single case study, which 
aimed to elucidate what is specific of that unique, extreme case (see Creswell, 2013, p. 
157). This principal should justify choosing the sampling strategies, sample size, and 
specific participants who can answer particular simple questions of this very detailed 
research (Marshal, 1996, p. 523). Therefore, I will detail the criteria on which 
participants’ selection is based; identify data collection instruments and sources; and the 
procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection 
Participant Selection Logic 
Considering the qualitative nature of the study, this case study is based on a broad 
range of data resources. Hence, collecting data ranged from gathering some documents of 
government and organizations to interviewing some political activists and lobbyists, and 
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community organizational leaders, mainly, from AEA. Therefore, this process should 
included and serve to instruct others who could be interested in the study topic, fulfilled 
the desired saturation and the desired credibility, and gave a full image of the diaspora 
situation.   
 Based on my choice of applying qualitative method of inquiry, my purposive 
sampling strategy focused deliberately on a small number of knowledgeable participants. 
Those potential participants should have rich information about the case because the 
intent is to obtain extensive detail about the case and each unit of it and to elucidate the 
particular of them (Creswell, 2013, p. 157; Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). The 
participants. They should be able to likely contribute significantly to enriching a deeper 
understanding of my topic, research questions, and phenomenon posed by this study. 
Finding proper participants and make sure that they meet the selection criteria that 
I have listed for that purpose will depend on several considerations. One of the 
considerations is the sampling strategy, which is the basis of my logic. That strategy 
determines and includes what case I should study in the first place and then the criteria on 
which participant selection is based to study that case. According to Creswell (2013), “In 
choosing which case to study, an array of possibilities for purposeful sampling is 
available” (p. 100). Therefore, I employed a mix of strategies that combines the snowball 
or chain sampling and the extreme or deviant case sampling.  
The rationale for choosing the later strategy was because it had the same logic and 
purpose of case study approach. Also, it offers a rationale for choosing the single case 
study rather than a multiple case study design (Yin, 2014, pp. 51-52). According to 
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Patton (2002), extreme cases can be information-rich cases. The reason is that by being 
unusual, the extreme cases can show what is unusual or special and is typical (p. 234). In 
addition, the Egyptian diaspora case shows notable failures or insufficiency so that it was 
worth being studied and it can offer useful lessons about the extraordinary conditions of 
the case.  
According to Patton (2002), “Extreme or deviant cases may be so unusual as to 
distort the manifestation of the phenomenon of interests” (p. 234). My readers could be 
wondering what are these extreme cases I have in mind and why could be unusual. The 
meaning here is not “extreme” or “deviant” individuals. I did not intend, in other words, 
to interview someone who is also completely politically inattentive and uninterested to 
find out why. I did not also mean by extreme or deviant cases something such as a 
military coup, militant Islamists, or illegal organization activities. Instead, the general 
unstable situation of the Egyptian national situation, erratic behavior of the diaspora case 
and the small but modest growing up size of the diaspora, and the unsuccessful 
performance of the diaspora compared to other similar diasporas, all imply the deviant of 
the case according to my estimation and observation.  
I had had practical experience with the political movements and organizations, 
and observation on the media. Based on this fact and my readings, I believe that the 
extreme trait of the study case also implies the outstanding successes and notable failures 
of the Egyptian political activists and organizations in the local political sphere of Egypt. 
Also, this trait implies the Egyptian diaspora’s limited proliferation and swinging 
political engagement in the host countries before and after the Egyptian revolution. 
143 
 
On the other hand, I asked the initial participants about other likely candidates 
who could be information-rich key informants or who could know who knows what cases 
are information rich (Patton, 2002, p. 243). Hence, I want to emphasize highly attentive 
Egyptian-Americans. Then, I asked them about issues which I predict they may have an 
inclination to try to influence the U.S. government. The issues are such as mixing religion 
with politics, U.S. immigration policies, and democracy of the Egyptian governance. Of 
course, their answers were related and affected by their subjective views regarding the 
2011 and 2013 revolutions/coups that are the overarching event of these issues and 
questions. 
As a likely result, the number of participants is not totally known at least in the 
present. However, the snowball sampling process would stop when it comes to a few key 
names of useful participants and when good informants or no new information are 
forthcoming from new sampled units; thus, saturation is the foremost criterion (Patton, 
2002, p. 246). Possibly, that how many I interview will depend in part on the identity 
polarizations, if they exist, among Egyptian Americans. Coptic Christian Egyptian 
Americans in Washington, DC may have significantly different views about President El 
Sisi’s Egyptian administration than do strongly Muslim Egyptian Americans and secular 
but Muslim identity Egyptian Americans. Moreover, because of the small size of the 
diaspora in Washington, DC and the hardship of locating and contacting the members, I 
expected that the available number of cooperative and informative interviewees would 
have been limited.  
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Besides, the criteria on which and how many participants should be selected 
include also religious affiliations, professional background, social level in Egypt and 
America, location, social connections, availability for meeting, and access to 
organizations documents and sites and business meetings. The candidates should be 
Egyptian who resided in Washington, DC before 2011, and somehow participated in the 
Egyptian political events such as presidential election campaigns. They could be also 
members of nonprofits or public agencies. 
 “In proposing an extreme group sample, as in all purposeful sampling designs, 
the researcher has an obligation to present the rationale and expected benefits of this 
strategy” (Patton, 2002, p. 234). Purposeful sampling criteria should consider that the 
selected participants should have to constitute a purposely diverse and presentational 
sample (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). So that, the sample included the relatively 
active members who have had experienced the extreme changes in the diaspora role and 
nature before and after the Egyptian revolution. Therefore, the interview instrument 
focused on interviewing those people who were relatively active in the Egyptian diaspora 
organization(s) at the Egyptian revolution time. I am also interested in interviewing 
members who were relatively inactive but became active in the civil society and Egyptian 
diaspora organization(s) during and after and because of that event.  
With describing the relationship between saturation and sample size, saturation is 
one of the major determinations of the sample size as I have just mentioned before 
regarding the snowball sampling strategy. The case study approach considers collecting 
data from interviewing appropriate candidates for participation with other data coming 
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from observations or other collected data sets. In this recent stage of the study, I did not 
have a full idea of what all difficulties I could face in the sampling process. According to 
Marshall (1996), “the number of required [participants] usually becomes evident as the 
study progresses, like new categories, themes or explanations stop emerging from the 
data (data saturation)” (p. 523).  
However, the sample size and how much it could be small should depend on 
several essential considerations. Those considerations are such as my decisions regarding 
the units of analysis, the available time and resources, access issues, availability and 
cooperation of participants, and the rationale for the study. I also considered my purpose 
of seeking particular sorts of participants, the amount of information the participants have 
and can provide, and of course, what I was looking for to understand and the depth of that 
understanding (Patton, 2002, pp. 228-229, 244-245). I considered my single case itself 
being the study sample, as well as the number of individuals within my case to interview. 
As it is a typical qualitative study, the sample size of this case study was small. 
Instrumentation  
The data collection instruments and evidences that I wanted to use had included 
field diaries or journals; historical, organizational, or legal documents, and interview 
protocols and open-ended interviews including several data types such as individuals and 
organizational founders and members. I have a list of questions that I should send my 
participants. I explained and justified these questions concerning the data that I hoped to 
gather using them and concerning generating valid data.  
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However, the interview was my primary instrument. Creswell (2013) identified 
the interview method as a “dialogue that is conducted one-way, provides information for 
the researcher, is based on the researcher's agenda, leads to the researcher's 
interpretations, and contains “counter control” elements by the interviewee [if the 
interviewee] withholds information” (p. 173). This popular instrument has high fidelity 
and little structure (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 130). It included phone calls, face-to-
face meetings and, e-mails. For this basic purpose, I collected a few legal documents 
about the AEA group, and initial exchanged e-mails between the group members 
including myself. Those e-mails included issues such as what is going on in Egypt, 
debates on the organizations' leadership legitimacy, bylaws, holidays, or invitations for 
annual meetings or organizational election. They were also different from the other type 
of e-mails that I planed to send with attached interview questions that I mentioned 
previously. As an ethical matter, I have informed these people that I was gathering data 
for my dissertation, which may change their e-mail behavior.  
However, my planned primary instrument of collecting data was the face-to-face 
open-ended interviews. It was preceded by collecting documents, researching through the 
organizations' websites, and collecting archival data. Getting responses by e-mail was 
difficult while conducting Face-to-face interviews were better, even necessary, in order to 
get the information I need. Hence, sending my questionnaires via e-mails was the last 
resort when I could not meet any of the participants in person.  
I used a protocol for the interviews when I needed to do that (Creswell, 2009, p. 
175). Another basic step in conducting the qualitative instruments is to set up a clear 
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protocol or several different protocols showing important procedural components such as 
the questions and interviewees-interviewer consent. I designed the interview protocol 
using a combination of sample interview protocols of Janesick dated in 2011 and 
Creswell dated in 2013. The protocol included eight central descriptive questions. It was 
useful for the consistency of the interviews and could vary based on the interviewees’ 
types (see Laureate Education, 2013, p. 24). 
Regarding the observation instrument, it could raise an ethical concern. I should 
not be so involved in the organization or community’s activities because I could lose a 
sense of my required level of objectivity as a professional researcher (Laureate 
Education, 2013). Pitfalls are also potential that might lead to biased role and outcomes 
that using the participant-observation instrument might push me gradually to assume a 
specific position within the observed organization or become such a supporter. Being a 
participant-observer also could turn me busy involving in the observed setting which that 
might make me forget about my original mission that is observing and taking notes (Yin, 
2014, p. 117). Therefore, applying the interview instrument was my choice to collect the 
data. The interview instrument should provide a good alternative when I cannot directly 
observe the internal setting, people, and the environment of the organizations, and when 
the observation cannot answer a particular research question. The interview provided me 
with full control over the questioning process and the inputs and outputs (see Creswell, 
2009, p. 179).  
Nevertheless, the nature of my study leads to apply both ways because I addressed 
the historical background of the studied group as well as its everyday matters such as the 
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engagement issues. According to Yin (2003), the observation and interview methods 
have the chance to address contemporary sources; however, the interview has the 
advantage of treating past or history in a better way than observation can do (pp. 92, 98). 
Hence, I did not use the observation option because there would be no actual reason or 
benefit to my study. During the data collection process, I involved and focused on 
interviewing people about their experiences and perspectives 
The selected source of the instrument for collecting the data is a researcher- 
produced. The basis for this instrument development is the literature source that is the 
Jang’s questionnaires. Jang’s work inspired the style and organization of my study 
interview questions. In Chapters 1 and 2, I explained the rationales for choosing Jang’s 
study and theory that should justify the validity for this source to be the basis for 
selecting the specific researcher-developed instrument.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection         
 According to Rudestam and Newton (2015), a good qualitative case study should 
include and apply more than one data collection method and obtain different perspectives 
(p. 56). This rule should give me the flexibility of choosing several methods or 
instruments depending on their appropriateness and usefulness for the study purpose, 
research questions, tradition and design, participants’ circumstances, and potential field 
issues. To achieve credibility of the procedures and findings, I sought different types of 
participants who have average level of political knowledge or interest such as 
participating in the national elections. They also might hold different if not contrasting, 
subjective perspectives on the reality.  
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I attended several meetings of the AEA group that can be in the current 
organization leader’s residence. I also came to some community meetings that were held 
in the public community centers. Before conducting any instrument, I have tried to make 
that everything would be clear and easy. Therefore, I used and take advantage on the 
community center meetings. As Millar & Ahmed, (2013, p. 11) advised the researchers, I 
should make the topic and the study interview questions known to individuals through 
using the place’ facilities and distributing fliers to ensure that the study participants did 
not feel coerced to involve in the interviews  
I did not expect anyone else to collect data for me. I know that could make 
potential bias; however, I asked or hire multiple analysts such as experts to assess the 
quality of my data collection and analysis. Besides my dissertation committee, the 
outcome of the assessment of the external analysts I would not consider as a formal or 
final opinion. Those analysts can also be some of my participants and qualified 
colleagues to review my collected data findings and analysis (Patton, 2002, p. 560).  
When I meet in the participants’ possible places, the starting point was observing 
the individuals and settings that give me a better idea of who are the best informative 
participants for the following anticipated interviews. Those meetings used to occur 
occasionally, not periodically; therefore, I did not wait until those people gather. Beside 
attending the community meeting, I contacted them via emails, phone calls, and in person 
to arrange online or face-to-face meetings. I conducted interviews in either English or 
Arabic or both ways depending on the participants' preferences and language proficiency 
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level. The interviews conducted in a language other than English were transcribed and 
translated into English prior to analysis (Jang, 2014, p. 637).  
Some participants asked not to be audiotaped because of personal or political 
reasons. I considered emails as a way of documenting, recording, and archiving the data 
that I collected by this method. I also considered using Skype to have online interviews. 
Potential interviewees might feel insecure about putting in writing in an e-mail response 
to questions; responses that they fear may end up being read by other people. I had to 
soothe fears that I would be recording what they are saying or even taking notes. I had to 
convince them that their identities would be anonymous. 
I conducted the interviews including two ways, standardized paper-and-pencil for 
my own personal notes and observations, and a tape recorder or other advanced 
technological equipment. I used two modes of recording such as a labeled microphone 
and iPad recorder making two copies of the interview material. My intention was to avoid 
any hidden technical problem that can result in losing the recorded text. In a later time, I 
transcribed the collected comments and answers of participants into written text, and then 
I ran content analysis and coding for themes of this written text using NVivo software. I 
detailed this triple process in following section. 
The outputs of the participants would be answers and comments. In using the 
interviews instruments, I was not anonymous to many participants. This is also because 
of my previous personal relationships with many of them. According to Millar and 
Ahmed (2013), due to the partial lack of anonymity of the researcher to some 
participants, a number of them had the chance to contact and provide comments 
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concerning some areas of confusion and difficulty of understanding the questions. Those 
likely comments were discussed in the discussion chapter of this study. 
There were other similar anticipated barriers. Recruitment process has been 
resulted in too few participants or no answers at all because of participants’ personal 
reasons, circumstances, inconsistency, or time. This expected behavior itself was 
important to be analyzed. It explained why some diasporas are not active or engaging 
enough. I roughly estimated five participants that I needed. As a plan B, I contacted the 
same participants again, and sought and added other new entrants. Therefore, before I 
contacted the candidates, I looked for public access to information about the AEA and its 
members such as press releases and website statements about who they are, what they do, 
their size and area of operation, etc. Also, applying the snowball strategy for purposeful 
sampling was another procedure of this contingency plan. I directed the interviews' 
questions to other several members in AEA and nonmembers instead of those whom I 
have contacted before. I did not expect responses from all participants or because they 
could simply have no rich information to provide for my case.   
Data Analysis Plan 
My approach to data analysis was an embedded analysis of a specific issue or 
aspect of the case to understand it by employing multiple units within the single 
instrumental case or system bounded in a specific place, time, and setting (Creswell, 
2009, p. 200, 2013, p. 100). The unit of analysis will not be the whole case (the whole 
diaspora or its entire community) itself because I will not consider studying and 
analyzing everything of this community such as its history, concerns, or educational 
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development (Creswell, 2013, pp. 98-100; Stake, 1995, p. 84).  
Instead of employing a holistic analysis, no matter how much data I could collect, 
my analysis focused on a critical incident stage, or aspect that is the political 
development and involvement of that community. The focused critical incident, stage, or 
aspect also included, for example, the nature of the foreign policy and relationships of 
Egypt or the Egyptian regime with the American government. This determination is the 
basis of my purposeful sampling method (Patton, 2002, p. 447) that I explained 
previously.  
As Creswell (2009, 2013) explained, the analysis process went through three 
generic procedures. Describing and reducing the codes into themes by categorizing the 
data into two cycles and condensing the codes followed preparing and organizing my 
data for the analysis. The last procedure was about interpreting the larger meaning of the 
emerged coded data and representing them in a narrative discussion or visually in graphic 
chart (i.e. comparison tables, charts, and figures). Those are the major steps; however, I 
detailed more specific steps or elements in the following sections.   
Several factors stipulated choosing my analysis strategies. The employed 
strategies included coding categories, theming, concept analysis, or connecting strategy 
(Maxwell, 2013, p. 105). The factors included my study’s nature, my research design 
choice (qualitative case study tradition), the focus of the questions and alignment 
between those questions and data analysis strategies, and types of data (Stake, 1995, p. 
77). My methods did not produce the data I needed to answer my research questions; 
therefore, I have not had to change either the questions or methods including the analysis 
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method (see Maxwell, 2013, p. 116). The alignment between the questions and data 
analysis strategies was a considerable factor that has let me produce a functional analysis 
for the study. Therefore, my analysis strategies and the whole method and design were all 
be compatible with the listed research questions and able to collect data I needed to 
answer those particular questions.  
Having said that, my analysis strategy and process did not fracture the data chunk. 
I did not apply the option of the “categorical aggregation strategy” only and I used other 
option, “connecting analysis strategy” option that I toke from Maxwell’s (2013) and 
Maxwell and Miller’s (2008) method of analysis. The purpose of this option was to 
understand my collected data in their particular time and context to find possible patterns 
and themes and to be fit for the questions (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112; Patton, 2002, p. 453). 
The reason for applying this strategy for coding the collected data is that my research 
questions focus on "the way events in a specific context are connected" (Maxwell, 2013, 
p. 115) and how one thing such as the diaspora contextual factors work. As I said before, 
my approach to data analysis was an embedded analysis of a specific issue or aspect of 
the case to understand it by employing multiple units within the single instrumental case 
or system bounded in a specific place, time, and setting. 
As examples of those events and factors and contexts that I explained in Chapter 
2, the factor of the relationship between diaspora and host country environment that can 
affect the diaspora' role, and the impact of the U.S. religious institutions; Muslim and 
Christian, on the Egyptian diaspora’s perceptions and attitudes. These variables should be 
analyzed by looking at the effective relationship “that connect statements and events 
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within a context into a coherent whole” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115) I assume that this 
analysis strategy concurs Yin’s (2003) empirical definition of case study method. This 
method “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between [them] are not clearly evident [or the] contextual conditions 
are highly pertinent to [my] phenomenon of study” (p. 13). 
Case study approach adds other unique procedures. Therefore, my chosen 
qualitative approach, the case study, and its purpose should made my analysis different 
from other types of analysis and general analysis phases. I blended the case study 
analysis particular procedures and the general analysis steps that include organizing and 
preparing data for conducting analysis, analyzing for themes, and then reporting them 
(see Creswell, 2009, p. 184).   
Applying the case study approach for inquiry should involve two major 
components of analysis: describing the settings and individuals in thick details, and then 
generating and identifying themes (five to eight themes). As I will explain in the third 
step of the analysis processes, I would extend the coding process scope by building 
additional layers of more sophisticated analysis meaning that I use those initial themes 
for more advanced analysis and connect them to the case. Adding more analysis for new 
themes might add another function to the coding process functions (see Creswell, 2009, 
p. 189; 2013, p. 200). I will explain in details in the following steps that brief of the 
analysis process. 
The describing phase. This step plays a central role in the case study and means 
that I should describe what I hear and see (Creswell, 2013, p. 184). An excellent case 
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study should have detailed descriptions of the case components (Yin, 2003, p. 46). The 
description should include the case relatively small number of participants and their 
behavior, specific incidents, and units as well as their context that gives them meaning to 
illuminate the focus of the inquiry. That essential description should be followed by 
analysis of the data for themes or issues and using the initially produced themes for more 
complicated analysis (Creswell, 2009, p. 184, 189; 2013, p. 98-101, 199; Newton, 2015, 
pp. 132-133; Patton, 2002, p. 450).  
Rich concrete and detailed description of the case within the context of a specific 
setting is the bedrock of qualitative analysis and reporting, and it should be the start of 
the qualitative study (see Creswell, 2013, p. 184). It should let the readers understand and 
feel deeply the phenomenon studied and, drive his own interpretation about the meanings, 
and make the generalization to other settings that are off the interest to the reader (see 
Newton, p. 133; Patton, pp. 437-438). Detailed descriptions ensure external validity or 
transferability of the likely coming results and findings of the analyzed collected data 
beyond the immediate case (Creswell, 2009, p. 200)  
This section of the case and analysis addressed questions of the “who, what, 
when, where, and why” of the topic under study. As a fundamental step of case study 
approach, this essential description helped explain and answer the research questions that 
focus on the mode events in a particular context were connected (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115). 
The questions are such as, what external factors affect the diaspora role and how could 
they hinder the diaspora organizations. I explained and described the role of the diaspora 
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and its organization in issues such as lobbying the U.S. federal government, or 
maintaining the cohesion of the diaspora community. 
During this description process, I frequently read and reviewed my collected data 
that I have gathered from several sources. Also, I collected field notes that I obtained 
through working in the research location and studying the case parts. Besides ensuring 
the validity of the study’s procedures and results, my other goal is to explore any 
emergent patterns and themes. Achieving this objective and process has led to the next 
step of the analysis. 
 Interpreting data into codes, categories, and themes. This section should 
include the steps of (a) the emergence of the findings phase (patterns and themes or 
issues), (b) the open coding phase that leads to the final step, and (c) the potentially 
learned lessons. The analysis, reporting, and interpretation of the collected data are about 
making sense and reaching the new meanings of the received data (Patton, 2002, p. 438; 
Stake, 1995, p. 71). Therefore, I could apply the two major options of strategy, the 
categories aggregation (coding analysis) or the connecting strategy or holistic approach 
(i.e. narrative analysis). In the first option, I could aggregate the data into some categories 
or themes and then collapse them into a specific number of themes by using categorical 
aggregation. With applying the connection strategy option, I analyze the narrative 
structure and contextual relationships among the data as a whole (Maxwell & Miller, 
2013, pp. 465-467).  
In different words, as Creswell (2013) put it, “the case study researcher looks at a 
single instance and draws meaning from it without looking at the multiple instances. It is 
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a process of pulling the data apart and putting them back together in more meaningful 
ways” (p. 199). Creswell calls Maxwell’s connection strategy option of data analysis as a 
“direct interpretation form.” As I mentioned briefly, generating and finding emergent 
themes was my purpose of the coding process. Those themes should indicate and lead to 
my study findings, as that was shown in the Results Chapter. Finally, I looked for 
developing generalizations about the case to obtain general lessons learned from the case 
(Creswell, 2013, pp. 99, 190, 200; Stake, 1995, p.74). 
Coding is an inductive process that has two cycles of open coding where I am 
open for the potential findings in the form of themes or patterns that might emerge 
inductively from the data. In the open coding process, the researcher should involve in 
reading the collected data and developing the codes based on what and which data seem 
most important (Maxwell. 2013, p. 107). It is important to emphasize that although open 
coding is the typical way for the categorizing strategy (option 1) in qualitative research 
analysis (Maxwell. 2013, p. 106), I primarily used the connecting strategy (option 2). 
The categorizing strategy is more common and it is focusing on relationships of 
similarities and differences that can be used to sort the fragments of data into categories 
regardless of the data context. It is also independent of the time and place hoping that 
issues relevant important meanings will emerge (Creswell, 2013, p. 199; Maxwell, 2013, 
pp. 112-113). Instead of that common strategy, the connecting strategy is different 
considering contiguity relationships that connect events or textual material such as 
statements of the participants’ interviews or field notes within the actual context into a 
coherent whole producing new meanings (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 112-113). To connect 
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those materials to find patterns, it was necessary to begin to categorize the responses, so 
these two approaches, the categorizing strategy and connecting strategy, were both used. 
The connecting strategy was the primer method for analyzing this study data but I 
did not ignore the categorical coding strategy that focuses on the similarities and 
differences to define, group, and compare the categories of data, and I might need to mix 
both strategies (Maxwell & Miller, 2013, pp. 471-472). According to Maxwell (2013), I 
should flexibly modify the strategy to fit the potential data, to answer specific questions 
that fit each strategy, and to address potential validity issues. Without integrating and 
developing the categorization of these situations, it could be not possible to use purely 
connecting analysis. That is because it can be insufficient to understand some situations 
and participants’ perspectives or to answer some particular questions when I use one 
strategy only (pp. 105, 113).  
Therefore, I looked for similarities and differences as a base of grouping the data 
(coding). At the same time, I looked for contiguity among data based on their actual 
context (contextualizing) looking for unexpected meanings and relationships between 
things, parts of the text, categories, concepts, antecedents, and consequences of the 
interview transcript and all other data types (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 106, 113). As an 
example of mixing both strategies, “contiguity relationships may also be identified 
among abstract concepts and categories, as a subsequent step to a categorizing analysis of 
the data” (Maxwell, p. 106). Moreover, using connecting strategy cannot be easy because 




Conducting more analysis. Coding process should go through another more 
elaborate and systematic layer of coding. This step involved more thinking, reflecting, 
and triangulating of the early emergent and coded themes seeking for new, deeper, and 
better meanings of the themes (Stake, 1995, p. 78). Triangulation is a process that aims to 
show and secure the validity of the themes and findings via soliciting data from different 
data sources or converging several sources of perspectives from participants as a way for 
cross-checking, illustrating, and justifying the themes (Creswell, 2009, p. 191; Rudestam 
& Newton, 2007, p. 134). In different words, I allowed the themes and then codes to 
emerge from gathered information or perspectives of participants interviewed (NVivo 
coding) and then, analyze and compare them across the produced themes of the case.  
I used NVivo software for the open coding process that I am familiar with this 
software compared to other software and websites. Although this program did not fulfill 
all jobs for me, it helped organize, retrieve, store, and analyze my different kinds of data 
such as interviews' responses and my daily field notes (Creswell, 2013, p. 204). However, 
according to Miles et al., (2014), the user of any software would not automatically get his 
data analyzed. The user has to stay the dominant instrument in the qualitative research. 
The software just allows selective monitor display of data and assigned codes in various 
configurations (p. 50).  
Issues of Trustworthiness  
This section addresses four criteria and strategies that I applied to validate the 
accuracy of the study’s ultimate findings and discuss their transferability, and illuminate 
the reliability of the procedures and methods (Creswell, 2009, pp. 200-201). Not all 
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strategies of trustworthiness or validity will be applied to all the four criteria; however, 
some strategies such as triangulation were applied to all of them. The validation is a 
process that includes employing several strategies aim to assess and establish authenticity 
or trustworthiness and document accuracy for the study (Creswell, 2013, pp. 246, 250). 
As generally and typically single case study offers a weak valid basis for 
generalizability (Yin, 2003, p. 37), no generalization from one case to another is the 
primary goal of this qualitative study because the context differs from one case to another 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 99). As I mentioned in the analysis strategies and phases section 
regarding the required thick description of the case components and units, it was a 
fundamental condition to allow for generalizability or transferability of the study results 
to other settings and situations or focus and maybe participants (Newton, 2015, p. 133). 
That is because this early process gives a robust theoretical framework for comparison 
that other researchers or readers need it to conduct different cases. Detailed descriptions 
should help provide generalization; however, generalization is still important but not 
primary to this case study and it remains “the task of the reader rather than the author of 
qualitative studies” (Newton, 2015, p. 133).  
However, using a systematic methodology and clear set of methods to collect and 
generate data should assure that my study results would be interpretable and just able to 
be generalized to another cases and populations. For example, I will consistently use the 
items in interviews protocol to assure the trustworthiness of the study findings (Walden 
University, 2014, p. 1). I made sure that there is alignment between designed questions 
and all other parts of the study especially the analytical strategy as I mentioned in the 
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section of the nature of the study in Chapter 1 and analysis section in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, I was able to substantiate that I could track the conclusions or findings 
backwards through the chain of evidence that I have collected to my approach, design, 
protocols, and research questions. The data should be able to be traced back to the 
primary source (Laureate Education, 2013, p. 24). The trustworthiness “of evaluation 
resides primarily within the data and is addressed by some questions such as, “Are data 
able to be traced back to a primary source?” “Are they verifiable?” “Are the conclusions 
reached logical, sensible, plausible?”  
Credibility. Because of the qualitative nature of the study, my anticipated 
participants should vary concerning many considerations such as participants’ gender, 
language preference, educational level, political affiliation or perspective, and 
proficiency. According to Jang (2014), the study's credibility should increase as result of 
of providing different and, vantage point of views (p. 636). Therefore, I worked on 
constructing the creditability and dependability of the data collection process and 
conclusions by ensuring that I derived the data from multiple sources such as different 
individuals, interviews, and document analysis. 
This process of applying this tactic that occurs in the data collection phase should 
allow for developing the in-depth understanding and triangulation of the study data. For 
an example of credibility issues, my background and personal presumptions could affect 
data collection phase and my interpretation of the findings. One of my assumptions that I 
should address and avoid is that organizations such as the State Department or mosques, 
in general, are not welcoming to the outside inquirers and observers. 
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There are several strategies such as triangulation. I used this strategy to address 
my study method and design internal validity. Triangulation in general includes 
collecting data from different types and sources, comparing multiple methods, checking 
the consistency of multiple data sources, employing various investigators, or consulting 
multiple theories to interpret a single data set (Patton, 2002, pp. 247, 555-556; Yin, 2003, 
pp. 34-35, 97). Besides, other strategies will be about using external auditors and 
providing a rich and thick description of the setting and perspectives. 
The triangulation strategy could include four types that are the triangulation of 
data, investigator, theory, and methods (Patton, 2002, p. 556; Yin, 1994, p. 92, 2003, pp. 
98-99). The first type is triangulation of collecting evidence sources that could include 
four ways such as bringing together and comparing two or more methods of collecting 
data in my case study (Creswell, 2009, p. 199; Patton, 2002, p. 559). The goal is to 
illuminate various aspects of the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora 
phenomenon. Conducting interviews with multiple resources and comparing them are an 
important strategy for triangulation to support the validity of the findings (Creswell, 
2009).    
I was going to find differences in levels and intensity of political engagement and 
kinds of that engagement. I explained these differences among Egyptian Americans. Is it, 
for example, one of different levels of education or religious affiliations and views? 
There are other variables may be important. Hence, I used my questions of multiple 
interviews to capture these different variables and variations within the variable.   
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The other types of triangulation strategies are with triangulation with multiple 
analysts that could include review by inquiry participants, observers, audiences review, 
peer examination, and expert audit review (Creswell, 2009, p. 200; Patton, 2002, pp. 560-
562). By applying the review by inquiry participants, I had my study’s participants, 
whom I described, observed, or interviewed, to review, react, and confirm my 
descriptions and analysis. I did not ask for this collaborative and participatory review and 
reactions to my published study. My reason is avoiding any early misunderstanding, 
ethical concerns or wasting time. In short, this strategy is about having those key 
informants to review the draft case study report during the composition phase of research 
(Yin, 2003, pp. 34, 36) 
Triangulation with multiple analysts and observers provided a check on my bias 
in collecting my data. Having a second opinion is better than having one researcher doing 
all data collection. This review and feedback were obtained through verbal and written 
evaluation, and I put the outcome in the final report. This second type of triangulation 
strategy helped me notice and generate new ideas that I did not notice during the research 
composition and phases of data collection process (Patton, 2002, p. 560). The ultimate 
goal of using the both triangulation strategies was to confirm the findings and 
interpretations, and guarantee that I designed and asked the right research questions 
(Patton, 2002, p. 560).  
Transferability. Transferability, generalizability, or external validity can be 
defined by the ability of the study results to apply and extend to other people, cases, 
settings, contexts, theories, or samples (Creswell, 2009, p. 190; Lincoln and Guba as 
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cited in Patton, 2002, p. 584; Yin, 2003, p. 37). Besides, those terms also refer that the 
likely findings are transferable between the participants and me (Creswell, 2013, p. 246). 
The major limitation of transferability for this study is that the study is a single case. 
Single cases method is a poor basis for generalization, and that feature is a major obstacle 
in doing case studies (Yin, 2003, p. 37). Yin (2003) restricted the possibility of 
generalization to the multiple case study approach as well as the analytical generalization 
that is about generalizing “a particular set of results to some broader theory” (p. 37).  
Having said that, generating a new or modified theory of the Egyptian diaspora 
that can lead to a case in the first place is the same theory that can also help to identify 
the other diaspora cases to which the results are generalizable. But, since this study is not 
a deductive one, therefore, generalization to other cases of diaspora or universe is not one 
of the study goals, however, it is theoretically, still possible. In his newest version of the 
same book, Yin (2014), mentioned that a single case study could be a good basis for 
significant generalizations if it included contrasting lessons or cases and was an 
explanatory and not just descriptive or exploratory one (p. 7).  
According to Yin (2003), the generalization or external validity is not an 
automatic process or outcome (p. 37). Having said that, and based on my choice of 
applying the single case study approach, I used specific tests and standards of evaluation 
to ensure the quality of my study. According to Creswell (2013), when the researcher has 
identifiable cases with clear boundaries and thick descriptions, a case study can be the 
right approach for conducting a study (p. 100). Therefore, I described thoroughly what 
methods and procedures I followed to collect and analyze my data (Miles et al., 2014, p. 
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310). This procedure would be related and could lead to the possibility of following “the 
actual sequence of how data were collected and displayed for specific conclusion 
drawing” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 311).  
Besides describing the data collection and analysis process, I defined and 
described adequately and thickly my case and its subunits in this chapter, and that should 
establish accuracy for the findings and convince the readers about them and potential 
lessons and generalizability (Creswell, 2013, pp. 100, 264-265). I collected data from 
different resources and forms. The wise selection of participants that includes sufficient 
variation should support this typical nature of case study approach and its accuracy. One 
source of data is, of course, not enough to achieve the in-depth understanding (Creswell, 
2013, p. 98; Yin, 1994, p. 92). The goal is assuring the convergence of the findings and 
ability to convince the readers of the findings. Achieving this level of transferability 
should, hopefully, enable other researchers in the field to have a solid framework for 
comparison between the study findings and other future studies (Merriam as cited in 
Creswell, 2009, p. 200).  
Dependability (the qualitative counterpart to reliability). It is the ability of 
something to reproduce or give rise to another copy or new version of itself. According to 
Rudestam and Newton (2007), this term refers to the “replicability of the study under 
similar circumstances” (p. 132). Reliability could answer the question of whether an 
auditor or another researcher would be able to review, understand directly my produced 
codes and themes and procedures, and thus find similar results of my original study. This 
tactic of testing reliability occurs in the data collection phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp. 
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34, 38-39). To ensure quality control, I developed and documented a formal, presentable 
database as a chain of evidence (see Yin, 2014, p. 105). Therefore, I was able to reach my 
collected data or row evidence directly. 
Establishing strategies for dependability includes issues such as documenting my 
case study procedures and most of the study steps, and setting up and using the detailed 
case study protocol and developing database (Yin, as cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 190; 
Yin, 2003, p. 34). This strategy of reflexivity means the using of field journals to capture 
ideas, connections, methodological notes, etc. related to the understanding of the 
phenomenon. Reliability strategies would also include checking transcripts “to make sure 
that they do not contain obvious mistakes made during transcription” (Creswell, 2013, p. 
190). I would also apply “systematically recording and transcribing data” (Rudestam & 
Newton, 2015, p. 132).  
Finally, crosschecking codes by another researchers who could be one of my 
colleagues is another strategy. Other way of a common procedure of increasing the target 
reliability of observational evidence is to involve more than one observer (see Yin, 2003, 
p. 93). I triangulated several data resources and ask participants for their feedback about 
my collected data and analysis themes to ensure the validity of findings (Creswell, 2009, 
p. 191).  
Confirmability. Confirmability purpose is establishing the value of the collected 
data (Creswell, 2013, p. 246) through several strategies. I was reflexive or self-disclosing 
about my position that I should be the maker and product and learner of the study text 
and findings (Creswell, 2013, pp. 257, 265). Credibility issues, my background, and 
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personal presumptions could affect the data collection phase and my interpretation of the 
findings. Therefore, confirmability refers to “the ability to ensure that the data collected 
was reflective of the attitudes and opinions of the participants rather than the researcher 
[and] was addressed through the use of multiple data sets” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, as 
cited in Branchcomb, p. 71). Confirmability also certifies that the data reported in the 
case can be pursued all the way back to original data sources (e.g., field notes, 
documents, records, logs, etc.)  
The strategy of triangulated reflexive inquiry should affect and inform my study 
findings. For example, in the self-reflexivity, I was aware of answering questions such as 
how did my background and experiences shape my perspectives and data collection and 
analysis? What should I do with the findings? How do participants know and perceive the 
topic? How do my readers and audiences make sense of what I produced and gave them? 
What is the potential feedback they could send me back regarding my study findings?  
Moreover, I used the service of an external qualitative auditing to review my 
methods and all steps and phases of the research process (Creswell, 2009, p. 200; 
Creswell, 2013, p. 246). In short, based on this reflexivity, self-awareness, and my 
political and social responsibility for social change, I did not write this study just for 
myself or build it on my presumptions. I was aware of presenting my study findings in an 
understandable way for the peer review and researchers.  
Ethical Procedures and Considerations 
The application for collecting the data was made and approved through the 
Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB; IRB Approval # 03-04-19-
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0371164). There was no need for additional protections because I did not expect to have 
special types of participants such as prisoners, children, or mentally disabled individuals. 
I continually examined the design of my study so that the risk can be justified by the 
benefits of the study. I did not expect any possible harm to my participants while I 
expected and offered several personal, political and organizational benefits for them. 
Those anticipated benefits did not include any financial benefits. The Egyptian 
community members in Washington, DC are well educated enough to have a decent 
financial level. 
Regarding the ethical consideration of proficiency, respect and, justice, I did not 
exclude anyone from participating in the study or collect my data based on my solo 
personal opinion or presumptions. To ensure the confirmability of the data collection 
phase and the value of the study findings, I addressed some of my presumptions that 
could pose some ethical issues. For example, I do not trust the loyalty level of the 
extreme Islamic groups and individuals. I do not accept or believe in their ideas or 
appreciate their negative adverse deeds towards both countries. My personal view on 
those opposite groups is that this sector of diaspora has its own agenda that is not 
necessary to be a national one. 
However, not all scholars and readers believe in these views regarding Islamic 
political groups and of course, a critical listener can offer an alternative interpretation of 
the facts and assumptions of my case. The exemplary case study should anticipate and 
consider those alternatives and challenges because the study should not be a one-sided 
case. Therefore, I collected all relevant evidence that supports or challenge my single 
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point of view selectiveness. Empirically, I examined the evidence from different 
perspectives and try to support the basis on which other anticipated challenging 
alternative assumptions and rival propositions about those groups and other issues could 
be rejected based on my study’s well collected and examined findings, otherwise my 
assumptions could remain such biases (Yin, 2003, pp. 163-164). 
Despite these presumptions and stand of mine, exploring the perspectives and 
political engagement of those groups in the host countries are paramount to obtain a full 
image of the studied case. Assumingly, those groups could be more active than others and 
have stronger and more positive relationships with the U.S. government. Thus, the right 
question is whether those groups are advancing the U.S. interests such as the war against 
terrorism or not. This is not to accuse specific groups but it is just to shed light on the 
controversial and potential role of some religious, political diasporic groups in the United 
States, and this is not also an attempt to say that the U.S. policy is influenced by those 
groups to be turned against the Egyptian state. Ambrosio (2002) argued, “The diasporas 
that connect to something involving international terrorism (either as victim, perpetrator, 
or even bystander) will have significantly less room to promote an “independent” foreign 
policy” (p. 211). Nevertheless, I considered the views and participation of all participants 
regardless of my presumptions to assure the validity of the different types of the study 
findings. 
I managed my potential bias as I have just mentioned in the previous section, 
apply and comply all IRB requirements, and secure permission for accessing to private, 
official, or business facilities and individuals’ residencies. Besides, I tried to maintain the 
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integrity and confidentiality of the obtained documents such as archival and official data 
and artifacts. During the interviews, I tried not to ask any leading question that could 
affect the authenticity of the participation and its subjective outcomes and conformability 
of the findings or results.  
In some occasions, other ethical concerns related to data collection or intervention 
activities could arise. These concerns could include participants’ refusing participation or 
early withdrawal from the study, and any unpredictable adverse events. Also, I expected 
that some participants would not be on time just because they can be busy, careless, or 
culturally have no respect for their and others time and obligations. Addressing this kind 
of concerns, I sought to "extend the discussion by incorporating new elements, or 
replicate [the] study in new situations or with new participants" (Creswell, 2009, p. 25).  
To avoid any ethical concerns in early time, I composed and submitted an 
informed consent. In general, voluntarism, competence, comprehension, and full 
information, are basic components of any informed consent (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008, p. 85). Ethical concerns and risks could occur at any time before, 
during, and, after the study. Hence, I was aware that my interviewees and all other 
participants would not be at maximum risk at any level or stage of the interviews and the 
whole study (see Creswell, 2013, p. 264).  
Because I interviewed participants in person, then the contact information for 
them would need to be known to me. My participants’ participation would be 
confidential, but not anonymous. Therefore, I composed and sent the consent form to my 
participants before starting the interviews and any other method of collecting the data. 
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This form simply allowed me to begin the interview and also stop the process or prevent 
it. The content of my consent include the study's topic, purpose, interviews questions, 
zero-potential cost and potential risks and benefits, time and place of the interviews, 
privacy right and anonymously, and my personal contact and affiliation (Creswell, 2009, 
p. 89). I also tolled my participants about their right of joining and withdrawing from the 
process at any time they feel that, and whether I would be publishing the interviews and 
study. Finally, I made sure to provide them a copy of the signed consent form in advance 
Summary  
My ideal choice for the research tradition was qualitative that directed my study 
and its parts in a specific way and shape. Particularly, it influenced the methods I would 
use to collect and analyze data. My chosen tradition is based on the social constructivism 
worldview that typically hold true for qualitative more than quantitative and rely on the 
participants’ rich views and open questions (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). I chose to apply this 
tradition and case study approach because they also fit my study problem, research 
questions, and purpose. They are fit because I have clearly identifiable case with specific 
boundaries and I seek to provide an in-depth understanding of my case. 
 I purposefully devoted my exploratory study to a single case and limited size of 
units in a particular geographic area and time. The purpose of this approach is not to test 
a theory or influential relationship between variables. Hence, generalizability of results 
and theory is not the primary goal, but it is just possible. Instead, the focus is on a 
specific, single organization or unique bounded system  
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Focusing on a single specific, bounded system is not also the purpose or nature of 
the other four qualitative approaches such as the narrative approach, and that is why I did 
not apply them to my study. My major purpose and criteria of deciding on choosing the 
samples (or units), sample size, and purposeful sampling strategy is reaching to the 
desired in-depth understanding and findings that were based on the research questions 
and the nature of those questions (Marshal, 1996. p. 523). Hence, this criterion should 
concern selecting and finding information-rich case and units or samples for study 
(Patton, 2002, pp. 229-230). I did “study a more open range of experiences for a smaller 
number of people (seeking depth)” (Patton, 2002, p. 244). To collect my data from this 
number of people, I applied specific methods. My primary method is interview-based 
(i.e., face-to-face and telephone).  
The quality or trustworthiness issues point to ensuring that the data and evidence 
are valid and free from biases on the part of the researcher, and thus the findings and the 
data are an accurate portrayal of the situation. Validity is one of the strengths of 
qualitative research and it includes a group of strategies to be followed to ensure that the 
study findings are vibrant and realistic, and the study interpretations are presented 
neutrally (Creswell, 2009, p. 191). Neutrality means collecting all relevant evidence that 
support or challenge my point of views avoiding any orientation of selectiveness that 
could harm the validity of evidence (Yin, 2003, pp. 163-164).  
Since I applied single case study, my potential findings could be criticized as not 
trustworthy enough, hence triangulating several collection data types or evidence sources 
could recover this limitation of the single instrumental case study (Creswell, 2009, p. 
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191). As I will show in the Results Chapter, the ultimate goal is not generalizing the 
findings, but it is exploring, developing, describing, and interpreting a particular 
instrumental single case to address a particular issue or phenomenon within given time 




Chapter 4: Findings 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore, 
describe, and share information regarding how the Egyptian diaspora and its different 
members and subgroups narrate their political engagement regarding the Egyptian 
interests in Washington, DC before, during, and after the 2011 revolutions and 2013 
revolution or coup d’état. Therefore, I recruited first-generation, Egyptian American 
immigrants living in Washington DC, most of whom are scholars and community leaders, 
to provide their perspectives on their political participation inclinations and activities and 
the factors that affect them. The participants also provided their perceptions of how their 
opinions have been reshaped by their acculturation experiences in the United States. The 
following two research questions guided my study, focusing on the key, joined internal 
and external factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement regarding particular, 
contemporary political Egyptian issues: 
Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the 
joint effect of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution on 
organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S. 
environmental elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host) of 
political engagement and the characteristics (i.e., small size, negative perception 
on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization, 
development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC 
society?   
175 
 
Research Question 2: How did the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act 
and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns, such 
as the Egyptian presidential election and revolution? 
In this chapter, I present the settings and demographics of the recruited 
participants, including a thick description of the group. Then, I discuss components of the 
data collection process, such as the settings for the interviews and the interview 
participants. I detail the analysis process with developed codes and themes. The chapter 
also includes a description of evidence of the trustworthiness of the data. I then provide 
the findings by research question, detailing the answers provided by the participants for 
the interview questions asked during the interviews to provide rich, thick data taking a 
narrative form. Finally, I present the findings of the study based on themes and 
summarize the chapter taking into account any consistencies or inconsistencies I have 
discovered before transitioning to Chapter 5. 
Settings 
At the time of the study, the participants and their experience had not been 
influenced by personal or organizational situations. I conducted all the interviews as 
planned; therefore, I believe that my interpretation of the results has not been influenced 
by any unexpected conditions. My data collection design was planned to target Egyptian 
diaspora members residing in Washington, DC. The primary unit of the study analysis 
was the case of the members and leaders of the AEA group who did not systematically 
meet in a specific professional place. Therefore, I interviewed participants in private or 
public settings away from any workplace or professional authority. Regarding the time 
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setting, I scheduled the interviews based on who was recruited and immediately available 
for an interview. Therefore, the setting times were related to the participants’ work and 
personal schedule. The political circumstances and interests of Egypt also made the 
participants change and delay the interviews several times. 
Demographics  
Because I employed a case study design, I need to provide a thicker description 
for the case major and subunits, AEA group and its members, and other active individuals 
and mosque followers who are not affiliated with AEA. Most of 16 participants in this 
study were current or former members of AEA. The participants comprised 14 well-
educated, professional, Muslim men; one orthodox Christian woman; and one Muslim 
woman. One participant was an active member in the Muslim Brotherhood. The age 
range of the recruited and interviewed members was 50–75 years old. Most of the 
participants lived in the Washington, DC metropolitan area and some others lived in the 
surrounding suburbs. 
Consistent with my filed notes and close observation, all of the participants were 
politically active directly before, during, and shortly after the 2011 revolution. Many of 
them came to Washington, DC more than 25 years ago and became U.S. citizens. They 
were retired or still worked as freelancers, such as doctors or taxi drivers, or worked in 
official or private U.S. or international foundations, such as the White House, Voice of 
America broadcast, universities, news media, and hospitals. Some of them came on an 
immigration visa for political issues during President Sadat’s era, and others came for 
working or education purposes during Mubarak’s time. None of them mentioned a clergy 
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figure whom they could love, follow, or admire. I noticed that all of the participants 
except two might not go to Friday prayers or Ramadan events in mosques. 
 For different reasons, all participants agreed on not going back to Egypt or at least 
splitting their residency between both countries. They explained emotionally that this 
general trend is related to the home state political culture and circumstances. However, 
many of the participants asserted that they might go back home for a while but not to 
stay. The diaspora members widely believe political conditions are inadequate in Egypt 
because they are afraid. Some of them also consider living or working responsibilities in 
Washington, DC and their children’s schools as a rationale for staying in the United 
States without any intention of returning to Egypt. A few of them expressed no reason for 
that trend at all. 
In 2005, the AEA was founded in Virginia as a group of Egyptian American 
scholars to work on bridging gaps in understanding between Egyptians and Americans. 
Similarly, to the rest of diaspora active members, AEA acts as a watchdog on the 
Egyptian governments’ activities and agenda in and out of Egypt in the Washington, DC 
political realm. AEA cares about different hot topics at different times. For example, in 
2016, AEA issued statements regarding the dispute with the Saudi government on the 
border islands between Egypt and Saudia. In 2019, AEA considered the top Egyptian 
political topic, which was the presidential election and the related controversial 
constitution amendment.  
The political orientation of this diaspora, and exclusively the AEA group, focuses 
on working for freedom of speech, better living conditions, and better governance style in 
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Egypt. Additionally, they work, at least theoretically, to support the middle and poor 
social classes that have been oppressed because of the unorganized political and 
economic policies and the spreading corruption in all government offices after the 
military coup in 1952. According to personal talks with several former leaders of AEA, 
this situation became severe in Elsisi time, and this is the current motivation of the active 
members of the diaspora.  
According to the collected e-mail exchanges of the group and my notes, several 
members and leaders of AEA asserted that their group used to have internal conflicts 
regarding several issues, such as the leadership style, elections, and the political stance 
the group should take as a whole. The former leader of AEA is a secular professional. He 
was a founding member (2005–2009), spokesman (2009–2012), and president (2012-–
2017). According to that leader, in 2017, AEA had low amount of activity because of the 
current Islamist director who was elected by default. AEA cares about giving a chance to 
all political orientations to be presented; however, most of the members claimed that he 
was not qualified. Another AEA member believed that the youth Islamists are an obstacle 
and that their membership reflects on the group activists as well as its typical political 
orientation that used to be secular and open-minded. 
A majority of my study participants did not believe that Egyptians, consisting of 
the diaspora, have Arab identification. They expressed their notion that Egyptians are 
Egyptian only, but they also desired to have desirable relationships with Arab human 
beings in the United States. Some participants also mentioned that the most of Egyptian 
Christians hate the description of being Arabs. AEA individuals are an ideal of this 
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patriotic notion. Despite being proud to be Egyptian and nothing else, they are willing to 
assimilate into the U.S. network and way of life. Residing in the United States and being 
away from Egypt for a long time caused modifications in their original Egyptian values. 
Several participants stated that they, similarly to many of the diaspora members, 
have been in a box culturally and politically. They also agreed that the most sizeable 
exchange that happened to them, given that they came to the United States, was that they 
are out of that home box. They became capable of seeing matters from a one of a kind 
angle; for instance, giving overall freedom to children to choose their life companions 
regardless of their religions. I also noticed that some of the participants have become 
grandfathers to grandchildren who maintain U.S. names. Another instance is that 
Egyptian Americans pay attention to their credit history, which is an extraordinary norm 
that could be essential for residing in the United States. 
Data Collection 
I conducted one-time, in-depth interviews that took place from March 2019 
through May 26, 2019 in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. I designed one group of 
27 open-ended questions that each of the 16 participants answered. Each interviewee’s 
answers provided me with new information and enabled me to do periodic reviews to 
enhance my questions before I sent them to the next interviewee. Data included my 
handwritten, filed notices and confidential audio recordings of the interviews using my 
iPad. None of the participants refused to be audiotaped. My field note captured the 
environment of the interviews, the participant’s personality, explanatory notes, and my 
overall impressions of the experience with the participant. These two joint methods of 
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data collection ensured that my findings were precise and captured the associated 
meanings of both verbal statements and nonverbal communication presented by the 
participants. 
Sixteen out of 20 possible participants residing in Washington, DC were 
successfully recruited for this study. I was looking for seven-nine members from the 
AEA group and another four to five nonmember participants. I contacted more than this 
total number to be able to avoid any last-minute surprises. Two potential participants 
declined the interview after they had initially agreed to participate. They said they would 
not have time. In general, all recruits were slow with their positive or negative reactions. 
Despite this slowness in response, I completed my data collection and obtained enough 
informative participants to meet saturation. I did not encounter any variations in data 
collection from the plan presented in Chapter 3.  
When I recruited the members for the interview, I drove from New York City to 
Virginia to attend an Egyptian community event on March 2019. More than 33 Egyptian 
members attended this event. Most of the members came from Maryland, and 
Washington, DC. I distributed invitational letters to potential individuals whom I thought 
that they might be fit to my recruitment criteria and able to volunteer for the study. I 
interviewed participants individually in a place of their choice inside the center; however, 
three other interviewees preferred to meet in their private residences. 
Each interview lasted an average of 90 minutes. This time included time to 
establish rapport, review the purpose of my study and the consent form, and to answer 
possible questions before and after the actual interview. I recorded each interview 
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entirely by two recording devices after asking and receiving the permission of the 
interviewees. I stored the recordings to my home computer with two backup copies. I 
transcribed each saved interview one by one without asking for following up questions or 
having any outside help.  
Data Analysis 
My approach I used to generate the codes and themes for identifying the meaning 
of the data included two joint strategies. The first strategy is the categorizing strategy that 
is about coding. The row data segments should be labeled, sorted, and then grouped by 
categories to create a similarity-based ordering of data (Maxwell & Miller, 2008, pp. 465, 
469). This process is seeking similarities and differences between data segments within 
the interview questions and their respective responses.  
I also applied the connecting analysis strategy that is, in contrast to the first one, 
does not fracture the data chunk. The purpose of this strategy was to understand my 
categorized data in their particular time and context to find possible patterns and themes 
and to have them fit for the questions chosen type (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112; Patton, 2002, 
p. 453). My research questions focused on the way events in a specific context are 
connected and how one thing, such as the diaspora external factors work with other 
things in the phenomenon studied. 
Because I chose to apply case study approach and connecting strategy for the 
analysis, I provided a thick description of the case, the Egyptian diaspora, the case major 
unit, AEA group, and subunits such as the active individuals and other groups, a mosque 
and its followers, and all other available aspects, concepts, or facts about the case. These 
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components of the findings chapter should give the coded data meanings to illuminating 
the focus of the inquiry, add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, and enhance 
the insight into the target single case and its representing larger, holistic aspects (Yin, 
2003, p. 46). Therefore, analyzing the examined codes by reducing them for eight themes 
or issues, two of which had additional subthemes, will follow this description phase. I 
confirmed the themes and subthemes against each other and the data and then began 
defining the final themes. In the following section, I report the process used to move 
inductively from small coded units to larger representations, including categories, 
themes, and subthemes. 
Coded Units to Larger Representations     
Therefore, I described the specific codes, categories, and then the themes that 
emerged from the data using quotations of participants interview as needed to emphasize 
their importance and relevancy. Moreover, I describe discrepant and infrequent issues, 
and disconfirming data if they exist and how they were factored into the analysis. For 
easier reference, examples of the preliminary codes are presented in Table 3. I also used 
those codes to produce possible pattern codes to summarize the interview data by putting 
the information into categories. I was able to see more codes and a set of themes emerged 
as I left it open so that new ones would appear. As a result, more codes were discovered 
and examined.   
For data analysis, I used Saldana’s (2014) coding manual for this qualitative study 
as was explained in Chapter 3. I performed two cycles of coding that included 6 coding 
methods such as descriptive, NVivo and emotions, values, hypothesis, causation, 
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attribute…coding and pattern codes to determine emerging themes after I conducted 
interviews. Also, I used simultaneous coding when the data’s content suggested multiple 
meanings (e.g., descriptive and attribution codes; Saldana, 2014, p. 81).   
I coded after I conducted each interview and rechecked interpretations of the 
meaning with participants by using their e-mail addresses and meeting some of them to 
ensure the validity of the coding process as well as its possible results. I identified and 
organized related codes produced by participants on each open-ended interview question. 
Table 1 provides an example of coding process and some specific codes.  
Table 1 
Example of Coding Process and Specific Codes 
Raw data  Simultaneous code 
[Descriptive and attribution] 
“They are politically passive, …by and largely 
preoccupied with making a living and improving their 
living conditions and achieving their personal 
immigration goals. Maybe living responsibilities have 
priority over political responsibilities.” 
Other factors involved with 
living issues  
  
“…our solo culture, you know, made us have no 
intention for collective work…,” “…it is in our 
blood…we are Pharaoh,” “Egyptian success stories in the 
U.S. are individual,” “It is one man-show culture, 
everyone wants to be the boss”  




  “Most successful diaspora institution in political 
mobilization is mosques and churches. Therefore, they 
care about the relationship between Egypt and USA 
governments more than other activists,” “There should be 
no role for mosques and churches in promoting political 
interest,” “…their roles in mobilizing Egyptians 
politically is poisonous” 
Mosques’ political    






Then, by employing the connecting analysis strategy, the participants that stated 
the same words or opinion or related statements were grouped and reduced into related 
themes. Finally, I summarized all of the theses gathered information in narrative nature 
seeking to preserve the context and story of the political engagement of the Egyptian 
diaspora. Table 2 shows all themes and their applicable subthemes. 
Table 2 
























for some time  








































l unity and 
problematic 
leadership 
   
Theme 3 
 




diaspora in DC. 
 
 




















maker on the 
   
185 
 
influence  diaspora’ role 








     










     







     




















   
Finally, while offering the results, I discuss the discrepant troubles or 
nonconforming data as applicable in which members’ opinions differed from the majority 
sentiments. By means of inclusive of specific perspectives, I ensured an actual reporting 
of individuals’ sentiments. That was without capacity bias influencing the presentation of 
the outcomes.  
186 
 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
I used several ways to establish the credibility of my research results of the 
study—in other words, by making sure that my research findings are consistent with 
reality. With applying qualitative case study, achieving the reality means that the results 
reflected what the participants intended to convey. I used persistent efforts to build 
essential trust with interviewees to obtain informative, detailed responses as I took 
enough time to establish rapport by making myself friendly, but empathetic. I applied 
triangulation of sources and triangulation with multiple analysts and observers that all 
should provide a check on my bias in collecting my data. Having a second opinion is 
better than having one researcher doing all data collection. This review and feedback was 
through verbal and written evaluation, and I put the outcome in the final report. This 
second type of triangulation strategy helped me notice and generate new ideas that I did 
not notice during the research composition and phases od data collection process (see 
Patton, 2002, p. 560). The ultimate goal of using these two types of both triangulation 
strategies is to confirm the findings and interpretations, and guarantee that I designed and 
asked the right research questions. 
Transferability 
The second tenet of trustworthiness is transferability, wherein a qualitative 
researcher seeks to determine if the findings are generalizable across other individuals or 
settings. By attaining saturation, I gathered a comprehensive view of the perceptions 
within the case of interest, subsequently generating a deeper understanding of the case of 
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interest. Because developing a descriptive study could lead to the finding transferability, I 
defined and described thickly my case and its subunits in this chapter. In addition, I 
described the data collection and analysis process. Therefore, I collected data from 
different resources and forms. The wise selection of participants that included sufficient 
variation and comprehensive view of the perceptions should subsequently generate a 
deeper understanding of the case of interest. While I cannot ensure generalizability of 
findings to other populations in social settings or cultural contexts, I utilized a thick 
description to ensure raw data excerpts supported the thematic findings. This strategy 
provides outside researchers with additional information about the phenomenon and 
context of the findings allowing them to decide if the findings would transfer to other 
populations.  
Dependability 
Dependability should answer the question of whether an auditor or researcher 
would be able to review, understand my produced codes and themes and procedures 
directly, and thus find similar results of the original study. This tactic of testing reliability 
occurs in the data collection phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp. 34, 38-39). To ensure 
quality control, I developed and documented a formal, presentable database as a chain of 
evidence (Yin, 2014, p. 105). I utilized other strategies, such as feedback acquisition, 
debriefing, and peer-review, to test the quality of the results. I triangulated several data 
resources and asked participants for their feedback about my collected data and themes to 




The fourth tenet of trustworthiness, confirmability ensures I realize I was not 
subjective totally, so biases were bracketed in my field notes and journal and were 
carefully considered during data analysis and reporting of the results. The strategy of 
triangulated reflexive inquiry should affect and inform my study findings. For example, 
in the self-reflexivity, I should be aware of issues, such as how did my background and 
experiences shape my perspectives and data collection and analysis, and what will I do 
with the findings. I should consider the way the participants know and perceive the topic. 
I should be able to retain the voices of participants in the analysis process by included 
direct quotes and excerpts to inform each theme. The potential feedback they could send 
me back regarding my study findings also should be my concern.    
Results 
Eight resulting themes emerged from the data analysis—(a) Cultural attributions 
for diaspora political engagement, (b) low level of loyalty, (c) effect of Egyptian 
domestic concerns on diaspora’s engagement, (d) diaspora relationships, (f) individuals 
and groups involve politically and organizationally, (g) Egyptian causes the diaspora 
individuals involve in, (h) different lobbying types, and, (i) evaluating the political 
performance. Themes Number 1, 2, 4, and 8 have subthemes as that was shown in Table 
2. Participants’ responses and noticed natural reactions informed the emergence and 
development of the themes, which I supported them with the most important quotations 
from the data to illustrate the possible results and assure their validity. I organized the 
results by themes, not by the interview questions. The themes numbered from 1- 4 are 
189 
 
related to the Research Question 1, and they are classified under the category factorial 
background of the political engagement. I sorted the rest of the themes under category 
style and evaluation based on the Research Question 2. I provided the answers to the 
research and interviews questions in the summary. 
Theme 1: Cultural Attributions for Diaspora Political Engagement  
This theme and its five subthemes presented the obvious effect of the diaspora’s 
cultural characteristics on the Egyptian diaspora’s development and political engagement. 
All participants expressed their belief that the original Egyptian dominant culture is the 
most persuasive rationale behind the typical passive characteristic of institutionalization, 
and organizational development thus resulting in low degree of political engagement of 
their diaspora. That authentic national culture is the collective attribution category that 
includes other cultural characteristics such as the lack of organizational purpose and 
unity, affecting Egyptians inside and outside Egypt.  
That overarching theme is associated with the current problem of the lack of 
political activity of Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. However, the difference 
between the participants’ general beliefs appears regarding the reasons for that typical 
cultural characteristic of being passive and where these reasons take place. The following 
statements, themes, subthemes detailed this attribution and the related noticed 





Theme 1: Cultural attributions for diaspora low political engagement 
Figure 2. Links between Theme 1 and its five subthemes. 
Subtheme 1: Typical passive engagement of the diaspora is attributed to its 
national solo culture. This subtheme indicates that Egyptian political culture of the 
diaspora individuals could be classified into two major sections; internal that is related to 
their growing, dwelling, and coming from a home country, Egypt, and external that is 
related to their living in a host state, the United States. Two participants denied this 
feature. DD thought, “We are not relay passive. We are learning.” In contrast, MM 
concluded this opinion by saying, “We are not active at home, therefore we are passive 
abroad, and no matter how can be the atmosphere helpful in this capital city.” In details, 
MK described how Egyptians abroad are culturally passive based on national Egyptian 




Subtheme 2: Diaspora 
typically acts as 
temporrary waves 
Subtheme 3: Unorganized and 
uncooperative diaspora.




long history of disappointment and despair as related to the possibility of real political 
change.” AW opined, “We did not use to participate in united organized efforts.” He 
further summarized his opinion saying, “When it comes to politics, it is a individualistic 
home culture.” AH expressed a similar sentiment when he explained, “Yes, we are 
passive most of the time in Washington, DC, but you can not blame us. Egyptians worry 
about getting back Egypt because that could make safety problem not just for us but also 
for families who live there. So, we keep shut up here!”  
Several participants overwhelmingly reported that also there is no fast interact 
with Egyptian events because of the conventional traditional political education and the 
priority of living safely. AG detailed this type of education and culture. He said, “Yes, 
because we came from authoritarian or dictatorship countries where people used to have 
no voice to share. Egyptian generations after the military coup and socialism wave were 
educated to consider the president as the nation father whom they should obey because he 
knows better and protects his kids.”  
Talking about living and assimilating with host country culture, participants 
agreed on several attributions. DD thought that Egyptians could better upwardly 
assimilate into the American society. They try to take the best of the dominant American 
culture but also remain attached to their own unique cultural practices. DD did not go 
forward to detail that practices and how they could affect the diaspora integration into the 
new political climate. 
AG believed that the problem of the low level of political engagement was not the 
Washington, DC system. He said, “I see that recent immigrants who still do not 
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understand intricacies of the new society of their immigration and settlement are the real 
problem. I wonder why other diasporas were able to take advantage of Washington, DC 
prevalent mood and raise their voice to be heard!” SG explained, “Perhaps we have no 
enough experience.” AG revealed, “They are politically passive, I mean Egyptians here, 
also by and largely preoccupied with making a living and improving their living 
conditions and achieving their personal immigration goals. Maybe living responsibilities 
have priority over political responsibilities.” SH believed, “Egyptians dwelling in 
Washington, DC longer than others are assimilated with the system however, they do not 
use it very well for their causes.” 
Subtheme 2: The diaspora acts typically as temporary reacting waves. In 
Interview Question 22, I requested participants to explain for; based totally on their belief 
on their passive political lifestyle, why and how long did the 2011 revolution feature as a 
factor for advantageous modifications of their role? Did they return to be passive again 
after the revolution? Why that occurred? 
When I asked DD does the diaspora act and react politically as a wave's shape and 
not as a straight line, he said, “Yes, to some extent.” MH illustrated an essential factor 
while he said, “We do no longer participate in politics in the United States due to the fact, 
absolutely, we do not participate in Egypt, and vice versa.” Therefore, participant SH 
attested that the surprising 2011 revolution was like a wake-up call for that diaspora in 
particular. The community in Washington, DC became aware of the need for being 
active, united, and organized.  
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AG asserted, “Yes yes... the so-called revolution of 2011 was a dream cut short. It 
did inspire some serious members of the community and provided hope for positive 
change.” Along the same lines of revolution short positive effect, XY said, “Short-lived 
hope soon crashed on. Maybe because it was not prepared or organized well.” SH gave a 
different explanation by saying that disappointment was because of the reality that since 
1952, Egypt became a military-security state that was able, unfortunately, to absorbing 
the revolution impact.” MK and other participants emotionally agreed that the 2011 
revolution did not last long because of the feeling of defeat by Muslim Brotherhood and 
military throw many of Egyptians back.  
SH concluded that at that time, Egyptians created a new term that is the deep state 
referring to all old powers that seemed to have vanished, but they came back again to the 
scene to revenge on the revolutionary parties and resumed the former security state of 
Mubarak. As a result, Egyptians, including the diaspora members, returned to their old 
passive culture. XY articulated that the diaspora was not far from all of those events and 
what happened to revolutionaries; it happened precisely to us here. He said, “We became 
careless, busy, or divided again as the day before January 25, 2011.” These sentiments 
and emerged themes revealed that passive characteristic, and they showed that there were 
external factors that might functionally join that national culture leading to the diaspora 
failing inside and outside. 
Subtheme 3: Pharaonic culture leads to unorganized and uncooperative 
diaspora. Along with the cultural attribution of being politically passive, several 
participants added more reasons that should clarify that the diaspora is not 
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organizationally united and cooperative. Participants also explained why the diaspora did 
not stay active after the revolution. Ten participants believed that establishing active 
organizations and having internal cooperation is not a high priority for some of the 
diaspora members.  
Participant AW said, “As I told you, our solo culture, you know, made us have no 
intention for collective work, no respect to roles. So, everyone wants to be the boss who 
has his own agenda.” SH added, “The leaders usually have personal business that has 
nothing to do with the group or organization mission-no trust in our leadership so that 
there is no single leader we should work under him only. So, there is no unification for 
now.” MM rephrased that saying and said, “We do not adopt and push for maintaining a 
primary or clear, single, known agenda for the organization.” AW provided an emotional 
example. He said, “The last leader of AEA went to Aljazeera channel talking about 
Elsisi. We might share his opposition opinion on Elsisi but he was speaking there for 
personal purpose, maybe money. We did not permit him to represent AEA.” AW 
mentioned other reasons for the insufficient organizational unity.” He said, “We are all 
busy with daily life; we do not hate each other. We do not love each other too.” 
Subtheme 4: The effect of small size on diaspora’s political engagement. This 
theme explored the impact of the Egyptian immigrants’ immigration decision, and the 
United States immigration policy on the diaspora size, and whether the diaspora invests 
in it to improve its influence. All participants agreed on the impact of those two elements 
on the size; however, three participants came up with an unexpected observation that 
might present discrepancy in the results. They explained: we are not really a small size! 
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We should take advantage of our size and maximize it. Simply, our official number is 
unknown. SH said, “No adequate information about the percentage of Egyptians in 
Washington, DC and the United States in general because we do not register our names in 
the embassy because we do not trust the official agencies.”  
The small size of the community could be attributed to other cultural reasons. AG 
mentioned, “Traditionally, Egyptians throughout their history have been more bound to 
Egypt soil and roots because they are an agricultural country. They do not immigrate 
largely in contrast to other nations. SH added to this explanation and said, “The problem 
of knowing the exact size of the community is not just about the residents in DC because 
that size is not stable.” According to TF, “For those Egyptians living in America or the 
DC area in particular, the frequency of their travel back to Egypt is an indication of their 
reluctance to be away from the motherland for any extended period. Therefore, the size is 
unknown, unstable, and small.” 
 AG added, “Do not forget geography. Washington is far away, and they would 
prefer to travel to Europe or the Arabian Gulf countries for closeness.” Similarly, TF 
conveyed “Larger numbers of Egyptians head to other Arab countries to work where the 
culture and language are more familiar. These places are closer to home and family.” 
When I asked about that trend, participant MK explained, “Egyptian immigration is a 
relatively recent trend in Egypt, started in the late sixties with accelerating pace until 
now, unlike Lebanese, for instance, which launched their immigration in the late 19th 
century.” TF admitted: Most Egyptians in America would rather have it both ways. They 
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want to get the green and citizenship but they also want to be able to split their residence 
between the United States and Egypt.     
There is another causation explains the diaspora small size phenomena and belief 
system that might affect its human actions or not. U.S. Embassy’s immigration policy, 
including visa restrictions, is a factor. MK revealed, “Also Americans make it very 
difficult for Egyptians to obtain the status. Cairo embassy always has a negative and 
aggressive attitude towards youths.” AW added a different side of the situation. He said, 
“Let us say that some of us were able to have any kind of visa, the problem is still us! Not 
everyone can afford expensive living in America while, as I told you before, those lucky 
newcomers get no help from residencies. Participant XY claimed that “Ethiopian 
community has more people, and they support each other.”  
MK explained further, “Unlike the Lebanese and Syrians who ventured out to 
other countries, the Egyptian people have historically been less inclined to immigrate.” 
DD explained, “Egyptians are immobile due to the Nile culture that promotes settlement 
and stability.” A former leader of AEA, participant MK said, “The level of the Egyptian 
diaspora organization is below average in contrast with the successful Jewish diaspora 
despite that both are relatively small.” SH concluded, “The small size was not the only 
factor because diasporas are not equal in investing in their size, and thus, it does not 
matter if they are small or big.” XY asserted the same idea and added, “This is what the 
Egyptian community is in Washington, DC and it should use that relatively small size.” 
Subtheme 5: Mistrust between diaspora and Egyptian officials. The previous 
theme mentioned that the mistrust between the Egyptian embassy and diaspora members 
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had pushed both of them away from building mutual organizational efforts between each 
other. This situation can be an example of the theme of negative perception and mistrust 
in Egyptian politicians and government in large. When I asked MK about this hypothesis, 
he responded firmly, “Yes, to a considerable extent.”  
According to multiple participants and my field notes, low level of political 
participation of Egyptian diaspora could be attributed to that typical characteristic of 
Egyptians. Egyptian politics and government as well as Egyptian organizations and 
leaders and their performance in Washington, DC refrain the Egyptian diaspora from 
political engagement such as establishing or joining the diaspora. SH implied a cultural 
attribution; he said, “Our community leaders, if any, mix personal issues with 
organizations’ agenda and activities-It is the culture of people who came in the near past. 
I think that distrust should harm our efforts of organizing ourselves.” AW indicated other 
several reasons. He said, “Blame Egyptians in general; we don’t respect roles because we 
have the usual dough or maybe many of us are such ignorant.” XY explained, “Before the 
revolution, we used to avoid the embassy or consulate because we have a deep mistrust in 
the Egyptian government agencies.” An embassy official told me, “That attitude hinders 
the embassy’s role and cooperation with the community. You can see that during the 
visiting army recruiting committee.” 
AW deeply explained this observation: “Regardless of our actual number or what 
you call it a size, they [diaspora members] simply do not want to talk with each other and 
the embassy.” XY explained, “They consider family is more important and have mistrust 
in their government; we do not want to provide the embassy with our real addresses 
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because that should harm families who still live in Egypt.” SH added, “I think the 
embassy spies us here. All dictatorship states are like that, not just Egypt.” In contrast to 
that general stream of participants, One Muslim female participant was such as an 
exception. She proudly said,” Yes. But Elsisi is an honest example that we trust.” 
Theme 2: Low Level of Loyalty  
  Subtheme 1: No adequate help for new immigrants. Those professional 
individuals who have connections in the political and social realm of Washington DC 
should be able to support their new peers; however, MK determined this capability as 
“Great level of loyalty but weak practice.” MM had the same observation: “No fast or 
continues help for newcomers. However, we send money and try to help with the local 
problems in Egypt for just good reason.” AW said, “Because they are busy with personal 
life concerns, they might have no time or even interest in frequent meetings and 
cooperating with others.” This finding might give an example of the lack of cooperation 
and a minimum level of loyalty to the home country that all should produce weak 
development and influence of the diaspora.  
That is in general, however, as some participants reminded me that there was a 
little exception on that negative image. AW asserted, "Christian Egyptians still; Church 
helps only Copts sometimes.” SH explained that particular good picture could be such a 
reaction. I mean Copts want to be different, or maybe they react as a weak minority that 
wants to gather to be reliable. XY gave the same opinion but added another dimension, 
“This minority invest positively in their small size similarly to Jewish and Ethiopian 
diasporas reacting to what they think is discrimination or isolation against them inside 
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Egypt.” However, FF told me, “Mr. XYZ, who is Christian man ordered his children to 
avoid talking in Arabic with their new Muslim-Egyptian next door and any Egyptian! We 
do not know his rationale. Bizarre!” Two diaspora members provided some detailed and 
unique answers when they mentioned the comparison between the Egyptian and Chinese 
diasporas. They believed that China invests in the diaspora as a political tool, and the 
Chinese diaspora supports the new immigrants in systematic and planned ways. Some 
answers merit exploration in the interpretation and implications sections of Chapter 5. 
Subtheme 2: Insufficient organizational unity and problematic leadership. As 
I mentioned before, insufficient support for new immigrants is an example of the lack of 
cooperation and organization but that is just one aspect of insufficient organizational 
unity. When it comes to comparing Jewish, Ethiopian, and Egyptian diasporas regarding 
their cooperation and organization style, AG said, “The comparison is not valid. The 
Jews came here as a persecuted minority from Europe. They were more motivated to 
invest in their small group and excel.” SH added, “Jewish people had no other choice 
other than success. They had had a teamwork spirit. In contrast, that is not the case of the 
Egyptian minority. Egyptian success stories in America are such individual.”  
TF conveyed, “In tribal and family settings, Egyptians followed directions got 
from the patriarchal leaders. Rarely did they follow organized initiatives.” MK provided a 
more profound explanation when said, “First generations came carrying their baggage. 
They do not have the teamwork spirit, they lack deep-seated democratic concepts, and 
they are trapped within the box they grew up in. All is about culture, here and there.” 
Participant SH mentioned the need for national professional and credible leadership 
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inside and outside Egypt working with the members for one national cause under the 
united organization.   
Several participants assured this meaning repeatedly: It is a one-man-show 
culture; everyone wants to be the boss and working for his or her agenda. They reminded 
me of the several clashes that occurred in front of the White House during the revolution. 
A group of demonstrators pushed other people away from the spot just because the latter 
wanted to demonstrate showing a different claim regarding the revolution. MM said, “Sir, 
it is in our blood precisely as the typical role of any leader inside Egypt itself; we are 
Pharaoh.” Meanwhile, participant MK attributed the competition and lack of gathering 
organization of the diaspora members to “ they are severely divided into political “tribes” 
covering a wide range no sense of and against Egyptian nationality, so people resort to 
their political tribes instead; thus, they lose the national framework and goal.” 
For another example, one of the participants, AW assured, “We need an outside 
leader who can cooperate with inside-people. I asked our community to announce me as a 
presidential candidate against MB, the military ruling council-SCAF- in 2011, and Elsisi 
in 2014 during both revolutions. No one listened to me!” Many participants said 
something similar to participant GH, who was a member of AEA. He said, “All 
organizations are fragile and fake. Our organizations are such empty frames and full of 
internal personal conflict.” Therefore, SH gave an example saying, “A congressman of a 
district in Virginia told me if you guys tell us what u all want, we will come to be with 
you.” When I asked DD whether the small size of the community could be a positive 
characteristic that the Egyptian diaspora might invest in it, he said, “Yes if they get 
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organized.” SH assured that potential bad feature could turn to be good if the diaspora 
understand our other positive elements. 
Theme 3: The Effect of Egyptian Domestic Concerns on Diaspora in DC.     
I asked my participants to explain how could the tension of political concerns in 
Egypt cause sharp divisions among the diaspora. The participants’ responses and 
reactions were unexpected and very different from each other. Their responses focused 
on the political and religious fragmentation in the country and among the diaspora 
members. Regarding this concern, one or two participants denied any division among 
Egyptians inside Egypt. A female participant who used to have positive reactions and 
show support to the current rule in Egypt, stated, “Its a temporary man-made crisis.”  
Another group of the participants thought that there was political powers 
polarization inside the country before the revolution and became severer during and after 
it; however, that situation had no reflection on the diaspora members. That is because 
Egyptians do not know each other in host countries! I noticed that they brought their 
culture aspects to the host country, but they did not say whether they brought their home's 
conflicts to the host state or not.  
Third groups of participants thought that Egyptians came to Washington, DC 
carrying their original beliefs. TF said, “They have the same thoughts anywhere.” AG 
articulated: Most Egyptians retain a mindset even after an extended stay in their new 
society. Therefore, diaspora members are rare to be affected by U.S. culture except for 
persons who born here.” MK provided two illustrating examples. He said, “This mindset 
is clear in the Egyptians religious orthodoxy as opposed to reform, and it is also clear in 
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their views of the Jews and the Israeli-Arab conflict. The outcome of this input is that all 
such factors plus people preoccupation with socioeconomic conditions affect their 
willingness to immerse in the American melting pot.” SH mentioned “the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is still in our heart and mind; however, we are not in the 1960s now. I mean it is 
not the priority on our agenda, and it does not reflect negatively on our diaspora.” 
Theme 4: Diaspora’s Relationships 
Subtheme 1: Contrastive relation between the home-hose states relationships 
and diaspora’s of influence. This theme describes the relation between the better 
relationship between the present Egyptian and American governments and the diaspora 
role and its chance of performing. Participant SH believed that relation is a contrastive 
relation. He said, “The working relationship between both governments should lead to the 
unfortunate situation of some diasporas, especially the Egyptian one.” Another 
participant specified that connection. MH said, “The current relationship hurts some 
active groups.” MK reminded me when said, “generally, most acting and successful 
diaspora institution in political mobilization are mosques and churches. Therefore, I think 
they are the most active component of that diaspora who should be worried.”  
AG explained further, “Very few Egyptians care about the nature of the Trump-
Sisi relationship and how it affects them. They care and afraid because that Elsisi and 
Trump have chemistry. That should give more protection to Elsisi and Israel.” I was 
surprised by this claimed similarity between Israel and Elsisi or Egypt and did not hear 
the same from other participants. TF reiterated participant AG’s sentiment and clarified, 
“That new official relationship between both governments affects the active portion of 
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our diaspora…you know! Like the Muslim Brotherhood are weaker now. They cannot 
talk with Trump’s administration as before 2017.” He added a separate statement: Those 
fear Trump may succeed in designating their group as a terrorist organization. I predict 
that Trump will be reelected.  
On the side of Copts, the effect was not harmful as it is for some Muslim groups. 
MN advised me to not to worry about Copts; they are happy, but still, there are negative 
results in the future on Egyptians in Egypt and the United States in general. AW 
summarized this theme: Egyptians, including many of the diaspora members, are not 
happy for that chemistry; all depends on who you are. I mean…whom you belong to at a 
particular time and place. The participant who has affiliation with the Muslim 
Brotherhood stated, “Of course, because it [the present governments relationship] 
justifies oppression and violation of our human rights.” 
Subtheme 2: The low effect of the relationship between diaspora and 
Washington, DC decision maker on the diaspora role. Unexpectedly, seven 
participants only who believed that lack of the relationship between the diaspora and the 
United States decision makers had a role to play when it comes to improving the 
establishment and activities of the diaspora. Participant SH elaborated this unexpected 
finding. He stated, “This communication between us and Washington, DC people does 
not affect diaspora engagement, not because America does not welcome or consider 
diaspora, it does, but because of the diaspora itself does not establish relationships with 
Washington people on a systematic base; thus no effect of that relationship and diaspora. 
One of those seven individuals was the Muslim Brotherhood representative in this study; 
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DD stated, “Some do [have relationships] in different degrees, and it can help the 
diaspora promote the American values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 
inside Egypt.” 
In contrast, AH said, “No effect because they [diaspora members] do not really 
interact except few educated individuals, but unfortunately, we don’t take advantage of 
the chance to work.” Moreover, DT denied the relationships themselves. He said, “no 
relationship or somewhat. Because they [diaspora members] have no specific stand or 
clear collective agenda, so Washington, DC does not know whom to talk to or support.” 
Participant SH agreed to TD’s inclusion and said “we left the playground to Islamists and 
maybe Copts since Obama’s time. President Donald Trump’s time is our chance.” 
As GS explicated this situation by saying, “Egyptians live in Washington, DC are 
few, and who wanted to approach Washington, DC decision makers are fewer.” MM 
uncovered, “that is because they choose to live in the suburbs to be close to larger 
common shopping areas. How they could build any relationship with the Washington, 
DC center?” When I exposed this example to the next participant, participant SH assured 
that it could not be an excuse! How about who lives in Washington, DC itself? He 
thought that could be not enough attribution. The reasons should be more profound than 
the living choice and more general. He referred that their social and economic life 
responsibilities keep active and none active members away from immersing in American 
political life of Washington, DC AW added, “no specific political activity. No lobby or 
weight to be considered by the decision makers."  
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The following themes 5-8 are based on the answers to the second and last research 
question regarding the engagement style and aspects.” 
Theme 5: Individuals and Groups Involve Politically and Organizationally  
Several participants believed that engaging in political activities and working for 
Egypt’s interests in Washington, DC would depend on the individuals. DT said, 
“Religious individuals and institutes are most active if called by their clergy. I am not 
sure whether first or new generations are more productive; however, newer generations 
are much involving in American life, of course, including political aspects. In details, 
AW said, “as I told you before, Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized and active 
component; therefore, they demonstrate in different events. However, they are not like 
before two or four years ago. Immigrants are also active.”  
Other participants focused on the difference between generations instead of 
groups or individuals. AG said, “First generation Egyptians come carrying their baggage. 
Culturally, they lack deep-seated democratic concepts.” So that, as MM added, “the 
potential impact on U.S. policy comes from the second and third generations, but they are 
too recent and small to political activism” Participant GS warned me saying, “new 
generations, if they participated in political realm, they are about American policies more 
than Egyptian, no wonder my friend!” SM is a school founder and principal and very 
active. She emotionally complained, “Unfortunately, there are very few of us, and that 
makes it a hefty load. I am so tired of being the only woman in gathering or 
demonstrations or political meetings!” 
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Theme 6: Egyptian Causes the Individuals Involve in Trying to Persuade the U.S. 
Government. 
The participants did not say much in this matter, and their comments were about 
three issues: -(a) facilitating the emigration process, (b) the presidential elections, and (c) 
Egypt-America political relationships. None of the participants mentioned any foreign 
policy issue, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. AG and DD believed that U.S.-
Egyptian relations and good Egyptian governance are two top issues of interest. MM 
reiterated participant AG’s sentiment. He said, “Both of these issues are important to the 
country stability, and we should support it.” But he also assured that human rights for all 
Egyptians including Copts are the priority. Another one mentioned to the Muslim 
brotherhood situation with this matter; TF said, “The good governance and establishing 
democracy in Egypt, in particular, is of interest to supporters of that group living in 
Washington, DC.” In contrast to TF’s view, DD talked differently about his group, 
Muslim Brotherhood. He said, “Christians lobby work hard for their sectarian agenda but 
many Muslims lobby struggle to see the American values practiced in Egypt.” 
Theme 7: Different Lobbying Types to Promote Egypt’s Interests 
Related to the previous one, this theme shows examples of issues and activities of 
the Egyptian activists. A very active participant conceded that there is a small lobbying 
effort by the Egyptian community; however, lobbying is not only on maintaining 
democracy and wise governance or against the Egyptian regime. GH said, “Our lobbying 
agenda includes such as an economic and business promotion group.” AG told me not to 
forget that there was an Egyptian government-supporting lobby during the era of 
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Mubarak. He added that “Most of the lobbying effort is government inspired or funded 
and it aims at supporting the regime in power at any moment.” MM added, “most of 
those lobbying efforts is laughable such as the case during a visit to Washington by the 
Egyptian president. The embassy rented a mobile screen advertising his achievements. 
Muslim Brotherhood has their lobby too.” Participant SH reminded me: in 2014 when 
Elsisi came for the first time, the president supporters and opposers had demonstrated and 
begun as only two groups in streets, and American local police separated them. We were 
monitoring who had the biggest number of demonstrators.  
Regarding the Islamic groups’ lobbying activities, DD said, “The lobby of the 
Brotherhood was very active during Obama’s time and cooperating with other Islamic 
organizations. DT agreed with this opinion and illustrated further, “Muslim Brotherhood 
runs the headquarter of CAIR [a Muslim charity organization] in Washington, DC. They 
cooperate with democrat politicians in DC. The politicians in DC know that CAIR 
members are active in DC.” MH believed that this Islamic organization for charity have 
been sending donations to the Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist Islamic groups in 
the Middle East regularly. SH added: Now, Trump announced them a terrorist 
organization. I do not know what they do now; however, they still act individually. MH 
said, “Hopefully we will have an Egyptian AIPAC. There are UAE and Saudi lobbies, 
but they are official.” SW, a female participant with a positive attitude along the whole 




Theme 8: Evaluating the Political Performance  
This theme evaluated the actions of Egyptian diaspora in general based on the 
participants’ answers and previous themes that were about assessing specific activities of 
the diaspora. There were two subthemes to this general theme providing concrete 
examples on the diaspora political engagement. Several participants assessed the current 
performance of the Egyptian diaspora as low or nothing. Participant SH articulated, “It is 
far below average…its bad…period.” However, SH believed, “Maybe we underestimate 
our political power and participation.”  
Some participants attributed this status to several negative reasons. AW said, 
“They do not want to be active, and if they do, everyone wants to be the boss with no 
objection.” SH though, “Leadership issues should harm the organization unity from the 
top and that should hinder the collective community work. UV added, “As for lobbying, 
Egyptian Americans are not active at all because they are used to be politically 
irrelevant.” When I asked FF how about the future, she specified, “Changes may emerge 
in third and fourth generations.” 
Subtheme 1: The revolutions reveal the inconsistency of the diaspora political 
behavior. During the 2011 revolution, obtaining new democratic nonmilitary governance 
was the principal motive for Egyptians inside Egypt. Diaspora in DC had been backing 
up the revolutionaries’ demand. SH proudly said, “Muslims, Christians, men and women, 
and even kids had the same motivation and demand; we all were Egyptian only.” Another 
participant, KS, revealed, “Right after the success of the revolution, many Egyptians who 
lived in DC for long years, had decided to go back home.” HA said, “Why not? Mubarak 
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and his spies had gone. It is safe now.” None of the participants provided me with the 
actual reason for acting during the revolution in the first place. The participants did not 
mention to their conflict with the previous regime or any disturbance or challenge to their 
common interest. All of them spoke about general issues. For example, DD said, “They 
love to see Egypt as free and just as America. The Arab Spring unified and made us more 
conscious.” I found that could be a discrepancy between this finding and the conflict 
theory. However, participants explained why they became politically passive again after 
the revolution 
What happened afterward was very different according to all participants. XY 
regretfully said, “We all came back to the first square, same same!” That is because, as 
AG said, “Most of Egyptians react and rarely take a significant initiative.” I asked a 
different participant whether she agreed on that observation, she said, “Our backing up 
for the revolution was such reaction.” Thirteen participants out of 16 expressed the same 
collective belief that was expected, but SG, optimistically said, “Egyptians in 
Washington, DC generally, are successful in many fields and slowly participating in 
politics.” However, KF added, “In contrast to the 2011 revolution, the 2013 revolution 
(or coup) retrieved polarization between Egyptians in Egypt. I think that had reflected on 
us in Washington, DC.” KF assured that “the diaspora members’ reactive political 
behavior was between passive and active but not very cooperative as before.”   
Subtheme 2: Political role of mosques and churches in Washington, DC. It 
was mentioned, conservative Muslim groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and 
many Christian groups, are active more than other diaspora members. Most of the 
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participants believed that the most successful diaspora institution in political mobilization 
is the religious institutes and groups. So, they care about the relationship between Egypt 
and the U.S. governments more than other activists.  
There was no agreement among participants, including the secular participants, on 
the nature of religious institutions’ political role. Most of them said that this role is 
harmful to both countries; however, participants did not equate the mosques' role to the 
church’s role. AW believed, “The effect of the sectors role depends on what is the 
interests’ sort! And who you are. When the active church urges its Christian believers to 
gather to welcome Elsisi in DC that gives him some necessary support; however, DC 
knows that is fake.” SH added, “This role does not harm the state’s interests but might be 
not what our diaspora wants.”  
However, there is a paradox in the Coptic groups situation as TF implied. He said, 
“They support the agenda of the Egyptian governments in Washington, DC, but they also 
lobby claiming unfair governmental treatment. They used to have fair hearings in the 
Capitol.” Therefore, as AE added, “The U.S. government widely suspects any role by the 
church. Some in Congress; however, echo the Egyptian Church in expressing those 
claimed grievances.” AE asserted that Trump’s administration has been raising those 
grievances with the Egyptian government; but the church role in promoting Egyptian 
interest remains limited for those grievances. AW saw this matter differently assuring 
that the U.S. government watches the church, but it does not bother it as it does for 
mosques. FF said, “They have a better situation here than their situation in Egypt.” 
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No agreement between participants, including the secular participants, on the 
religious institutions’ political role. Their opinions range from “no role” to “it is a bad 
role.” Thus, the clergies should be stopped and limited to their original religious role. 
MK’s opinion was extreme and did not make any difference between the mosque and the 
Egyptian church. He said, “Mosques and churches are extraordinarily orthodox and anti-
modernity, therefore I find their roles in mobilizing Egyptians politically poisonous.” The 
observations of AG supported my hypothesis that Mosques are suspect of hosting 
radicals. He said, “They are infiltrated by FBI agents and informers. Both the Egyptian 
and U.S. governments suspect them. Therefore their role remains minimal.“  
In contrast, one or two participants only thought that mosques in Washington, DC 
have no political role, but the church had an active part all the time supporting Elsisi’s 
agenda. One participant only who called for the role of the mosques and churches; DD 
added, “there is no dialogue between Christians and Muslims of Egyptian origin, and 
there is a need to develop a national agenda that is good for all of us. I tried many times 
but did not achieve positive results.” 
As a result, several participants agreed that there should be an affirmative 
separation between religion and the state. The former leader of AEA, MK asserted, 
“There should be no role for mosques and churches in promoting political interest. Such 
separation doesn’t exist, however, but the role played by these religious institutions is 
limited anyway in America.” Therefore, as SH reminded me: President Sadat said during 
the Muslim-Christian clash in 1981, that no religion in politics…no politics in religion.” 
Consequently, he asserted to me that America-Trump should know and apply this golden 
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role, which Obama and Carter did not consider, and we pay the price now. Listen, Imams 
and Moncks should lead prayers only.” 
Summary   
The principal conclusion from the findings of this study is that the theme of home 
culture explained the Egyptian diaspora typical passive political engagement. There are 
several positive characteristics of the diaspora as well as positive elements in the host 
country culture and system, such as living in the tolerant political climate of Washington, 
DC close to the decision-makers. However, the diaspora members did not take enough 
advantage on those elements because of the negative effect of the political home culture 
characteristics. All participants agreed that the diaspora should continually and actively 
contribute to the Egyptian interests in Washington, DC through socioeconomic and 
political discourse, family relations, and networks; however, the practice is different. 
Participants underlined several cultural characteristics in conjunction with external 
factors that are hindering their political efforts. 
The members, especially the older generation, preserved that domain culture and 
its several aspects, despite their claim of long-living and total assimilation in the open 
climate of Washington, DC. It seems that climate factor and high level of education and 
carrier did not result in a high level of political engagement because of the opposite effect 
of other factors. The cultural aspects are such as the busy personal life schedules, 
insufficient help to new immigrants, lack of adequate organizational unity or cooperation, 
competitive internal relationships, fear of Egyptian political and security authorities, and 
lack of political ties with Washington, DC. 
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All participants agreed that the external factor of the revolution was the greatest 
motivation for acting for all Egyptians, including the diaspora in recent time. This finding 
might confirm my hypothesis that the Egyptian diaspora acts when it has a compelling 
and exceptional motivation such as the revolution. However, it remained unclear why and 
how, if they are culturally passive, such a factor (i.e., revolution) changed their behavior 
temporarily, or whether it was the change in the culture itself.  
All participants provided enough information regarding their political concerns 
and reasons for acting politically such as establishing a new democratic rule in Egypt or 
economic support for Egyptians. However, none of them talked about their mechanism of 
building and utilizing the desired lobby working on those concerns. For example, 
participants did not mention reaching out to think tanks, or knocking on the door of 
Washington, DC agencies. 
The diaspora does not act as a whole. Engaging in political activities would 
depend on individuals and specific groups. All participants agreed that Christians lobby 
for their sectarian agenda and many Muslims lobby actively more than others. 
Participants used the term individuals and similar terms frequently. For example, 
participants stated, “Initiatives normally take the form of small demonstration…it 
depends on the individual.” and “Egyptian diaspora members’ success stories are 
individual.” There were fewer female participants than male participants. The female 
participants spoke and participated less in my interviews. This note can be a small 
indicator of the low level of their participation and interest in large.  
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The Egyptian diaspora has difficulty maintaining and investing in political 
relationships as well as obtaining their noncompetitive internal relationships. 
Participants’ answers could imply that establishing active organizations and having 
internal cooperative relationships serving one national agenda was not a high priority for 
some of the diaspora members. Some participants admitted that there is national political 
polarization that they had brought to their host country. However, none of their responses 
were clear enough about the influence of that polarization, if any, on the diaspora 
interrelationships and political activities in Washington, DC.  
In Chapter 5, I will analyze and interpret the findings in the context of the 
theoretical framework. I then will present the implications of the research study’s 
findings for positive social change at the appropriate level and provided my study 
recommendations for future researchers in the field. Finally, I will outline the limitations 





Chapter 5 Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore, 
describe, and share information regarding how the Egyptian diaspora and its different 
members and subgroups narrate their political engagement regarding the Egyptian 
interests in Washington, DC before, during, and after the 2011 revolutions and 2013 
revolution or coup. In this chapter, I present my interpretation of the findings of this 
study focusing on some key themes of the results, such as the effect of home culture on 
the diaspora organizational development and political engagement and the style of its 
involvement.  
In this study, I discovered that the overall perception of the Egyptian diaspora 
community on its contemporary engagement was negative. All participants asserted the 
political engagement of the diaspora is affected negatively by the home culture side-by-
side with a few other factors related to the homeland and host country. Therefore, I 
worked from the premise that exploring the present situation of Egyptian diaspora’s 
political engagement is essential to establish a sustainable diaspora with healthy future 
participation towards building an organized influential lobby in Washington, DC  
The key findings also implied that Egyptian Americans participate in politics in 
Washington, DC not because they are interested in politics in general or American 
politics in particular but because they react to home politics. They do not engage in 
Washington, DC political activity regarding U.S. or Egyptian political affairs because 
they did not learn or use to participate in the Egyptian political realm inside Egypt. 
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In the discussion of the results in this chapter, I further incorporate viewpoints 
from the literature as presented in Chapter 2 that are related to the findings of this study. 
Likewise, the theories of the passive political and social engagement of the Korean 
diaspora, conflict theory of Truman, and the climate theory of Cigler and Loomis (2007) 
were applied to the findings as appropriate. In the following sections, I discuss the 
limitations, recommendations, and implications of the study. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion. 
 Interpretation of the Findings 
The findings of this research revealed a generally negative image of the Egyptian 
diaspora and its contemporary political engagement. The diaspora engagement inclines 
to be passive most of the time and to be active from time to time. Such perception was 
particularly confirmed in the literature review of this study. The majority of Egyptian 
expats abroad have been more focused on gaining an education and career to build their 
economic fortunes (Ashour, 2010). 
I used a theoretical framework that was based on Jang’s (2012, 2014) Korean 
diaspora negative model to explore the adverse factors of the failing enterprise of 
Egyptian Americans’ lack of political engagement. Some participants suggested that the 
comparison with the successful Jewish diaspora might be not valid. Jang’s model 
included factors that mainly addressed how and why the Korean-Americans were not 
very engaging or influential except during intensive times. I applied some of those 
factors from Jang’ (2012, 2014) theory, such as underestimation of the self’s political 
engagement, lack of organization, and negative perception toward politics and 
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organizational leadership. Besides Jang’s theory, my theoretical framework also included 
other theories and diaspora models to address issues that Jang’s theory neglected. 
The findings of this study approved several of my hypotheses from Chapter 1. 
Positive characteristics and external factors are not always enough or capable of imposing 
a positive change or keeping it in the diaspora reality; for instance, the excellent 
education, employment and supportive political and social climate of the host 
country. Cigler and Loomis’s (2007) climate theory indicated that a national, tolerant 
environment should shape the expected proliferation of interest groups and organizations. 
The general norm of many participants in this study was in line with this theory. 
However, they also believed that the current generation did not understand the climate, so 
they use the system of the host city. AG said, “The problem of the low level of political 
engagement was not the Washington system.” One of the diaspora members’ significant 
problems was the home culture of disorganization and lack of unity among the members 
and groups. That culture has been hindering them from politically investing in the open 
climate of Washington, DC.  
The effect of host climate was not enough to help the diaspora members; 
therefore, they became passive again when they lost the homeland motive to be active 
politically. Several participants asserted that they were assimilated in U.S. society a long 
time ago. However, the diaspora does not remain consistently engaged in the supportive 
U.S. atmosphere despite that claim of assimilation, according to the participants. This 
finding was further vindicated in the literature review of this study, as described by 
Talani (2005) who stated that despite the members of many Egyptian diasporas deciding 
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to become new citizens and assimilate into the Western host countries, they still have 
difficulty being accepted and integrated into the political realm.  
I sought to determine what factors made the diaspora members typically passive 
and not influential most of the time, and I found that those factors are primarily cultural. 
Ashour (2010) stated that the Egyptian diaspora is divided along political, ideological, 
religious, and social class lines. Participant MK described the diaspora members resorting 
to their political “tribes” and covering a wide range of small goals against Egyptian 
nationality and losing the national framework. 
The study findings also showed that the participants’ loyalty to Egypt is high but 
is highest to the culture. All study participants reported that the lack of organizational 
unification is a cultural characteristic. That culture includes several elements, such as 
adopting sectorial agendas instead of recognized national purpose and organizational 
leadership. Previous researchers, such as Cigler and Loomis (2007) and Oswiecimski 
(2014), linked passive engagement to the lack of unified political organizations. Müller-
Funk (2016) found that sharing common situations and believing and working for the 
same causes among the members are essential elements for the diaspora’s proliferation 
and development. 
In general, a diaspora needs to found organizations or lobbies holding a clear 
agenda and reasonable goals to be influential in the political process (Mearsheimer & 
Walt, 2006). However, the results of this study revealed that the situation of the 
contemporary Egyptian diaspora in general and AEA in particular is static and has clear 
polarization. Fourteen participants out of the 16 admitted that the members have ongoing 
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disputes on essential matters, such as leadership, the organization’s agenda, and political 
orientation. 
Many researchers also asserted the effect of losing an announced, clear 
organizational purpose and goals among the Egyptian diaspora members and groups, in 
particular, and Arab Americans in general. Smith (2000) and Ambrosio (2002) 
contended that organizational unity might enable the diaspora to convince decision-
makers to support its political agenda. Therefore, the diaspora might have a chance to 
shape the foreign policy of the United States (Smith, 2014). These sentiments are backed 
up by a participant’s report. A congressman advised this participant to encourage the 
Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC to announce a single agenda if the diaspora needs 
consideration from Congress. When divisions occur within the diaspora and it loses its 
united voice, it will be harder to gain or keep support outside it for its political cause 
(Uslaner, 2007). 
All participants asserted that building mutual relationships within the political 
structure of Washington, DC in terms of enhancing the diaspora role in both countries 
should be beneficial to the diaspora, Egypt, and the United States. Regarding the effect of 
the different types and levels of diaspora relationships, the response of participants 
ranged from “I do not know,” “no relationship at all,” or “minimal relationship; therefore, 
low effect should be expected.” All participants admitted the lack of trust between 
diaspora members and Egyptian governments, including official agencies, as well as the 
insufficient relationship between diaspora and Washington, DC decision makers. They 
also acknowledged that both levels of relationships are deteriorating at an alarming rate.  
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Some participants specified results of those effective relationships, such as 
imposing human rights statutes in Egypt. According to DeWind and Segura (2014), the 
host land-diaspora relationship should help resolve some conflicts in the motherland. 
Participant DD indicated that unfortunately, there is no dialogue between Christians and 
Muslims of Egyptian origin, and there is a need to develop a national agenda that is good 
for all. 
The study findings determined that it is not true that the Egyptian diaspora never 
has a political agenda that is based on organizational unity. It is also not true that all 
sectors of the diaspora do not foster announced or unannounced agendas. The literature 
explained and asserted the positive changes in the political positions and powers of some 
diasporas after certain significant events, such as revolutions and Arab Spring. As all 
participants asserted, their diaspora exceptionally, had a specific national motive based 
on promising unification between all individuals and different groups during the 
revolution.  
Participants did not mention any home conflict caused by their diaspora 
involvement. As indicated in Chapter 1, the Egyptian diaspora can be similar to Korean 
diaspora regarding the sudden engagement behavior but not similar regarding the reason 
of that engagement. According to Jang (2014), Koreans faced a domestic racial conflict 
that had led to civic unrest in Los Angeles in 1992. That diaspora understood the need 
for being active, united, and organized and, therefore, became aware of coalition 
building. The study participants determined that the Arab Spring revolutions unified and 
made them more conscious politically. Nevertheless, they gave different reasons for their 
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enthusiastic reaction to the revolution; for example, DD mentioned that they love to see 
Egypt as free and just as the United States. The conflict theory of Truman did not align 
with the findings regarding the real reasons for the diaspora involvement in the 
revolution activities. 
 Because of the diaspora’s passive home culture, such as typical insufficient 
organizational unity and waves shape of engagement, it had not been able to keep the 
revolution factor. All participants, including AEA members, also criticized and blamed 
the political powers and circumstances in Egypt for the lack of sufficient organization 
and political engagement. Jang (2014) mentioned the same observation regarding the 
Korean diaspora but did not explain the reason for that waving shape of the diaspora 
political and civic engagement. 
The theoretical framework for this study held that the political engagement of 
some diasporas, such as Korean diaspora, might take the waves shape. Some diaspora 
turn from typically being passive to being active then passive again. The study findings 
approved this major claim of this study regarding the Egyptian diaspora. This 
phenomenon is an echo of the same behavior of the citizens inside the homeland. All 
participants in this study agreed on that phenomenon, but they attributed it to different 
reasons. MPI (2014, 2015) reports agreed with this finding. A significant portion of new 
Egyptian organizations was established during the Arab Spring and Egyptian 
revolutions. Many of those organizations had already grown inactive or disappeared after 
the revolution. Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory clarified that although the domestic racial 
conflict brought attention and awareness to the larger Korean population, Koreans have 
222 
 
continued to be inactive. UV explained this phenomenon by attributing the constant 
passive political engagement of Egyptian lobbying efforts to the fact the Egyptian people 
used to be politically irrelevant.  
Another aspect of the passive engagement and the absence of the culture of 
organizational unity is the difference between the diaspora members, generations, and 
groups regarding who could be active and the level of commitment. The difference 
between involving people should lead to differences between their levels and types of 
their organizational purposes. Diaspora members can also be different regarding their 
lobbying efforts and national goals.  
In details, all participants agreed that the first generation is politically passive. 
They also decided on the future political role of the second and third generations in the 
political realm of Washington, DC. This finding was in line with the theoretical study 
framework that was based on Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory. The first generation of both 
diasporas has this stand that is more intensive than the position of the later generations. 
Therefore, the study participants believed that the second generation who understands 
the politics and culture of both countries could hopefully function as a bridge to 
represent their citizens and diaspora communities. They have hope in the political 
involvement of the younger generations. 
All participants agreed on the role of mistrust and negative perceptions factor that 
exists, in particular, among the members of the first generation. That impact of that role 
is not limited to the diaspora members’ intra-relationship, but it extends to the 
relationship between the diaspora and Egyptian political system and agencies. This 
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finding is consistent with previous concepts revealed in the literature. It is not just 
negative perceptions but also mistrust between Egyptian citizens and their governments 
that affect the citizens as well as diaspora members (Zohry & Debnath, 2010).  
In line with those statements, Jang (2014) found that cynical perceptions and 
distrust toward Korean associations and leadership, who belong to the first generation in 
America is a common trend among Koreans in Washington, DC. It is a common thought 
that those leaders and politicians only work for their won agenda and family businesses. 
As the findings of my study indicated, the first generation of the Egyptian diaspora and 
its leaders have the same situation; therefore, the members refrained from engaging 
similarly to the Korean case.  
The opinion of all participants confirms the prevailing view in the literature 
review regarding the Coptic lobby in the United States. Rowe (2001), and Severo and 
Zuolo (2012) emphasized that the lobby members are very active and more organized 
compared to their Egyptian peers. However, the dispersed Islamic organizations and 
mosques should also be considered in the same category according to the findings.  
Mosques have been found to directly and purposefully influence political engagement 
and perceptions of Arab Muslims (Jang, 2014). 
The opinion of most of the participants that the political role of religious 
institutions and groups is harmful to both countries matches Sheffer’s (2006) assertion. 
This role and nature of some diasporas and groups can be detrimental on the political 
level causing conflicts and terrorism in the home and host lands. This sentiment seems as 
opposite to DeWind and Segura‘s (2014) recommendation; the host land-diaspora 
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relationship should help resolve the conflicts in the motherland. However, I believe that 
both statements are compatible.  
The general implications of participants’ responses indicated that the national 
purpose of a diaspora would be for the benefit of the diaspora and the home country. In 
contrast, one sector of the diaspora with a sectorial agenda is usually working against the 
whole or at least working for selfish demands. As stated by many participants who all 
are Muslims, the Christian community promotes support for their claim of civic and 
religious discrimination and the Egyptian military regime. Most of my study participants 
do not like or at least they do not agree with the Coptic claim and political orientation. 
Same participants except one who belongs to Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly asserted 
that the organization is the most organized and active component of the diaspora in 
Washington, DC. This group works for their won agenda that could be beyond the 
Egyptian national purpose.  
Limitations of the Study 
Even though I applied several procedures to enhance trustworthiness, such as 
members checking and executing multiple data sources, some limitations emerged. One 
limitation of my research occurred during the data collection process was that the level 
of participants’ cooperation and interaction with the study was average. Even though all 
participants were asked to be not in a rush for returning their responses, all except one 
did not respond promptly at all, and some did not respond and ignored my frequent 
contacts. Three candidates were hesitated to answer my questions during the interview. 
Their concern was whether I conduct my research for the Egyptian government and 
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Elsisi, or a U.S. or Egyptian university. They were afraid that I could transfer their 
information and responses to the security agencies. I assume that some others had the 
same thought, although they did not say. To overcome their suspicious of my motive, I 
referred them to the consent form. 
Moreover, two candidates from my study had withdrawn after they have agreed 
on participation. This behavior may imply to their passive political participation 
concurrent with a lack of cooperation with other Egyptians like me. Another potential 
recruit who was an Islamist leader advised me to join in a demonstration was conducted 
by an Islamic group against the Egyptian president and government in front the Capitol 
Hill. He said that I would meet several people who can accept answering my questions 
instead of interviewing him! The last potential recruit did not respond to my several e-
mails or phone calls. 
Despite knowing about the member-checking process and the study duration, 
most participants took a long time to respond to my request of member checking and did 
not offer any valuable feedback or corrections to the transcripts. Perhaps, participants 
answered the questions to the fullest, or they merely browsed their responses. To 
overcome the threat to quality due to my own potential personal bias as an Egyptian 
American political activist, I tried to remain objective throughout the entire study while 
establishing trustworthiness. 
Recommendations 
While reviewing the available literature on diasporas, I did not find any study on 
the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. Also, while collecting my study data, I found 
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there are no Egyptian or U.S. academic surveys, and interviews focusing on the Egyptian 
diaspora viewpoints. Researchers performing similar studies could use this diaspora 
model to explore the barriers and opportunities of other new or small-size diasporas 
situations. According to literature as well as Chapter 4 findings, I found that the political 
performance of the Egyptian diaspora connects functionally to culture and social 
background interpretation of the diaspora members. So, to gain a deeper understanding 
of the political engagement of the diaspora, future scholars could focus on the same 
diaspora and city in areas other than political area such as social and economic. 
Therefore, future researchers will be able to build a new inductive composing for a 
comprehensive model theory on the Egyptian diaspora.  
 The strength of this study is that it is the first; therefore, all the candidates who 
accepted to participate were interested in the topic; therefore, they willingly answered 
the research questions. This involvement indicated that my research was meaningful to 
participants. Their interest might encourage any follow up study to focus on the same 
diaspora and city or other areas in the United States. Hence, the knowledge obtained by 
my study participants would expand. Future research would also provide additional 
information and recommendations for the Egyptian diaspora as well as decision-makers 
of the home and host countries to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of that 
diaspora. Washington, DC should be a good starting point for policy-makers and future 




 In this case study, I based the study implications on the analysis of the subjective 
perceptions and daily real-life experiences of research participants. Though this study 
has limitations, implications for positive social change on different levels emerged for 
policymakers, immigration agencies, and the diaspora itself. Because this study is not a 
practical one, the study purpose was not about providing information from or to leaders, 
members, and beneficiaries about strategies for better work. Instead, the study only 
brought attention to the present status of the Egyptian diaspora and its weaknesses. In 
this way, the members can design better programs and strategies to empower their 
community and promote its agenda. Particularly, this section should bring attention to 
the need for improving better internal relationship the Egyptian diaspora as well as 
cooperation between it and other diasporas, and the home and host lands. 
An organized, active diaspora operating in Washington, DC can be an agent of 
positive social change in both countries. I asked participants how could their groups or 
the whole diaspora obtain any benefit from my study and questions. One of them stated, 
“Highlighting the challenges and the opportunities is always an eye-opener. I hope it 
leads to a serious dialogue among all Egyptians in America to create a democratic Egypt 
where all human rights are protected.” However, the Egyptian diaspora sustainability, 
development, and influence are hindered by many challenges beyond and under its 
control as Chapter 4 findings presented.  
Regarding the potential positive social change on the individual and social levels, 
the knowledge gained from this study could guide changes in the practices of the 
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diaspora, including the leaders of AEA. The foremost step towards a competent diaspora 
and its strong lobby is building personal trust and organizational unity among the group 
members and leaders (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Those leaders must find ways to 
remain sustainable by resolving their conflicts and avoiding their personal agendas to 
reach the desired unity. This is not an easy task, but the diaspora should take advantage 
of the supportive climate of Washington, DC to work on its individualistic cultures 
where individuals strive for self-achievement only. I assume that the diaspora needs to 
build trust with Egyptian citizen and new immigrants via economic contribution and 
legal aids. Formalizing and intertwining that social role with political action might lead 
and speed up social and political change in the homeland and the diaspora reality. The 
Chinese diaspora can be an ideal that the Egyptian diaspora might follow.  
The most active organizations and groups such as Muslim and Coptic 
organizations should be directed towards one national purpose under a single leadership 
of one diaspora. However, that is a tremendous goal needs a lot of personal, 
organizational, and political work. Concerning the religious institutions' political role, I 
would adopt the recommendation of Jang (2012) who considered the religious factor as a 
critical element of organizational type and unity. Therefore, there is a need for studying 
the effect of the civic and political role of religious-background institutions factor on the 
diaspora communities in the host countries, including the United States, particularly, in 
Washington, DC.  
Jang (2014) and my participants emphasized the likelihood of political 
involvement of the following generations. The second generation who understands the 
229 
 
politics and culture of both countries could function as a bridge to represent their citizens 
and diaspora communities. On the other hand, new generations might not have the 
negative traits of the home culture such as negative perceptions mistrust in the homeland 
politicians and diaspora organizations. Hence, there might be a hope in the political 
involvement of the younger generations. Future studies might also focus on the empirical 
implications of that role and why it could have a better chance than the chance of the 
first generation of the diaspora. 
On the organizational and political levels, the whole diaspora, not as groups or 
individuals, needs to create a collaboration with other incipit diasporas. The diaspora 
also needs to seek partnerships with the home and host governments regardless of the 
nature of the existing relationships between the governments. Knowledge of the diaspora 
efforts and challenges could establish opportunities for partnerships between the 
governments and diaspora, thus promoting positive social change. Knowledge of goals 
and plans rendered by the diaspora could add to existing data and assist in the decision-
making processes of organizations and governments. 
Also, the diaspora should be active, involving in the host country' affairs in the 
first place; therefore, it would be accepted and heard in its host environment regarding 
home concerns. Smith (2000) recommended that interests groups, in general, should 
implement deep understanding and deal with the U.S. political system. Groups should 
work to foster political relationships with the decision-makers, no matter whether the 
system could be good or bad according to the groups view. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, 
diasporas should not try to change the political system of America because it would be 
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an unrealistic attempt. On the other hand, the favorable climate and policies of the host 
state should consider diasporas as a definite source for national benefits rather than a 
symbol of weakness for their original countries or threat against their host states.  
The Egyptian diaspora should investigate, on all possible levels, the factors that 
kept it passive again after being active during the revolution. The cultural attribution 
might be not the only factors. The theory of Jang (2012, 2014) and conflict, and climate 
theories did not offer enough updated explanation regarding the study target diaspora. 
Hence, future studies need to seek theories and methods to explore other factors 
explaining that shape of unstable political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and other 
similar diasporas. The diaspora leaders might need to share the results of this study with 
their members. That could be as a mean of exploring ways to build their stability of 
engagement and effective lobby with specific strategies that should enhance and truly 
empower the diaspora. AEA would be ideal for the whole diaspora in this regard.  
Conclusion 
The problem of this study was that there is no existing studies or interests in 
studying the Egyptian diaspora. Given this fact, the contribution of this qualitative study 
is important to the discipline, diaspora, and related parties. The study is not an applied or 
comprehensive study, but it forms a foundation for future studies on the same topic. The 
impact of this qualitative case study is to help the diaspora members in Washington, DC 
understand their current situation issues. The different views of the study participants 




Some facts in the present diaspora predicament would not be changed in the short 
term because they are beyond the diaspora control. Perhaps, political culture and small 
size of the diaspora could take generational time to be enhanced. On the other hand, the 
diaspora can improve other factors. Adopting one national motive can be the backbone 
of the diaspora organizational unity. Chapter 4 findings showed that this factor could 
lead to improving other factors and facts. Besides, the host land-diaspora close 
relationships should provide opportunities for all, thus resulting in positive social change 
on all levels and areas (DeWind & Segura, 2014). Residency in Washington, DC is a 
privilege that is not available for other Egyptian communities and it should facilitate the 
diaspora access to the decision-makers door. However, to reach positive change, any 
diaspora should not involve in relationships as individuals or groups. Individual and 
sectorial relationships and interests could lead to negative changes, especially related to 
the homeland's interests (Sheffer, 2006) and that is like the present situation.  
Given all of these facts, some individuals of the younger generation might be 
interested in sharing and addressing the findings of this study. There is a need to 
encourage the younger generation to become more engaged, not only in the host country 
but also homeland (See Jang, 2012). The Passive culture of the current generation should 
not affect the coming generations whom born and live in the United States. The ultimate 
goal is to maintain the organizational unity by avoiding any potential emergence of new 
religious or sectorial groups and agendas among the new generations. AEA needs to 
accumulate more efforts in this regard to strengthen the collective political weight and 
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Appendix: Interview Questions 
The diaspora term in this questioner is defined as a socio-political entity that maintains 
connections with Egypt and other Egyptian groups beyond the border and mobilizes for 
causes. For the purpose of this interview, be aware that the term diaspora, would mean 
community 
 
A. Describe your Background (Nationality, education, religion, age, profession) 
[Optional]  
1. Why and when did you come to the United States, and DC in particular?  
2. Do you think about going back to or staying in Egypt? Why or why not?  
B. Identify your political identify  
3. What community or political group do you belong to [If applicable]?  
4 What did lead you to change or not change your original identity since you came to 
America?  
5 Who do you admire among the greatest Egyptians of the past and present?  
6 Do you attend any church service or go to any mosque? If so, how often?  
 
Research Quistion1. How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the 
connection of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution, organizational 
and political concerns, relationship between the governments, American 
environment elements, relationship between that diaspora and host country) of 
political engagement, and the internal factors (i.e., small size, negative perception on 
politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization and 
development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC society?   
 
C. The level of assimilation and self-identity of the Egyptian community within the 
American society? 
7. Do children learn Arabic because the parents push it, send them to Egypt, and so on?  
8. Does second generation become Americans and soon forget how to speak Arabic?  
9. What is the level and type of the loyalty the diaspora keeps and shows to Egypt (e.g. 
financial contribution, showing self-identity, lobbying, and helping newly arrivals in 
solving their legal concerns)? 
10. Do Egyptians, including you, believe that they are Arab? What can be a rationale?  
11. How that belief could reflect on the Egyptian Americans identity, and Egyptian 
political interests?  
D. The Egyptian community characteristics and elements  
12. Why could you think that the Egyptian and Arab diasporas are typically passive in 
terms of political activities? 
13. What has kept the Egyptian diaspora unorganized and not cooperative politically?  
14. Despite the huge population in Egypt, why Egyptian diaspora's size is smaller than 
others? Can be individuals’ immigration personal decision and pattern, or U.S. 
immigration policy [e.g. green card] a reason? 
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15 Could the small size be a positive characteristic and thus; the Egyptian diaspora 
should invest in it similarly to the small Jewish Diaspora? Why and how? (Explanation: 
Jewish diaspora as an example; the more it is small, the more it is more focusing and 
stronger)  
16 How could mistrust and negative perception of Egyptian politics and government in 
Egypt and organizations leaders in DC refrain the diaspora from political engagement? 
17 Based on those characteristics, how could you evaluate the performance of diaspora?  
E. External factors you think discourage or motivate the diaspora political 
engagement 
18 How could the Egyptian diaspora possible concerns [e.g. personal, political and 
religious fractions among the diaspora members; and Israelis-Palestinians conflict] affect 
its political activities and engagement?  
19 Does the better relationship between the present Egyptian and American governments 
affect the diaspora negatively? How? 
20 How could political American environment elements, i.e. local politics and politicians, 
foreign policies, and official or public attitude do or do not effect diaspora establishment, 
engagement, and activities?  
21 What do you think about the factor of the relationship between your diaspora and 
decision maker in the host country or city, Washington, DC that can affect the diaspora 
position or role?   
 
Research Question 2. How does the Egyptian community in Washington, 
D.C., act and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian 
concerns such as the presidential revolution and elections?   
 
F. The political engagement style of the Egyptian Diaspora in Washington, DC. 
23 Who involves in the Egyptian concerns more than others [first or new generation, men 
or women, religious or secular persons, or immigrants or citizens...]? 
24 What Egyptian issues [i.e. 1-facilitating the emigration process, the presidential 
elections and constitution, and Egypt-America relationships] make the diaspora (AEA in 
particular, if applicable) attempting to influence the U.S. government?  
G. The Egyptian diaspora’s perspective on its political roles and engagement 
activities in Washington, DC society concerning Egypt issues? 
25 How do you, as a member of AEA or not, perceive the way Egyptians have been 
active in the American political sphere and activities [e.g. voting, financing the political 
campaigns, contacting American official entities, becoming politicians themselves, or 
demonstrating]? 
26 How much the community members lobby to promote Egypt’s interests? 
27. Should Washington, DC area mosques, and Coptic institutions play any political role? 
Is it harmful to the Egyptian state? How could the American government and host 
environment see that role? 
 
